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Abstract 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is a part of an international network 
organization called Hizb al-Tahrir (HT). The organization is commonly portrayed as 
an ―anti-system‖ movement that seeks to overthrow democracy and revives the past 
transnational rule of the khilafah (caliphate). This view is justified by the doctrine of 
HT that promotes a revolutionary strategy of non-participation and envisages a 
political change outside the parliamentary process of democracy. Based on this 
ideology, many see the future of HT in its role of radicalizing Muslims that eventually 
lead to violence.  
This study evaluates the consistency of HTI in following its revolutionary 
strategy of non-participation. It argues that HTI is undertaking a strategic shift from a 
total non-participation to a selective participation. It establishes a strategic balance 
between revolution and reform by taking part in the democratic system for stirring 
opposition toward the existing political system. HTI focuses on challenging the 
legitimacy of democracy while at the same time engages with the supporting 
institutions and actors of the democratic system. This strategy resembles the model of 
political change called by Oxford University‘s political scientist, Timothy Garton Ash, 
‗refolution.‘ It aims to overthrow the existing political system without overthrowing 
the political regime. It seeks entry into the system to covert key elements of power 
holders and to persuade them to undertake a fundamental change from democracy to 
an Islamic government based on shari‘ah law.  
This change is inevitable for HTI to adjust itself to the democratic context of 
Indonesia that integrates the majority of Muslims in the democratic system. This 
presence of Muslim actors in the system has created a perception of political 
opportunity for Islamization that prevents HTI from confronting the existing political 
process. This stance betrays HTI‘s revolutionary doctrine that requires it to 
uncompromisingly undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system and propagate 
political detachment. However, HTI understands that opposition to the Muslim 
involvement in the democratic process can isolate it from its most potential allies.  
Based on this, this study calls attention to the trajectory of HT outside the box 
of violent and revolutionary activism. The above path is especially likely for HT that 
operates in the context of Muslim democracies. HTI offers an alternative strategy to 
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violent activism and the moderate trend of Islamist movements. Evidence shows HTI 
is building support bases for the establishment of a pro-shari‘ah or anti-system 
politics, either in the form of starting a new party or in creating a coalition between 
the existing parties.  
To support this argument, this study analyzes the nature of HTI‘s activities and 
its attitude toward the democratic structure. It is primarily based on a content analysis 
of HTI‘s discourse and activities recorded in two of its main publications: Al-Islam 
weekly bulletin and Al-Wa‟ie monthly magazine. These sources cover HTI‘s activism 
from 2000 to 2009.  
Methodologically, it follows references and activities relating to key elements 
of Indonesian democracy (such as state ideology, democracy, election, the 
government, House of Representative, and political parties) and elements of Muslim 
society that are part of the democratic system. Drawing on the theories of political 
change, the analysis is based on the scope of change and the degree of opposition it 
promotes. Cases are analysed on a scale of 1 to 3 that represents moderate, radical 
and extreme. The finding shows mixed attitudes with a significant portion of radical 
character. This confirms the character of ‗refolutionary‘ strategy: it focuses on 
challenging political system over political institutions and combines political 
participation with anti-democratic campaign.  
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Thesis Overview 
 
This thesis seeks to understand the trajectory or the model of political change sought 
by HTI and to examine the role of the democratic context of Indonesia to HTI‘s 
choice for the path. Toward answering these questions, this thesis proceeds as follows:  
Chapter one starts with a literature review and sets out significance of this 
study. This is followed by a summary of the arguments, a sketch of theoretical 
framework and an explanation of the framework used to develop the arguments. 
Discussions on the methodology and limits of the study close this chapter.  
Chapter two presents background information about Hizb al-Tahrir (HT),  its 
revolutionary ideology and its emergence in Indonesia. Of particular importance is the 
elaboration of HT‘s revolutionary ideology, which serves as the parameter of HTI‘s 
faithfullness to the revolutionary mandate.  
Chapters three and four presents the quantitative findings of the research, 
where chapter three focuses on the discourse aspect of  HTI and  chapter four 
discusses the action aspect.  
Based on these findings presented in chapter three and four, chapter five 
presents the analysis of HTI‘s third path (called political radicalism or the 
‗refolutionary‘ trajectory). This chapter answers the first argument of the thesis on the 
pathway of HTI.  
Chapter six is devoted to answering the second argument of this thesis; it 
discusses the role of democracy in relation to HTI‘s inconsitencies in implementing its 
revolutionary doctrine. It focuses on the way HTI responds to political opportunities 
within the democratic framework.  
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This thesis concludes with a brief summary of the arguments and of their 
implication for the future of political Islam and democratization in Indonesia.    
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
A. Background 
Soon after the fall of Soeharto in 1998 that brought a political freedom not seen for 
more than three decades, a new Islamist group named Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) 
emerged from the shadows after a decade of intensive cell-based mobilizations.
1
 Now 
another decade on since it began its public engagement, HTI shows its prominence as 
a key player in the advocacy of the Islamic state or the shari‘ah in Indonesia. As many 
Islamist movements now show a trend toward moderation, HTI appears to be the last 
bastion of Islamic state ideology which has been unsuccessfully fought for by various 
Muslim groups since the founding of the nation.
 2
 HTI is now the only Islamist group 
that openly calls for the creation of an Islamic state or what it calls khilafah.
3
 As a new 
contender, HTI has made an impressive appearance in recent years. It has created a 
more awarenss of the once peripheral idea of the khilafah. HTI‘s progress is apparent 
from its expanding presence across the nation. Even though it remains a tiny minority 
compared to moderate mainstream Muslim organizations, it has been able to express 
                                               
1 The transition to public campaign or what HTI calls tafa‟ul maa al-ummah (interraction with 
the ummah) was officially launched in 2000, two years after the fall of Soeharto, in aconference on 
khilafah in Jakarta under the name of ‗Syabab Hizbut Tahrir‘ (Hizbut Tahrir Youth) before officially 
used the name Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.  
2 Other groups hold strong the Islamic state orientation but they either adopt softer term such 
as ‗formalization of shari‘ah‘ as propagated by Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) or openly calls the 
creation of an Islamic state but within underground struggle like Jemaah Islamiyah and Negara Islam 
Indonesia (NII). For reading about Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia see Ahnaf (2000), for reading about 
Jemaah Islamiyah, see International Crisis Group (2003, 2007, 2008) and Barton (2005), for reading 
about NII, see International Crisis Group (2005) and Ridwan (2008), for reading about the history of 
Muslim  failure in the struggle for an Islamic state since the founding of Indonesia, see Boland (1982), 
and for reading about the geneologies Islamic radicalism in post-Soeharto Indonesia, see Bruinessen 
(2002).  
3 Throughout this thesis, I use the Arabic word, khilafah, which is also commonly used in 
Indonesia. Other works in HT uses the Anglicised word caliphate. 
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its aspirations loudly, often louder than the mainstream. Intense social mobilization, 
public appearances, and media propaganda have rewarded it with a growing public 
presence.  
Brought to Indonesia in 1983, HTI is a part of the international movement 
called Hizbut al-Tahrir (HT) founded in Palestine in 1953 by Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani 
(1909-1977). HT started with the revolutionary goal of restoring the past imperium of 
khilafah while at the same time claiming the principle of non-violence. The raison 
d`etre for the founding of HT is al-Nabhani‘s disillusionment with the political 
Islamic movements that failed because of their participation in secular systems on one 
hand and violent strategies that caused state repression and Muslim antipathy on the 
other. Al-Nabhani rejected both the reformism of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
militance of violent Islamists (Taji-Farouki: 1996: xi). He offers an alternative 
strategy of uprooting the legitimacy of the existing system and mobilizing political 
detachment to persuade powerful elites to transform the secular state into a khilafah 
government extra-parliamentarily and non-violently.
4
 
In Indonesia, HTI revived the idea of an Islamic state which has never won 
support from the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. It challenges democracy and 
demands its replacement with the trans-national government of the khilafah. Unlike 
many other political Islamist groups that have given up the Islamic state ideal and 
compromised their demands into a limited use of the shari‘ah within the existing 
democratic framework,
5
 HTI‘s doctrine sets out to change the course of Islamic 
                                               
4 For discussion about the strategy of HT, see chapter 2 of this thesis, pp. 51-66.  
5 The prominent Islamist groups like the Islamic Defenders‘ Front (FPI) and Islamic Ummah 
Forum (FUI) do not use the rhetoric of Islamic state, and rather choose word the implementation of 
shari‘ah. For a reading about FPI, see Al-Zastrouw (2006). See also the transformation of the Tarbiyah 
Movement (that followed the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood) into a moderate political party in 
Rahmat (2008); for exploration about FUI‘s activities, see www.suara-islam.com. This is not an official 
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movements by emphasizing the necessity of capturing the state as a means to 
implement the shari‘ah. It seeks to break through the failing struggles for an Islamic 
state by offering an alternative strategy to violent or democratic struggles.  
 
B. Studies on Hizb al-Tahrir: Beyond Two Least Likely Extreme Ends  
There has been a growing interest in the study of HT or HTI. Puzzled by the 
combination of HT‘s revolutionary ideology and its non-violent principle, current 
studies on the organization are largely focused on two extreme outcomes: violence or 
the revolutionary struggle for the khilafah. One prominent analysis in the argument on 
the violent potential of HT is the widely cited work of the Nixon Centre‘s analyst, 
Zeyno Baran, who sees HT as a ―conveyor belt‖ toward terrorism. She argues that 
even though HT‘s activists constantly claim that its organization is non-violent, it has 
never condemned the violence perpretated by terrorist Muslim groups. She believes 
HT‘s extreme ideology will bring about radical behaviour among its members that is 
likely to transform into violence with or without official support. Baran supports this 
argument by identifying existing and ex HT members who have been involved in 
various violent activities (Baran: 2004: 11; 2005: 68).  
Ariel Cohen agrees, drawing attention to HT‘s potential for violence by 
underlining its staged strategy. He argues that HT is most likely to become violent 
once it gains the level of support it needs to take over power (Cohen: 2003: 3). Others 
take the view that violence is inherent in HT‘s doctrine of jihad and anti-semitism. Its 
doctrine of Islamic expansionism supports the use of war to conquer countries that 
refuse to submit to a Muslim ruler. Even though theoretically HT‘s doctrine only 
                                                                                                                                       
website of FUI, but is run by its prominent figure leader, Muhammad al-Khattath, that publicises FUI‘s 
activities. To the best of my knowledge, there has been any research focusing on this growing 
organization.  
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supports violence after a khilfah government is in place, in practice HT‘ leaders have 
made statements that encourage violence prior to this, such as the call of HT‘s amir 
Atha Abu Rustho for war as the only way to deal with Israel (Raziq 2009). Earlier 
Rosbalt news agency even predicted that HT would replace Al-Qaedah in the future 
(Martirosyan: 2003). An ex-member of HT in Britain, Ed Hussein, strengthened this 
view through his book that describes the secretive nature of HT and its role in 
radicalizing Muslims (Hussein: 2001). 
This focus on HT‘s potential for violence is however dismissed by observers 
like Hanif (2007a), Mayer (2004) and Krause (2008). Mayer argues that such an 
analysis is merely based on speculations that serve the needs of political lobbyists to 
invent threats that resonate with the global war on terror. This speculation, according 
to Mayer, lacks empirical foundation as it is mostly based on HT‘s confrontational 
statements that do not necessarily lead to physical violence (Mayer: 2004: 8). 
Similarly, Krause counters the argument that links HT with violent groups like Al-
Qaedah by comparing the membership structure, ideological base and establishment 
of HT and Al-Qaedah. She finds differences between the two that lead her to suggest 
that it is highly unlikely that HT will resort to violence (Krause: 2008: 27-43). Hanif 
(2007a) goes further by suggesting that HTI is a phantom organization serving the 
interests of the US and Britain in the cold war against Russia and China.
6
  
I share this criticism of the assumption of HT‘s inherent violence. Much of the 
argument on the eventual violence carried out by HTI is based on the expansionist 
ideology that legitimates war to conquer opposing countries (Baran 2005; Raziq 
                                               
6 The phantom perspective is also suggested by a Turkish journalist, as quoted by Ali Bulac in 
his blog comment, who made an allegation that ―What al-Qaedah means to the US is exactly what Hizb 
ut-Tahrir means for Russia.‖ This implies a suggestion that Hizb al-Tahrir in central Asia is helping 
Russia to destabilize the region in order to justify Russian intervention (Bulac 2005).  
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2009). For HT, the waging of war by authorities other than a khilafah government is 
illegitimate. The representation of HTI in a violent framework therefore overlooks this 
belief system and its dominant practice of non-violent activism. It might be true that 
there were individual members or ex-members of HTI who were involved in violent 
activities, but these isolated incidents are insufficient to support the argument that the 
group will eventually resort to violence. This is especially true with HT in Indonesia. 
The group has been operating in the country for more than two decades with no record 
of even small-scale violence.   
The works of those (Mayer: 2004, Krause: 2008, Hanif 2007a) who dismiss a 
violent link to HT however fail to provide satisfactory answers to the ―so what?‖ 
question. This type of analysis suggests that a movement with a revolutionary 
ideology will necessarily embrace a revolutionary path. It is unimaginable that HT 
will be able to achieve the goal of establishing the khilafah. Understanding HT‘s 
direction beyond this utopian objective is therefore critical  
The intent of this study is to fill this void in understanding the course of HTI 
beyond the khilafah ideal in the specific context of Indonesia – an open democracy 
and home to 205 million Muslim or 84 percent of total population (240 million). 
Analysis of HT‘s direction with reference to this context is essential because even 
though HT is an international organization, different contexts are likely to cause 
different character.  
 
C. Indonesia’s Unique Context: Political Freedom and Political Opportunity 
The promotion of HT‘s revolutionary ideology in Indonesia is greeted with two 
unique contexts. First, unlike in other places in the Middle East and Asia where HT 
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struggles under repressive authorities, in Indonesia HTI enjoys remarkable political 
freedom. Despite the fact that on paper HTI is a potential threat to the Indonesian 
constitution, it has been able to operate freely. Second, Indonesian democracy offers a 
different opportunity to Hizbut Tahrir‘s goal than in non-Muslim democratic countries 
like Britain and Germany. In these countries, political freedom does not co-exist with 
real political opportunities. It is highly unlikely that HT‘s theocratic aspiration will 
resonate in predominantly non-Muslim populations. In contrast, HT in Indonesia may 
have the opportunity to capitalize on its political freedom among the large majority-
Muslim audiences. If a total change is not possible, opportunities for wider state 
accommodation on moral and religious issues may make way for HTI‘s ideological 
shift.  
These contexts have brought about different shapes of HT. In Muslim 
countries such as Jordan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan, HT continues to have a fairly low 
profile under repressive government. In non-Muslim countries where it enjoys 
political freedom but without effective political opportunity, HT, according to Taji-
Farouki, tends to tout its revolutionary message by using the countries as diplomatic 
spots to make direct attacks on secular ideologies (Taji-Farouki: 2004: 343).  
HTI in Indonesia presents an interesting case for studying the transformation 
of a revolutionary movement that gains both political freedom and political 
opportunity - especially since HTI has raised its profile and moved toward a public 
campaign. The fact that the majority of Islamist groups in Indonesia have surrendered 
the Islamic state ideology to the democratic political system gives a significance to 
this study about HTI. As one of few organizations that still openly calls for the 
creation of an Islamic state, HTI is a critical test of the capability of democracy in 
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demobilizing or taming revolutionary movements. This thesis intends to shed light on 
the trajectory of HTI with a particular interest in examining the effect of Indonesia‘s 
democratization on its maintenance or abandonment of its revolutionary commitment. 
 
D. Arguments 
This thesis makes two arguments: 
 
Argument One: 
HTI is undertaking a shift from its revolutionary doctrines of non-participation and 
non-cooperation toward a strategy that combines anti-system campaigns with political 
participations. It is seeking a balance between sustaining its revolutionary orientation 
of establishing the khilafah with engagement in reformist politics. By this strategy 
HTI hopes to secure the political freedom to expand social mobilization against the 
exisiting political system and to seek political entry in order to plant seeds of 
opposition within the system. The likely outcome of HTI‘s success in this endeavor is 
neither violence nor revolution in the form of the overthrow of the existing 
government and political order, but the establishment of extreme right forces that 
propagate sectarian polarizations (Islamic versus secular blocs) within the democratic 
system. This may take the form of the establishment of a new party or the creation of a 
pro-shari‘ah coalition in the parliament. HTI‘s success may resemble the success of 
extreme right parties in Western democracies where small right wing parties gain 
political significance.  
In this way, HTI offers an alternative path to violence extremism and the 
moderate trend of major Islamist movements in Indonesia. HTI may be not strong 
 8 
 
 
enough to cause democratic breakdown, although this is desired, but its success in 
mobilizing public support  may change the course of democratization in Indonesia so 
that it becomes more receptive to the influence of political Islamism.  
 
Argument Two: 
HTI‘s shift toward the above trajectory is the result of its adjustment to the democratic 
environment of Indonesia. This is because HTI‘s mobilization inevitably requires its 
engagment with elements of the political establishment. This naturally makes HTI less 
committed to its revolutionary doctrines of political detachment and more tolerant or 
supportive of the existing political system, although it remains critical, of political 
participation. In this way, HTI, which started as a revolutinary movement, survives 
democratic challenge by transforming into a ―political radicalism‖ that combines anti-
system campaign with political particpation.  
In this case, this thesis argues that democracy does not necessarily destroy nor 
moderate revolutionary movements as some suggest, but motivates revolutionary 
movements to manipulate democratic opportunities for political radicalism. The 
impact could be mutual. While HTI has been changed by democracy, it also has the 
potential to change democracy so that it becomes less liberal. The performance of 
democracy that strengthens its legitimacy and empowers political moderation is 
therefore antithetical to the rise of the right wing politics sought by HTI.  
 
E. Tasks and Procedure of Arguments   
Based on the arguments above, the aims of this thesis are twofold. The first is to 
demonstrate the shift of HTI from a revolutionary orientation toward political 
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radicalism. The second is to demonstrate the role of democracy in the chosen pathway 
of HTI. The first task is carried out by evaluating the faithfullness of HTI in following 
revolutionary principles that are parallel to HT‘s theories for change. As for the 
second task, this study follows the theoretical debates on the impact of democracy to 
revolutionary movements. It especially adopts the arguments about the aspects of 
democracy that are arguably moderating in nature to assess their relationship to the 
changes of HTI. Discussions below show the uses of these theories to develop the 
arguments of this thesis. 
 
E.1. Argument One: Theories of Political Changes, Beyond Revolution and Reform  
Scholars and activists of political change have admitted the limit of the dychotomy of 
revolution and reform (Foran 2003; Farhi 2003; Goodwin 2003).  Explanations of 
political change into an either/or categorization of revolution and reform arguably fail 
to capture the political transition that falls in between both these extremes. Following 
this nuanced characterization of political change, this study attempts to explain the 
orientation of HTI in three categories of political change: revolution, ‗refolution‘ and 
reform. By including the  third path of ‗refolution‘ in the centre of the spectrum, this 
study broadens the perspective of the alternative model of political change sought by 
HTI in facing the democratic context of Indonesia.  
In this study, I follow Jeff Goodwin‘s state-centered approach in 
understanding revolutionary movements. In this perspective, Goodwin defines 
revolution as "an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for 
political authority in society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization 
and non-institutionalized actions that undermine authorities" (Goodwin 2001: 9). 
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Although this defintion mentions mass mobilization as the cause of revolution, 
Goodwin acknowledges that a revolution can be carried out by small powerful elites 
(‗revolution from above‘). But a political change in terms of regime change, acording 
to Goodwin, is not a sufficient characteristic of revolutions. A revolution also requires 
―more or less rapid and fundamental social, and/or cultural change during or soon 
after the struggle for power‖ (Goodwin 2001: 9). This definition is different to those 
who argue that a revolution can only take place through a violent struggle and in a 
sudden or rapid process of political change (Skocpol 1979: 4; Huntington 1968: 264; 
Giddens 1989: 605; Colburn 1994: 5). In short, a revolution may take place in either a 
violent or non-violent manner or in rapid or less rapid processes of change. What is 
clear is that revolutionary change is characterized by an overthrow of a political 
regime followed by the introduction of large scale change in various sectors of life.  
This scope of change, including both the intellectual (political system) and 
institutional (structure) aspect of the state, distinguish revolution from reform. A 
reformist change means addressing critical problems without overthrowing the regime 
and altering the fundamentals of the political system.  
An alternative scenario of change, between reform and revolution, however is 
not impossible. Garton Ash and Kis call this scenario ‗refolution,‘ which means a 
hybrid combination of revolution and reform (Ash 1990:3; Kis 2001: 319). They 
argue that a movement may seek a revolutionary outcome through non-revolutinary 
actions. In this scenario, a large scale transformation of the political, social and 
economic system, including the amendment of the constitution, takes place without 
the collapse of the present political power-holder. This may happen in a situation 
where popular movements cause a crisis of legitimation to the power-holder and 
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therefore, because of unbearable pressures, changes in favour of popular demand are 
then made. In response to this situation, the ruling power comes to the table with the 
opposition party to negotiate large-scale transformations of the political, social and 
economic system while maintaining the legitimacy of the power holders. Garton Ash 
connects this model with the processes of political change in Poland and Hungary in 
which a fundamental transformation of the state system, from totalitarian Marxism to 
democracy was made while maintaining the legitimacy of the former power-holders 
(Ash: 1990; Kis 2008). 
State legitimacy is the key to distinguishing this model of change from the 
other models. There are two components that need to be emphasised: namely the 
legitimacies of the power holder (authorities) and the existing political system 
(democracy). Reformist change maintains both forms of legitimacy; revolution seeks 
to overthrow both legitimacies and replace them with a new political power and a new 
political system; refolution entails overthrowing the existing political system without 
overthrowing the existing power holder. The achievement of refolution thus requires 
the crisis of legitimation of the existing political system (rule) that will put pressure on 
the political authority (ruler) to carry out a transformation from the existing political 
system to a new one. Kis compares refolution to revolution and reform as follows: 
 ―Like revolutions, this type of change [refolution] is invariably 
marked by the presence of legitimation crisis. But, unlike revolutions, 
it does not proceed through the collapse of the state and a multiple-
power situation. On the contrary, as with reforms, it is marked by a 
concious strategy to preserve coordination. Unlike reforms, it does 
not preserve coordination by relying on the authority of institutional 
power-holders. Coordination is maintained by combined efforts of 
institutional power-holders and groups belonging to extra-institutional 
opposition‖ (Kis 2008: 319).  
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Such a distict model of political behavior (between revolution and reform) is 
similar to the term ―radicalism‘ used by Pappas (2008). In the continuum between 
revolution and reformism, he defines radicalism as: 
  ―any movement or political party that explicitely aims at legal, 
customarily non-violent subversion of an existing institutional 
framework to replace it with a new, allegedly better one. Subverting 
an already solidified institutional framework may involve drastic 
constitutional change, alterations in the relations of production and 
the engineering of profound  economic redistribution among social 
groups, shifting international alliances, and any other measure from 
which claims to a new legitimate authority may be deduced‖ (Pappa 
2008: 1119).  
 
The amount and type of change distinguishes these three models. Unlike 
revolution that aims at a complete overthrow of the existing political system and 
reformism that seeks gradual and incremental changes in policies within the existing 
political framework, radicalism aims at a systemic change by using the existing 
political process. A revolutionary movement is therefore characterized by opposition 
to the existing system and the strategy of detachment (non-participation) from the 
existing political process. Radical or refolutionary movements are defined by 
participation in the existing political system as a way to undermine the system from 
within; reformist movements are typified by their participation and acceptence of the 
existing system despite the demand for change.  
 
 
E.1.i. Attitudes toward the State as a Unit of Analysis 
To this end, it is clear that the attitude toward the state, both its intellectual (political 
system) and its institutional (political structure) aspects, is crucial in understanding the 
political change orientation of a movement. The revolutionary or non-revolutionary 
nature of a movement is characterized by its attempt to create the breakdown of the 
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state in order to seize political power and introduce a new constitution. The nature of a 
movement therefore can also be measured by its aim to create situations that will lead 
to the breakdown of the state.  
Because in Indonesia HTI is seeking to overthrow democracy this study 
follows Lipset‘s proposal of the three requisites for the stability of democracy, 
including: economic development, legitimacy and effectiveness (Lipset 1959: 75-98).  
The revolutionary and non-revolutionary nature of HTI therefore can be characterized 
by its effort to undermine these requisites of democratic stability, regardless of the 
strength of the effort. Due to HTI‘s non-military nature this study is focused on the 
effort of the movement to undermine two of the key elements of democracy, namely 
legitimacy and effectiveness. The other factor, economic development, is an external 
aspect that is beyond HTI‘s role.  
The first factor is legitimacy, which refers to a belief that democratic political 
institutions are the most appropriate mechanism to govern society (Lipset 1959:  86; 
Dahl 1971: 40).  The task of an anti-democratic movement is therefore to uproot 
public consent in the elements of the democratic system. This feature may appear in 
the discourse of HTI. The second factor deals with the effectiveness of the democratic 
institutions to perform their political roles. An effort to undermine this aspect of 
democracy may appear at the action aspect (activities) of a revolutionary movement; 
this is the way it mobilizes political detachment or disobedience among the people. A 
major indicator of the legitimacy and effectiveness of democracy according to Lipset 
is the degree of political entry (Lipset 1959: 8). The higher the number of people that 
enter into a political system the more legitimate and effective a democratic system. As 
illustrated in figure 1.1 below, the strongest democracy is the one that possesses both 
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characters of legitimacy and effectiveness (country A in diagram in below). A 
democracy that lacks both of these aspects is unstable and likely to break down unless 
it is held by an authoritarian government (country D). Illegitimate but effective 
democracy (country C) or an ineffective but legitimate democracy (country B) may 
survive, but has the potential to lose both factors. Lipset‘s diagram below illustrates 
this variation (Lipset 1959: 90): 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Degrees of legitimacy and democratic stability (Lipset 1959: 90) 
This diagram suggests that ‗legitimacy‘ relates the degree of public support to 
the political system and ‗effectiveness‘ refers to the performance of the political 
institutions. The characterization of the strategy of HTI in this study is based on the 
assesment of its attitudes towards these two aspects of the state. This study holds the 
position that revolutionary movements seek to take away the legitimacy of a political 
system and to undermine political institutions. In contrast, reformist movements seek 
political change but with a commitment to maintaining the existing political system 
and institution. Mixed attitudes may indicate a different orientation between 
revolution and reform, which is referred to in this study as ‗refolution.‘ This variation 
looks like the following figure:  
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State Elements Revolution ‘Refolution’ Reform 
Political System Negative Negative Positive 
Political Institutions Negative Positive Positive 
 
Figure 1.2:The relationhsip between  
state elements and models of change 
 
This study looks at the attittude of HTI toward key elements of Indonesia‘s 
democratic system. The political system includes Pancasila as the state ideology, the 
Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik 
Indonesia/NKRI) as the state ideology,
7
 the written constitution, democracy and 
elections. This system is implemented by various state institutions that include the 
legislative institutions (the higher house or the consultative people‘s assembly [MPR] 
and lower house or the House of Representatives [DPR]) and executive institutions  
(the government bureaucracy; the police and the military). It also includes the political 
parties as a key element of democracy.  
Additionally, as the inability of the state to asimmiliate the public into the 
democratic system is the key to democratic breakdown (Lipset 1959: 8), this study 
also examines the attititude of HTI toward Muslim participation in the democratic 
process; this represents their assimilation into a political system. Islamic politics may 
be expressed formally through political parties, their participation in government and 
                                               
7 The unitary model of Indonesian political system contained in the term ―NKRI‖ is compared 
to the federal model state like United States. The difference lies in the degree of authority of the 
regional government in which central government in a unitary state has a larger control over regional 
government than that in a federal state. Indonesia‘s use of the unitary model is motivated by the reality 
that the high degree of diversity in the archipelago. A large degree of autonomy in the model of federal 
system is feared of generating national disintegration. After the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia introduced 
the decentralization policy to give more authority to local government through the local autonomy law 
(Law No. 22/1999). However, there has been debate about the possibility of Indonesia turning to a 
federal government in order to strengthen capacity of regional government. For a discussion about this 
issue, see Ferrazzi (2000). Additionally, the word ―republic‖ in the term ―NKRI‖ also implies that 
Indonesia adopts democracy as a political mechanism.  
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by becoming pressure groups. Therefore, in addition to the democratic system and 
institutions, this study also follows HTI‘s attitudes toward political parties, examining 
differrent attitude toward Islamic and secular groups, Muslim organizations or actors 
and instances of their advocacies within the democratic framework. In the next 
discussion this aspect is called ‗Muslim participatory politics.‘    
 
E.1.ii. Discourse and Action Matter  
The gap between theory and practice is crucial in understanding the dynamic of 
political movements. Tucker, for example, identified such a gap as the hallmark of the 
de-radicalization process of Marxist movements in Europe (Tucker 1967). To capture 
this dynamic, this study analyses the character of HTI at the ―discourse‖ and ―action‖ 
level.
8
 It assumes that revolutionary and refolutionary movements can be equally 
challenging to the political system  However, unlike a revolutionary movement that 
needs to confront the State (political institutions) in order to undermine it, a 
refolutionary movement avoids confrontation with the State to open the space for 
undermining the State from within. Likewise, while refolution and reform attempt to 
seek changes within the arrangement of the existing system, a refolutionary movement 
needs to delegitimize the consensual support of the State at the discourse level to gain 
support for a systemic change.  
 
                                               
8
 Here I use the term ―discourse‖ to refer to written and spoken language as an interaction 
between speaker s and addressees or writers and readers. This is different to an extended use of the term 
to refer various forms of expression including written, spoken, images, body, signed language 
(Fairclough 1992: 3). Considering that a discourse represents an interaction between multiple sides, it is 
true that discourse can be considered an action. However, in this thesis I limit the use of the term 
discourse to language or rhetorical form of action; and therefore I differentiate it from ―action‖ to refer 
actual activities that represent the translation of theories or rhetoric.  
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The relational attitudes of different models of movement toward the State are 
shown in the following chart: 
  Revolution ‘Refolution’ Reform 
State 
Elements 
Discourse  Action  Discourse  Action  Discourse  Action  
Political 
System 
Negative  Negative  Negative  Positive  Positive  Positive  
Political 
Institutions 
Negative  Negative  Negative  Positive  Positive  Positive  
 
Figure 1.3: The role of discourse and action for change 
 
 
E.2. Argument Two: The Impact of Democracy on Revolutionary Movements  
Clashing views dominate debates on the relationship between revolutionary 
movements and democracy. The majority of the discussion centres on the question of 
whether or not democracy tames the revolutionary movements. Three theses stand out. 
 
E2.i. First Thesis: Democracy is by Itself Counter-Revolutionary 
Following the declaration of the end of the Cold War (‗the end of revolution‘)  (see 
Nodia: 2000, Snyder: 1999), some scholars believed that the advance of democracy, in 
addition to globalization, was a critical factor in the decreased possibility of 
revolution. The first factor is concerned with the nature of democracy that provides 
different channels of social conflict other than revolution. This view is held for 
example by Jeff Goodwin (2001; 2003) who argued that the proliferation of 
democracy in the post-Cold War era has made struggles for fundamental changes 
obsolete. Democracy becomes a ―barrier‖ for a revolutionary movement because it 
encourages the institutionalization of social and political means through political 
institutions. By allowing diverse lines of political process, democracy eliminates the 
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incentive for revolution (Goodwin 2003: 66). In the words of Seymor M. Lipset 
(Lipset 1960: 7; Lipset & Lakin 2004: 35) democracy ‗institutionalizes‘ conflict 
through the democratic mechanism.  
The second argument looks at the challenge of mobilizing a broad-anti-regime 
coalition as a necessary aspect of a revolution (Huntington 1968: 275; Dix 1984: 423-
46; Wickham-Crowley 1987: 473-99l; Tilly 1978; Brinton 1965; Skocpol 1979). A 
broad anti-system (anti-democracy) and anti-regime movement is only possible when 
the regime has narrowed its support base significantly, creating an opportunity for 
revolutionary recruitment. Typically such a situation does not happen in a democratic 
political system because the government is formed by a single majority party or a 
similar coalition parties. Additionally, when social conflict disperses into struggles 
through political structures such as political parties and pressure groups, 
revolutionaries are unable to build an extensive following outside core militants.  
 The impact of democracy on revolutionary movements is considered more 
severe to those participating in democratic systems. In the words of Alan Dawley 
(1976: 70), the ―ballot box is the coffin of revolutionaries.‖ While the democratic 
impact on non-participating movements is demobilization, theorists believe that 
participation in democratic institutions and processes can turn the extremists into 
moderates. The transformation toward a moderate direction is driven by three reasons.   
The first is the need to attract voters (Dawns 1957). Dawns‘ argument relies on 
the need of a political party to persuade a majority of the population to support them. 
As the majority of a population is usually moderate the revolutionary party is forced to 
at least partially redirect its campaign toward the majority needs. This effort will force 
them to depart from their original extreme views. The second is the oligarchic nature 
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of organization that requires addressing practical needs and this tends to drive 
organizational runners away from revolutionary activities (Mitchels 1999). The 
operation of a political party, according to Mitchels requires formal organization that 
is capable of running campaigns, political mobilization and organizational sustenance. 
The short–term organizational management demands overcome the party‘s long-term 
ideological objective (Mitchels 1999: 277).  The third is the need to satisfy people‘s 
demand for concrete outcomes over long-term fundamental change (Macmillan 2006). 
The need to satisfy constituents will leave the party activists with little time for rigid, 
ideological rhetoric. This will eventually drive the party away from its original 
revolutionary objective. 
The proponents of this thesis refer to the post world war transformation of 
Leftist movements to justify this argument. The emergence of terms like ‗Post-
Marxism‘ (Therborn 2008), ‗New Left‘ (McMillian & Buhle 2003) and ‗Post-
Islamism‘ (Roy 2004; Bayat 2007) refer to the transformation of revolutionary 
movements in such a direction. Goodwin points out that the revolutionary 
organizations like El-Savador‘s ‗Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front‘ (FMLN) 
and South Africa‘s ‗African National Congress‘ are now seeking to reform capitalism 
rather than overthrow it. Marxists who participate in elections such as the ‗German 
Communist Party‘ and the ‗Italian Communist party,‘ are also in crisis as they are 
constantly unable to win sufficient support to significantly alter the political system 
they are participating in (Goodwin 2003: 70). They therefore believe that de-
radicalization is the fate of 21st century revolutionary movements.  
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E.2.ii. Second Thesis: Democracy Drives the Metamorphosis of Revolutionary 
Movements  
Challenging the ‗end of revolution‘ thesis (see Nodia: 2000, Snyder: 1999), some 
scholars (Garton Ash: 1999, Farhi: 2003, Jost: 2006) argue that democracy does not 
necessarily end the mobilization of revolutionary movements. Instead of ending 
revolutionary ideals, democracy transforms revolutionary movements into a new 
model. Unlike the traditional models of revolution, the newer thesis identifies a less 
confrontational tactic of revolutionary movements.
9
 Following Antonio Gramsci‘s 
notion of ―passive revolution‖ or ‗war of movement,‘10 these scholars believe that 
globalization and modernization have made revolution in the conventional model 
impractical. However, that does not mean that the idea of a fundamental systemic 
change, which is the essence of revolution, is obsolete. According to Farhi (2003) the 
democratic turn has changed the direction of revolutionary movements from past 
violent methods to something more gradual or non-revolutionary. This may sound like 
an oxymoron. However, Farhi insists that this represents various groups that continue 
maintaining their objective of systemic change. While in the past revolution took 
place in a violent and sudden manner, today revolutionary movements take a more 
                                               
9 An example definition of revolution that is much shared by conventional theories especially 
those referring to the Great Revolution‖ one comes from Forrest Colburn, that says: ―sudden, violent, 
and drastic substitution of one group of governing territorial political entity for another formerly 
excluded from the government, and an ensuing assault on state and society for the purpose of radically 
transforming society‖ (Colburn 994: 6).  
10
 According to Gramsci, the advance of capitalism makes a frontal attack to the state, through 
rebellion and strike, vulnerable to state repression. A revolution or what he termed ―war of movement,‖ 
in the sense of the takeover of political power, needs to be preceded by a ―war of position,‖ which can 
be done by constructing an alternative hegemony in opposition to the state hegemony. Such counter-
hegemony can be achieved through intellectual and moral reforms of civil society by a party 
(movement) with direction, discipline and militancy. A true revolution, according to Gramsci, is not 
about taking over the state, but about winning over society by establishing institutional, intellectual, and 
moral hegemony of society or subaltern that is autonomous from the state.  It is believed that once a 
revolutionary movement is successful in gaining position in the society, it already exercises a 
leadership in opposition to the state, and with this leadership a revolution is imminent (Adamson: 1980: 
222).  
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gradual and non-violent strategy toward the desired transformation. The means may 
be non-revolutionary, but the end can be revolutionary (Farhi 2003: 31).  
Most notable examples of this non-revolutionary revolution are political 
changes such as Poland and Hungary in 1989 as described by Timothy Garton Ash 
(Ash 1990). It is argued that the Polish and Hungary experience blurred lines between 
reform and revolution. They show a fundamental transformation of political regimes 
through the rules of the democratic game. The implication was no less fundamental 
than great revolutions. In the interpretation of Farhi, this model of revolution 
―combines an insistence on non-violence, or the well considered use of violence, with 
the creative use of civil disobedience guided by an opposition elite, calculated pleas to 
world public opinion through the use of electronic media, attention and pressure from 
the outside world, and ‗readiness to negotiate with power holders while refusing to be 
co-opted‖ (2003: 31).  
The successes of the Fascist and Nazi parties in overthrowing democratic 
government in Italy in the 1920s and Weimar Germany in the 1930s and the recent 
rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 2008 illustrate that democracy is not immune 
from revolution. These examples bring about the term ―legal revolution (Cappocia: 
2005: 7) in which anti-democratic parties exploited the freedom and the right for 
participation  leading to the collapse of democratic governments. In contrast to the 
first thesis, scholars in this rubric believe de-radicalization is not an inevitable fate of 
revolutionary movements that operate in a democratic context.  
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E.2.iii. Third Thesis: Weak Democracy Incubates Revolutionary Movements; Strong 
Democracy Makes Them Obsolete 
Taking a modest stance between the above two positions, this thesis does not assume a 
blind confidence in democratic counter-revolutionary power. Sheri Berman (1997, 
2003) proposes a differentiation between weak and strong democracy. She argues that 
only states with weak democracy are vulnerable to democratic revolution. This is 
because a weak democracy that only satisfies political elites can give a sense of ―no 
other way out‖ (Berman 2003: 11). This revolutionary potential is particularly key 
because democracy does not always bring prosperity.  
Berman compared the behaviour of communist parties in Europe between war 
years, focusing on countries with different levels of democracy. During this period, 
democratic systems in countries like Germany and Italy were weak and were blamed 
for the national crisis. As democracy became dysfunctional the communist parties 
accelerated their anti-systemic activities. There is little evidence that participation 
tamed communist radicalism. The communist party during this period, in Berman‘s 
view:  
―maintained its non-compromise doctrine, preserved anti-systemic 
ideology, and although they occasionally supported practical policies 
viewed as beneficial to the everyday lives of their constituents, 
communist parties never wavered in their belief that no real 
improvement could come without a violent revolution‖ (Berman: 2003: 
11).  
 
A contrast appeared when European democracy improved in the post-war era. 
When democracies such as France became stronger and contributed to political 
stability and the economic growth of the country the French Communist party began 
to evaluate its radical stance. In effect, Berman notes, ―all communist parties 
underwent a complete transformation- dropping their sectarian appeals in favour of a 
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mass, cross-class coalition orientation, abandoning their organizational 
Leninism…and committing themselves fully to democracy and gradualism‖ (Berman 
2003: 11). This led to the communist claim in 1962 that democracy is ‗an essential 
step in the struggle for socialism‘ (Berman 2003: 12).  
Conveying careful confidence in democracy, Berman concluded that ―without 
strong states able to enforce democratic rules of the game and punish the extremist 
forces, and without large, robust parties fully committed to democracy and therefore 
able to make others pay an electoral and political price for sectarianism and anti-
system activity, the revolutionaries face few incentives to abandon radicalism‖ 
(Berman 2003: 15). This line of argument therefore suggests that only established 
democracies are immune from the threat of revolution. While strong democracy is 
counter-revolutionary, weak democracy in contrast encourages revolutionary 
struggles.  
Learning from these theories, this study seeks to analyse the impact of 
democracy on HTI‘s revolutionary or non-revolutionary direction. In doing so, it 
follows the two arguments on democratic counter-revolutionary capacity. First, it 
looks at the way HTI responded to political opportunities within the democratic 
framework. The availability of democratic channels other than non-democratic 
revolution is essential to counter the revolutionary argument of ‗no other way out‘ 
(Lipset 1960; Goodwin 2001). HTI‘s attitude with regard to democratic opportunities 
is therefore crucial to define the impact of democratization on HTI. Second, following 
the argument that the integration of diverse political forces on the democtratic system 
deters the formation of a revolutionary coalition this analysis looks at HTI‘s character 
when attempting to address diverse groups. It specifically examines the consistency of 
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HTI in challenging democracy and in propagating a political detachment in its 
interractions with diverse groups, especially those of Muslim actors integrated within 
the democratic system.  
The impact of democratization on HTI is derived from its attitude in terms of 
its abandonment or its commitment to the revolutionary campaign in situations when 
political opportunities appear and coalition building is in progress. This helps to 
understand whether HTI is ‗strengthening‘ or ‗softening‘ its revolutionary goal in 
different political situations.         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
F. Data and Methods 
G.1. Primary Sources and Analytical Tools 
This study primarily draws on the content analysis
11
 of two of the major publications 
of HTI: Al-Wa‟ie (monthly megazine) and Al-Islam (weekly bulletin).12 Using these 
two sources has two advantages. First, due to their currency they represent the 
dynamic of HTI‘s campaign, its responses to existing political and social realities. 
Second, because of their regular publication they have been consistently published 
since HTI‘s transition to a public campaign in the early 2000s both official documents 
offer a significant account of HTI‘s propaganda (discourse) and mobilization 
(activities). Combined, the two sources document the dynamic of HTI over a ten-year 
period beginning from the early period of the Reform era in 1999 until 2009; this 
period includes three election periods. This ten year period enables HTI‘s responses to 
                                               
11 I follow a more general definition of content analysis proposed by Stone, Dunphy, Smith 
and Ogilvie (1966: 5) that says ―any research technique for making inferences by systematically and 
objectively identifying specific characteristics within text.‖ 
12 In addition to these publicatios, HTI produces various other publications. Some of them are 
officially affiliated to the group such as the monthly newspaper called ‗Media Ummat,‘ books and 
booklets published by HTI. There are also other publications by publishers that are not officially 
affiliated to HTI but propagate HT‘s ideology and political propaganda. The most productive of them is 
Pustaka Thariqul Izzah book publisher.  
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be tracked to different political circumstances which are essential for examining the 
impact of democracy on its behaviour as a political movement.  
 Units of anlaysis follow my previous discussion on  attitudes toward the state 
in defining the revolutionary or non-revolutionary nature of a movement. As  
previously stated, the state consists of two elements – the political system and the 
political institutions. With regard to the political system, I look at the key elements of 
Indonesia‘s democratic system including, Pancasila, the Unitary State of the Republic 
of Indonesia (NKRI), the constitution, democracy and election.  In the area of political 
institutions, I select elements of Indonesia‘s trias politica and party system that are 
most relevent to HTI propaganda and mobilization, which include government (local 
and national), the lower and higher houses of parliament (DPR/MPR), political 
parties, the police and the military. Additionally, to capture HTI‘s attitude toward 
Muslim particpatory politics which is essential in characterizing HTI‘s faithfullness to 
its revolutionary doctrine, the analysis also includes some instances of HTI‘s attitude 
toward key Islamic political issues such as the Jakarta Charter, the opposition to 
alleged anti-Islamic heretic sects, pornography, and shari‘ah inspired district 
regulations. It also follows HTI‘s attitudes toward actors of Islamic politics such as 
Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, the Islamic Defeders‘ Front (FPI), the Islamic 
Ummah Forum (FUI), and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI).  
This study follows references of analysis to Al-Islam and Al-Wa‟ie. To avoid 
any redundant analysis, I adopt Altheide‘s procedure of qualitative or ethnographic 
content analysis called ‗discourse tracking.‘ This approach focuses on following 
themes or subjects rather than words in the content of documents (Altheide 1996: 68). 
Therefore I treat a discussion on a subject in one source as one case despite the 
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multiple mention of words related to the subject or theme. Similarly, one document 
may contain multiple subjects or cases because of their multiple elements. For 
example, when an edition of Al-Islam discusses democracy, this is considered one 
case or reference to democracy. But it may also contain multiple references on other 
subjects related to the democracy such as entities or actors mentioned because of their 
attitude toward democracy.  
Further, analysis is divided into two levels of attitude- discourse and action - 
and categorized into the nature of the attitude that follow the three models of political 
change: revolution, refolution and reform.  The discourse aspect comes from relevent 
materials in Al-Islam and Al-Wa‟ie, while the action aspect is from the Ahbar (activity 
news) section of Al-Wa‟ie that contains information about a significant number of 
HTI‘s activities across the nation.  
 The categorization of revolution, refolution and reform is based on their 
implication to the ways a movement addresses the state.  Throughout this study, I also 
use the terms extreme, radical and moderate to substitute for revolution, refolution 
and reform because the terms more explicitly describe the spectrum of attitude.  
Based on the implications of how a movement‘s desired model of political 
change correlates with its political attitude, this analysis is based on the following 
categorization: 
1. Moderate: This refers to references to institutions, groups, individuals 
described in ways that are supportive, affirmative or critical yet hopeful. This 
stance often includes proposals that are executable within the existing 
democratic system. This stance accepts participation in the democratic system 
to advocate policy changes, rather than a change of political system.   
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2. Radical:  This refers to the representation of subjects as incapable, illegitimate 
or inherently dysfunctional, yet avoids explicitly suggesting disengagement. 
This stance tolerates participation to advocate policy changes within the 
democratic process. But unlike moderate stance, participation is carried out 
here as a means to expand mobilization and to propagate a change of the 
existing political system. This often occurs in the form of lending legitimacy to 
democratic institutions by demanding policy changes while at the same time 
campaigning for a comprehensive change.  
3. Extreme: This refers to the representation of subjects as dangerous, anti-Islam, 
the enemy and other expressions that indicate suggestion to total replacement, 
elimination or disengagement. This stance delegitimizes the capability of the 
existing system to carry positive changes and discourage any form of 
participation in the democratic system.  
 
G.2. Secondary Sources 
In addition to Al-Islam and Al-Wa‟ie this study also makes use of other internal 
sources of HTI including books, press releases and the organizational statute 
submitted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It also makes use of external sources 
such as news agencies that covered the activities and leaders‘ statements of HTI. 
Literature on Indonesian politics and Islamic political affairs is also essential in 
supplying information about the context of HTI‘s activities. Understanding the context 
of HTI‘s character is particularly important in understanding the impact of the 
democratic environment on the strategic choices of HTI.  
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             In order to gain direct interraction and clarification about HTI, I also 
conducted a series of semi-structured interviews
13
 with more than  12 HTI leaders at 
central and local levels, former members, relevant Muslim actors, participated in few 
HTI‘s workshops, seminars, rallies and took a series of personal sessions on HTI‘s 
ideology with a leader of HTI in Yogyakarta. The interviews with HTI leaders were 
primarily aimed at revealing their interpretation of key events in conjuction with the 
doctrines of HTI. The interviews with outsiders (former members and Muslim leaders) 
were focused on clarifying and investigating the claims of HTI activists. This 
fieldwork took place in six months from July to December 2009 in which I travelled 
to Jakarta, Bogor, Malang, Padang and Kendari to conduct the interviews and 
participant observations. Jakarta, Bogor and Yogyakarta constitute a ‗leadership 
city(ies)‘ for HTI because of the amount of activists from these cities who sit on the 
central board of HTI; the rest represent locality. These locations enable me to capture 
variants of HTI‘s activism from the central to periphery and from the areas where it 
gains more to the areas where it makes less progress.  
 
G.3. Data Analysis 
This study combines quantitative and qualitative analyses. The quantitative analysis is 
employed to determine the dominant nature of HTI‘s attitude toward the state both at 
the discourse and action levels. Data on the nature of behaviour is numerically coded 
into 1, 2 and 3, in which each represents moderate, radical and extreme character. 
Frequency and aggregate analyses are carried out to determine the dominant nature of 
the character on the differrent levels and units of analysis mentioned  previously. 
                                               
13 For a description about the application of semi-structured interview in social movement 
research, see Kathleen and Taylor (2002: 92). 
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 The qualitative analysis is applied to examine the correlation between  the 
specific   HTI attitude toward political opportunity structures that define the impact of 
democracy on the behavior of HTI. To do so, this study selects cases of HTI‘s attitude 
that corresponds with instances of political opportunities. In this way, this study 
determines the nature of the character, which reflects the result of HTI‘s interractions 
with differrent political opportunities and diverse audiences. Finally, this study also 
makes use of interviews and field observation to support arguments developed from 
content analysis.  
 
G. The Limits of Study  
This study primarily relies on the observable aspects of HTI as reflected in its open or 
public documents and activities. One factor that cannot be covered in this method is 
the inner dynamic of HTI that could reveal the most accurate reality of the 
movement‘s orientation. Information on this can be gained by an extensive study of 
core activists or policy makers of the organization, subject to their sincerity in  
providing information. Unpublicized internal statutes (internally called idary) and 
circulars (nasyroh) are also essential in understanding the movement‘s strategy and 
orientation. Gaining such access and information is however not easy because it 
requires a more intense degree of involvement and trust that can only be achieved with 
long-term research. I did manage to interview a number of HTI‘s key leaders. Short 
meetings with these leaders are however insufficient to dig deeper into the 
organizational strategies and plans of action becuase of the short term period of my 
fieldwork. I therefore have to admit that compared to this ideal method, this study is at 
a relatively superficial level. Nonetheless, I believe that my analysis of the discourse 
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and practice of HTI reveals the character of the organization at the actual level. In this 
way, it provides a close analysis of its trajectory based on the pattern of its activities. 
This method offers a better understanding of the nature of the movement than many 
studies that are merely based on inductive analysis of isolated activities or are based 
on the doctrine of the organization.  
Another disclaimer is that this work is a case study of HT in Indonesia. I 
believe different social and political circumstances lead to different implementations 
of HT ideology. As stated earlier Indonesia‘s social and political context is unique 
compared to other countries where HT operates. I do not intend to argue that the 
direction of HT in other countries will be similiar. However the pathway of HTI may 
not be a unique case or can only happen in Indonesia. This study offers a model of 
how HT adjusts its doctrine in the context of a democratic Muslim country. HT in 
similar a context (Muslim democracy) like Egypt and Bangladesh may embrace a 
pathway similar to HTI.  
Finally, this study covers a limited period of HTI‘s activity in Indonesia from 
1999 to 2009. The earlier period of the organization‘s semi-clandestine activism 
during the Soeharto era that defines the formation (tathqif) stage of the movement is 
beyond the scope of this study. A comparison between the activities of HTI before and 
after the transition to public campaigning can also be helpful in understanding the 
transformation of HTI and the impact of democracy in shaping the character of the 
movement. As for the aftermath of 2009, this study makes some references to the 
incident in 2010 (such as HTI‘s participation in the Indonesian Muslim 
Congress/KUII in April 2010), but does not take into account most of the 
developments after 2009.  
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H. Terminology 
Some key terms used in this study are contentious. Those that need clarification are 
the terms ‗Islamism‘ or ‗Islamist‘ and ‗radicalism‘ and/or ‗political radicalism.‘ The 
term ‗Islamism‘ refers to an understanding of Islam as an ideal comprehensive rule or 
laws to govern all aspects of life. This implies the necessity of the integration of 
Islamic teachings into both state and social affairs. The term ‗Islamist‘ is therefore 
used here to refer to actors or groups that uphold an aspiration for the adoption of 
Islamic laws or shari‘ah by the state that is larger than the current adoption of Islamic 
family laws into the Indonesian Islamic court system.
14
 Islamists are however not 
monolithic in terms of strategies and the degree of their vision for political change. 
Some Islamists use heavy arms such as bombs and firearms, others occasionally use 
small scale violence such as damaging the property of minority groups. Others focus 
on the political struggle, some do not condemn violence by other Islamists, and others 
are commited to non-violent struggles. In terms of the degree of change, some 
Islamists demand a comprehensive change of political, economic and social orders 
and others seek partial changes in sociaties and in the political arena.  
The term ‗radicalism‘ is used here to refer to a political aspiration that 
demands fundamental changes to political, social and economic systems either by 
violent means or by non-violent struggles. Radicalism is therefore not necessarily 
violent. Throughout this thesis, I also use the term ‗political radicalism‘ to refer to a 
movement that seeks a systemic change by political, not violent, means. This 
differentiates radicalism from extremism. Both extremism and radicalism aspire to 
                                               
14 This follows a broad definition of ―Islamism‖ proposed by Fuller as ―the belief that the 
Koran and the Hadith (Traditions of the Prophet's life) have something important to say about the way 
society and governance should be ordered -- remains the most powerful ideological force in that part of 
the world‖ (Fuller 2002). 
 32 
 
 
fundamental change, but unlike the extremists that reject political participation and 
justify the use of violence, radicals may tolerate political participation as an 
alternative to violence. Radicals are also differrent to the moderates in the way that 
both accept political participation. But unlike the moderates who are fully commited 
to the existing system, the radicals sustain an aspiration for systemic change.  
 
I. Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates the significance of understanding the nature of HTI‘s 
character (in both discourse and action levels) in defining the model of political 
change it envisions. A comparison between the nature HTI‘s character and its doctrine 
is essential to define changes of strategy undertaken by HTI to adjust to the 
democratic context of Indonesia. Before discussing the nature of the behaviour of 
HTI, the following chapter elaborates the revolutionary nature of HT‘s ideology. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: 
The Origin, Ideology and Strategy of Non-Violent Revolution 
 
In order to evaluate the faithfullness of HTI in the path of revolution it is essential to 
understand the revolutionary nature of its ideology. Following literature published by 
the mother organization of HTI, this chapter elaborates on the original ideology of 
HTI, including its theory and strategy for change, and shows the revolutionary nature 
of its ideology despite claiming non-violent methods. Before starting this discussion, 
it is useful to explain the emergence and growth of HTI. This discussion is kept brief 
to avoid distraction from the main focus on the revolutionary doctrine of HTI. A more 
informative discussion about the emergence of HTI is available in other sources.
15
  
 
A. The Origin, Emergence and Growth of HTI 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) follows the ideology of Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), an 
organization founded by the Palestinian jurist, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, in Palestine in 
1953. HT is now active in more than forty countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, 
Europe and North America. It is banned or restricted in most Muslim countries 
including, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Malaysia and in some Western countries such as Germany, Russia and the 
Netherlands. Despite political containment HT however, maintains its presence in 
                                               
15 For other works on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, see for example Fealy (2007),  Rahmat (2005), 
Salim (2005) and Mohamed Osman (2010) 
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these countries. In contrast HT enjoys political freedom in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Canada and Australia although no official recognition is granted. In 
Indonesia, HTI secured official recognition from the government as a social 
organization despite being a self-proclamed political party.  
Although the extent of the relationship between HTI and HT needs further 
investigation, the ideological relationship is clear from their shared objective, 
literature and visits of HT‘s leaders to HTI‘s events in Indonesia. In 2003, HTI 
reported that the amir or qiyadah (supreme leader) of HT, Atha‘ Abu Rustha attended 
its conference in Jakarta (Al-Wa‟ie 40: 31). Another prominent leader of international 
HT who has visited Indonesia is named Abu Mahmud who was sent by the previous 
HT amir, Abdul Qazim Zallum in 1998 (Komunitas Mantan HT, 28 August 2009) to 
supervise the transition of HTI from the formative period to open campaigns. The 
spokesperson of HT in the United Kingdom, Imran Wahid, was scheduled to attend 
HTI‘s conference in Jakarta in 2007 but was denied entry by Indonesian authorities 
(Detik, 12 August, 2007). The conference was attended however by delegates of HT 
from differrent countries. Recently, in July 2009, HT organized another high- profile 
conference in Jakarta that brought together international delegates, including the chair 
of HT in Britain, Jalaluddin Patel.
16
  
The first cell of HT started in Indonesia in the early 1980s at a time when 
President Soeharto tightened political restrictions in order to prevent the growth of 
extremists from both the left and right. At this difficult time, Islamic revivalism grew 
in major university campuses, partly instigated by the Iranian revolution in 1979. In 
this growing atmosphere of revivalism, HT came to Indonesia joining forces with 
                                               
16 I interviewed Patel in Jakarta one day after the conference.  
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older Islamist movements such as Salafi, the Muslim Brotherhood (in Indonesia it is 
associated with tarbiyah movement) and the Campus Da‘wah Network (LDK). The 
shared interest to avoid government repression overcame the inherent differrences of 
strategy and ideology between the groups. Only after the loosening of political 
restrictions following Soeharto‘s fall from power did conflict between the groups 
occur forcing them to establish their own identities. Students of al-Nabhani‘s ideology 
in Bogor, West Java, were among those who started forming the distinct new group 
that is now called HTI (Rahmat 2005: 125).   
The transmission of HT‘s ideology to Indonesia was made possible by the role 
of an influencial leader of a local Islamist organization, Dewan Dakwah Islam 
Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic Da‘wah Council (DDII), named Abdurrahman bin Nuh. 
Little is known about how bin Nuh encoutered al-Nabhani‘s ideology, but he might 
have read the books of al-Nabhani given to him by his son, Mustafa bin Abdurrahman, 
who studied in Jordan, the birth place of HT. In 1981 Bin Nuh also visited Australia 
and met a Jordanian HT activist there named Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi (Rahmat 
2005: 101). Bin Nuh then brought al-Baghdadi to Indonesia to teach at his Al-Ghazali 
Islamic boarding school in Bogor, West Java (Salim 2005: 25).  
The coming of al-Baghdadi to Bogor has some significance. The city is one of 
the hotbeds of Islamic revivalism centered on the campus of the Bogor Institute of 
Agriculture (IPB).
17
 The first students of al-Baghdadi were students of this university. 
These early activists of HTI taught the ideas of al-Nabhani through the activities of the 
Islamic student association at IPB located at the campus‘ mosque. Even though the 
first halaqoh (cell) has established in 1982-1983, it was not until 1984 when a leading 
                                               
17 The use of the term ‗hotbeds‘ here does not mean that the radicals have stronger influence 
than the moderates in the location. The moderates are still a predominant majority across Indonesia, but 
some cities like Bogor have become the learning centres of many radical leaders.  
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figure in the circle of the campus revivalist movement, Muhammad Al-Khattah, 
joined the halaqoh, that the group found its shape. Al-Khattath had a significant role 
in the formation and expansion of the young group. His past role as a leader of a 
campus Islamic student association (Badan Kerohanian Kampus/BKK) that served as 
a melting pot for various revivalist groups enabled him to find space for the group‘s 
early operation. Al-Khattath used his inter-campus da‘wah network to run the Campus 
Da‘wah Movement (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus/LDK), which later became an 
umbrella institution for revivalist student activities from different strands.
18
 Under the 
name of the LDK, HTI‘s activists spread al-Nabhani‘s ideology to major campuses in 
other cities in Java including most prominently Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Malang 
(Salim 2005: 25-26).  
After years of cell-based activism under the guise of the LDK, in the early 
1990s as Soeharto begun adopting a friendlier policy toward Islamist movements, HTI 
began reaching out to the public by organizing open seminars and by publishing more 
of al-Nabhani‘s writings in Indonesian language. In 1994 HTI introduced its major 
mouthpiece, the al-Islam bulletin.  
Two years after the fall of Soeharto, in May 2000, HTI openly launched its 
organization through a conference on the ‗khilafah‘ held in Jakarta, which was 
attended by about 5000 people. This marked the transition of HTI from its formative 
period, it calls tathqif onto the stage of open campaign or interraction with the ummah  
(tafa‟ul ma al-ummah). This new stage is characterzied by the introduction of the 
official name of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, increasing programmes to address the public 
through seminars and publications, and more aggressive efforts to approach 
                                               
18 As discussed in later part of this thesis, internal differrence has made Al-Khattath leaving 
the organization in 2008 and started his own organization called Hizbut Dakwah Islam (HDI) that 
publishes Suara Islam weekly newspaper.  
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mainstream Muslim organizations. In 2007, HTI attempted a major push to 
demonstrate its standing through what it calls the international conference on khilafah 
which was held in Jakarta‘s national stadium mobilizing a crowd of about 80,000.  
To secure its increased social mobilization, in 2006 HTI sought and was 
granted official recognition by the government as a social organization.
19
 This official 
status as a social organization however contradicts HTI‘s self-proclamation as a 
political party. In its book that introduces its ideology, ―Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir dan 
Strategi Dakwah Hizbut Tahrir‖ (Introduction to Hizbut Tahrir and Its Da‘wa 
Strategy), HTI defines itself as follows: ―Hizbut adalah partai poliitk yang tegak 
berdasarkan Islam. Politik Menjadi aktifitasnya, Islam sebagai ideologinya‖ (Hizbut 
Tahrir is a political party based on Islam. Politics is its activity, Islam is its ideology). 
(Anonim 2008: 200). To avoid contradiction between its legal status and real 
ideology, HTI classifies its publications into two categories: official (mutabanat) and 
unofficial. Many publications about HTI‘s ideology are unofficial and for this reason 
HTI denies responsibility despite the fact they were written by its leaders. The above 
introductory book about HTI‘s ideology is a good example. HTI uses the title ―Hizbut 
Tahrir‖ in this book. This differentiates it from HTI‘s official name as a social 
organization, ―Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.‖ The author of the book is made anonymous, 
but it was distributed and circulated by HT (Anonim 2008). Is expectable therefore 
that despite official recognition, HTI discloses little of its internal workings and 
structure, and remains a largely secretive organization.   
                                               
19 The official letter the Government recognition of HTI as social organization provided by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs was issued on 22 June, 2006. The copy of letter was circulated among 
bloggers. I was able to get confirmation from the Ministry officers about this letter. Despite this status 
HTI still publicly call itself a political party. 
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After gaining official recognition, HTI has begun disclosing its organizational 
structure. HTI‘s openess however, is not at the same level as other Muslim 
organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and even radical groups 
like the Islamic Defenders‘ Front (FPI) and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI). 
HTI never officially released information about its organizational structure. Unlike 
social organizations in general, HTI does not hold a general assembly to form 
organizational statute, programs and structure that is open to the public or media. 
Nonethelss, the following names and positions are mentioned in various publications 
of HTI: Hafiz Abdurrahman (chairman),  Ismail Yusanto (spokesperson), Harist Abu 
Ulya (head of Department of Political Affairs or  Lajnah Siyasiyah), Rohmat S. Labib 
(head of department of civilizational affairs or  Lajnah Tsaqafiyah), Farid Wadji (head 
of department of information or  Lajnah I‟lamiyah),  Muhammad Rahmat Kurnia 
(head of department  of leadership relation or Lajnah Fa‟aliyah), Riza Rosadi (head of 
social affairs or Lajnah Maslahiyah), Hasyim Mustafa (department of preachers and 
mosques or Lajnah Makatib and Masajid), and Febrianti Abbasuni (spokeperson of 
women of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia). HTI also introduced its student wing 
organization, Gema Pembebasan (Echo of Liberation) headed by Erwin Permana, a 
post-graduate student in public policy at the University of Indonesia (UI).
20
 
Additionally HTI publicised the structure of its organization, a structure 
commonly adopted by many Indonesian organizations including (from top to bottom): 
a Central Board (DPP), a Provincial Board (DPW), a District or Municipality Board 
(DPC). This structure does not include the lower level structure, which is not officially 
                                               
20 These positions and names are based on the mentions on HTI‘s official publications until the 
time of writing of this thesis.  
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publicised including university branches (called chapter) and study circles (halaqoh). 
See figure 2.1 for an illustration of this organizational structure.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Organizational structure of HTI
21
 
Now, more than two decades after its emergence, HTI has a presence in almost 
all provinces of Indonesia, including non-Muslim majority provinces like Papua. It is 
however difficult to determine the importance of these and other branches because 
founding branches do not require a large number of members. Theoretically, the 
founding of a DPW requires a minimum of 50 members, and consists of 10 core 
                                               
21 The terms and hierarchy of DPP, DPW and DPC are not known in HT‘s organizational 
structure. Compare this structure to the structure of HT as reconstructed by Taji-Farouki (1996: 116). 
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activists each of whom supervises five members (novices).
22
 This number is sufficient 
to maintain an organizational presence, which mainly takes the form of the 
distribution of organizational publications, organization of seminars and running study 
circles. 
It is difficult to establish an exact number of HTI‘s members. Based on the 
distribution of the Al-Islam bulletin, in 2006 Ismail Yusanto estimated an optimistic 
figure of one million.
23
 This claim however should be seen as Yusanto‘s ‗bandwagon‘ 
strategy that deserve scepticism.
24
 This possibly refers to a diverse audience ranging 
from members, sympathizers to those who are only curious to read its publications and 
attended its activities. The actual members of HTI must be much lower. There is an 
estimation of approximately 15,000 members.
25
 This is because HTI uses a strict 
process of recruitment. A novice or student has to go through a deep discussion and 
intensive study before formally becoming a member. Members (syabab) should attend 
many of HTI‘s activities. What is clear is that HTI has already established a 
geographically extensive presence in Indonesia. In numbers, it is still inferior to other 
Islamist groups like Salafi and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). However, HTI is 
gaining better publicity. Dialogue on TV about religious issues often includes HTI‘s 
leaders who represent the conservative segment of Muslims. More importantly, HTI 
adheres to a ‗vanguard‘ movement model that emphasizes recruiting highly commited 
individuals as core activists to achieve goals of the leadership in society. Thus, even 
                                               
22 These figure is an adaptation of the finding of Taji-Farouki (1996:116). HTI does not 
publicise the structure of its organization.  
23 This is based on my converstion with Yusanto in September 2006, before I conducted this 
reserach.  
24 ‗Bandwagon‘ is one of techniques of propaganda that aims to mobilize support by creating 
the impression of wide support. Propagandists use the tendency of individuals to ‗follow the crowd‘ 
(Sproule 2001: 136).  
25 The 15,000 figure comes from the Director of International Crisis Group in Southeast Asia, 
Sydney Jones (personal communication).  This estimation was made in 2009; and it is likely that the 
membership of HTI has grown since then.  
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though the number of its members is important, the strength of HTI should be seen in 
its ability to influence sociey rather than in the actual number of its members.  
 
B. The Objective: Reviving the Transnational Rule of Khilafah 
The ultimate goal of HTI is to establish a khilafah government  in a Muslim country 
that adheres to no law except the shari‘ah, leading eventually to global Islamic rule, 
which it claims stood since the era of Prophet Muhammad until the fall of the last 
Ottoman government in Turkey in 1924. It believes that the establishment of the 
khilafah is the only way to continue the Islamic way of life (istinaf al-hayah al-
islamiyah). This idea of khilafah is however not the original goal of the founder of 
HT, al-Nabhani. Before establishing HT in 1953, al-Nabhani was active in various 
Arab nationalist movements including the Ba‘th party in Jordan. In this period, the 
major concern of al-Nabhani was the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity to expel 
Western Colonizers. This is apparent from his early books published in 1950, 
including Inqadh al-Filastine (Saving Palestine) (al-Nabhani 1950a) and Risalah al-
Arab (The Message for the Arab) (al-Nabhani 1950b), which make no suggestion 
about the necessity of the khilafah to liberate Palestine and achieve Arab unity.  
 Unlike al-Nabhani‘s later emphasis on Islamic ideology, the Ba‘ath is a leftist 
movement that carried a secular Pan-Arabist ideology, aimed at creating a 
revolutionary change in Arab lands by toppling the monarchical government of the 
Arab states and replacing them with a socialist government and thereby uniting all 
Arab countries. According to Taji-Farouki- who has conducted the most 
comprehensive research on HT- in 1949 al-Nabhani took part in a plot by the Ba‘ath 
to topple King Abdullah of Jordan but failed. His involvement in the Ba‘th was 
 42 
 
 
intense. His primary role included ensuring communication between the leader of the 
Ba‘th in Jordan with the leader of Syrian Ba‘th party during the coup attempt against 
the Jordanian ruler (Taji-Farouki 1996: 3; 1994: 368-372). 
 After the encounter with the Ba‘th, al-Nabhani found a weakness in the 
secularity of the Ba‘th Pan-Arabist ideology. Al-Nabhani begun emphasizing Islam as 
an ideology and started preaching khilafah as a religious duty and as a political goal. 
Al-Nabhani convinced a number of his colleagues in Palestine, including As‘ad and 
Rajab Bayyud Tamimi dan Abdul Qadim Zallum, to establish a political party he 
called Hizb al-Tahrir. In 1952 they made attempts to gain official recognition from the 
Jordanian government, first as a political party and then as a social organization, but 
was rejected because the khilafah objective ran counter to the Jordanian constitution. 
Without legal status, al-Nabhani and his colleagues promoted HT‘s ideas through 
religious services and by secretly distributing leaflets. In March 1953, the party 
activists declared the establishment of HT in its weekly publication of Al-Sarih. It did 
not take long for the new movement to grow. Only one year after its declaration, in 
1953 it was successful in expanding its presence to neighbouring countries like 
Palestine, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Syria (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 7; Samarah 2003: 16-35). 
Now, more than 40 years after its founding HT has a presence in more than 40 
countries including, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Uzbekistan Tajikistan, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Chad, Sudan, the United Kingdom, Germany and 
USA. It operates under state repression in most of the Muslim world, except in few 
countries like Indonesia, but it enjoys political freedom in some Western countries 
such as the Britain and Australia. Even though the current Amir (central leader) of HT, 
Atho Abu Rustha, lives in an unpublicised location in the Middle East, HT‘s wilayah 
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(country branch) in the UK is central in the organization of HT 
internationally,
26
especially in the production of HT literature. The Khilafah 
publication house that published many of HT‘s literature in English is based in the 
United Kingdom.  
The founding of HT was followed by the publication of a series of books to 
justify the khilafah cause and describes al-Nabhani‘s unique strategy to realize it. HT 
emphasises that the fall of the Ottoman Empire was the ―most disastrous calamity‖ 
that happened to Islam and this led to the further decline of Muslim societies and 
therefore re-establishing the khilafah is the only way to resurrect Muslim supremacy 
(Zallum 2000: 187). The appeal to the return of the glory of the khilafah signifies the 
more revolutionary character of HT compared to other Islamist movements. Even 
though HT shares the goal of other Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood  
in bringing the rule of God to earth (justified in the doctrines of tahkimiyah), the 
international orientation of khilafah differs from the political objective of other 
Islamist movements by advocating terms like ‗shari‘ah application‘ and ‗Islamic 
state.‘ Al-Nabhani‘s khilafah ideology, according to Taji-Farouki, signifies the radical 
and unique character of HT. She puts it this way:  
The caliphal state theory and the political discourse of 
Nabhani represented a specific juncture in the radicalization of 
the discourse typified by Al-Banna and the ‗old‘ MB [Muslim 
Brotherhood] from the 1950s. Indeed his overall conception of 
Islam rests on theoretical assumptions reflecting a way station 
between the two distinct camps of Islamic reformism and 
Islamic radicalism. The reform tradition was shaped by 
modernist intellectuals such as Jama Al-Din Al-Nabhani and 
Muhammad Abduh, culminating in Al-Banna and the ‗old‘ 
                                               
26 The location of HT‘s headquarter is a contentious issue. The claim that HT Britain presently 
serves as HT‘s headquarter is made by Cohen (2003) and Karagiannis (2006). During al-Nabhani era, 
HT headquarter moved from one country to another. In the beginning it was based onal-Nabhani‘s 
resident in Jordan, but when he moved to Damascus he relocated the headquarters with him (Cohen 
1982; Taji-Farouki 1996).   
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MB. The radicalist trend was formulated in its comprehensive 
ideological expression by Qutb (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 71-72).  
 
To support its argument for khilafah, HT refers to an historical account of the 
decline of Islamic civilization. It believes that the fall of the khilafah has a significant 
role in the decline of Islamic supremacy. It sees the khilafah as an institution that 
protects Islamic rule. Therefore Western forces targeted this institution as a way to 
control the Muslim world. To achieve this goal, the West started with attacking the 
intellectual foundation or ideology of Islam that supports the ruling of a state based on 
Islamic law. Al-Nabhani refers this to an Islamic understanding that connects Islamic 
thought (fikroh) and method (thariqoh). This is the reason that Muslims fail to 
understand the necessary linkage between Islamic rules (also explained in the concept 
of fikroh) and their implementation by the state (referring to the concept of thariqoh). 
This implies that Islamic law cannot be implemented without an Islamic state (al-
Nabhani 2001a: 5).  
He believes the West was aware of this vitality of Islamic ideology. Therefore 
they launched cultural and missionary invasions to introduce secularism that promoted 
the separation between state and religion. According to al-Nabhani, this agenda of the 
West was made easy by the intellectual decline of the ummah; a side-impact of the 
growing military supremacy of the Ottoman Empire. Military achievement distracted 
the attention of the Caliph to Muslim intellectual decline. The closing of the door for 
ijtihad (juristic reasoning) led to the decline of creative thinking among Muslim. As a 
result, they tended to understand Islamic laws in accordance with the claims of the 
Western scholars. In his words, ―Islam is understood in a way that satisfied the 
accuser [the West]‖ (al-Nabhani 2001a: 10). They accepted principles influenced by 
Western way of thinking like that that says ―it is not prohibited to change the rules 
 45 
 
 
according to the changing of the time‖ and ―Tradition is the arbiter‖ (which means 
Islamic law should be implemented in accordance with local tradition) (al-Nabhani 
2001a: 6).  This flexible way of thinking, for al-Nabhani, set the standard for the 
success of Western intellectual attack that led to Muslim neglect of the importance of 
an Islamic state (al-Nabhani 2001a: 11). 
In HT‘s view, the Western intellectual invasion was followed by a series of 
political invasions. In his book, How the Khilafah was Destroyed (2000), that provides 
a detailed account of the process toward the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Abdul 
Qadhim Zallum (the second leader of HT after the death of al-Nabhani) argues that 
after weakening the ideological base of Islam the West incited separatist political 
tendencies in the territory of the khilafah. Provinces (under the Ottoman Empire) like 
Turkey, Persia and some areas in Europe served as the gates of Western political 
invasions. The West supported separatist movements in states like Serbia and Malta 
and then exported that strategy to Arab countries. In 1798, through its agent, 
Muhammad Ali Pasha (also known as Mehmet Ali Pasha), who was the governor of 
Egypt, France succeeded in invading Egypt and marched into Palestine, Lebanon and 
Syria (Zallum 2000: 5). HT argues that in the 19
th
 century France extended its 
occupation to Africa and India. Britain and France divided Muslim lands in the secret 
agreement named Sykes-Picot. The pact granted Britain control over Haifa and France 
gained Turkey, Northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. It believes that it is this agreement 
that established the current borders of the Middle East (HTI, 13 July 2007).  
HT‘s argument about the role of the Western intellectual invasion that 
destroyed the khilafah provides a critical footnote for the association of Islamic 
fundamentalism and the Islamic puritan movement, Wahabism. HT claims that 
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Wahabism was part of the Western conspiracy to create division in the khilafah 
government. It argues that the founder of Wahabism, Abdul Aziz Ibn Muhammad ibn 
Saud, was a British agent who assisted the British force in its attack on the khilafah 
from within. Wahabism is also seen as a part of the Western support for tribal leaders 
like ibn Saud in his effort to establish an Islamic state within the khilafah (Zallum 
2000: 5).  
Zallum argues that the success of the West in dismembering the khilafah 
government relied on the influence of missionary groups and the founding of secret 
organizations to raise the sentiment of nationalism within the khilafah territories. 
Central in these operations were the cities of Istanbul and Beirut, which stood at the 
heart of the khilafah government. In Istanbul, France supported the founding of a 
nationalist organization named ―Young Turks.‖ The group‘s success in mobilizing 
nationalist sentiment among the people caused a major blow to the government of 
khilafah. A key leader who was born from the group was Mustafa Kemal. Irrespective 
of Kemal‘s role in the Turkish struggle against the British, Zallum believes that 
history shows the clear motivation of Kemal. He was a traitor to the khilafah (Zallum 
2000: 90).  
Zallum claims that Kemal was actually a Jew who served as an agent for the 
British.
27
 To justify this claim, Zallum cites stories that demonstrate the relationship 
between Kemal and the British. For example, he wrote that when Kemal went to Syria 
with a goal of fighting the British force, he betrayed Syria which fell into the hands of 
the British by pulling his troop from Anatolia (Zallum 2000: 90). For HT, this is not a 
surprise because Kemal has repeatedly stated his intention to separate Turkey from the 
                                               
27 This argument is based on the city origin of Kemal, Thessaloniki (now part of Greece), that 
had a large Jewish population. However, according to historian Andrew Mango, Kemal‘s parents were 
Albanian Muslims (Mango 2002: 27).  
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government of khilafah. The alliance between Kemal and Britain is also based on a 
frequently cited statement, which according to HT, was made by Kemal. The 
statement says: ―Was not it because of khilafah, Islam and ulama that made Turkish 
farmers went to war and died for centuries? It is time for Turkey to take care of its 
own affairs and ignore Indian and Arabs. Turkey has to separate itself [from khilafah] 
to lead Muslims.‖ With the help of Britain, Kemal assumed political power in Turkey 
in 1942 and officially abolished the khilafah government (HTI, 13 July 2007). 
Based on this account, HT argues that the key factor of the decline of Islamic 
supremacy was the division of Muslim societies based on the nation-state system 
planted by the West. Therefore, HTI asserts that establishing a universal government 
of Muslims as modelled by the khilafah should be the main goal of the Islamic 
struggle. The establishment of the khilafah is considered a matter of life and death 
because it is the only political institution that can uphold the implementation of 
Islamic laws, revive the ummah and establish the supremacy of Islam over all other 
religions (Zalum 2000: 187). Zallum wrote:  
Establishing the khilafah is conclusively a vital issue, because 
in addition to being a method to transform our lands from Kufr 
homeland into an Islamic homeland, its establishment is also 
aimed at destroying the Kufr systems (Zallum 2000: 202). 
 
To justify this goal, HT elevates the level of khilafah establishment from a 
means to implement God‘s laws into a necessity by arguing that the establishment of 
the khilafah is a communal obligation (fardlu kifayah) of the Muslim ummah. Like 
other Islamists, HT draws on to verses in the Qur‘an about the obligation for Muslims 
to implement God‘s laws (e.g. QS. 5: 48-49). However, HT interprets this command 
with reference to the post-Muhammad era when the executor of God‘s laws was a 
caliph. Using the basic principle in Islamic jurisprudence (ushul al-fiqh) that ―what is 
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required for implementing a duty (wajib) is by itself a duty (wajib),‖ (ma la yatim al 
wajib illa bih, fa hua al-wajib), HT argues that the establishment of the khilafah is 
necessary to implement God‘s laws (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain 2000: 27). 
This argument is also supported by HT‘s understanding of the doctrines of bay‟ah 
(allegiance) and imamah (leadership), which are based on several sayings of the 
Prophet (hadiths). Two of the most frequently cited hadiths are (Members of Hizb ut-
Tahrir in Britain 2000: 25-26):  
Whosoever takes off his hand from allegiance to Allah, will meet im 
on the Day of Resurrection without having any proof for him. And 
those who dies without any bay‘ah (allegiance) on his neck (to a 
Khalifah) he dies a death of jahiliyah (ignorance) 
 
He who pledges allegiance to an Imam giving him the clasp of his 
hand and the fruit of his heart shall obey him as long as he can, and if 
another comes to dispute with him you have to strike the neck of the 
man‖.  
 
For HT, the obligation to have a bay‟ah refers to the practice of bay‟ah as a 
mechanism in political succession in the khilafah era, which was practiced by the 
Prophet‘s companions after his death. The first thing that the early generation of 
Muslim did after the death of the Prophet was to appoint Prophet Muhammad‘s 
closest companion, Abu Bakr, as caliph. This story, for HT, indicates a political 
leadership (imamah)-- interpreted by HT as khilafah-- is a crucial matter.
28
 Despite the 
suspicion that these stories were cited to support political establishment in the khilafah 
period, HT claims that establishing a khilafah government is a communal duty (fardh 
al-kifayah) - a consensus of Sunni ulamas (mu‟tabar ulama). In support of this view, 
HTI quotes the following citation from Imam al-Qurtubi‘s interpretation of a Qur‘anic 
verse (2: 20) on the matter of imamah (HTI, 20 June, 2009): 
                                               
28 Lengthy argument the obligation to establish the khilafah can be founded in Zallum (2000: 
191-206) and Member of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain (2000: 24-32).  
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―…this verse states that having an imam and khalifah (caliph) to be 
heard and obeyed and to reconcile opinions and implement it, through 
khilafah, and the laws on khilafah. There is no dispute on this 
obligation among the ummah and the imams except what was 
narrated by al-Ashaam… 
…He said: if the necessity to have an imam is not a duty for the 
Quraysh and others, why was there discussion and debate about 
imaamah? Indeed people would say: Imaamah is not a duty for 
Quraysh and others, why did uneccesarily you debate on something 
that is not a duty?  
He then said: Therefore it has been decided that imaamah is a duty 
based on sharia‘ah, not logic. And this is very clear.‖  
 
Further, HT believes that the return of khilafah is divinely destined because 
this is the promise of God.  It suggests that the Prophet Muhammad foretold the return 
of the khilafah after its destruction, suggested with reference to the following hadith:  
Prophethood will last with you for as long as Allah wants it to last. 
Then He will end it if He wishes to end it. Then there will be Khilafah 
according to the method of prophethood, and things will be as Allah 
wishes them to be. There will be a hereditary rule, and things will be 
as Allah wishes them to be. Then He will end it if He wishes to end it. 
Then there will be an oppressive rule, and things will be as Allah 
wishes them to be.  Then he will end it if He wishes to end it. Then 
there will be Khilafah according to the method of prophethood‖ 
(Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain 2000:116).   
 
In reference to this hadith, HT asserts that oppression against the da‘wah 
movements is indicative of the near coming of the khilafah. It holds the belief that the 
Prophet has foretold that there will be a period of hereditary or tyrant rule before the 
return of the khilafah. Further, it cites ‗messianic‘ prophecies mentioning that the 
khilafah will return before the end of the world as a culmination of the battle between 
the followers of God and Disbelievers. More specifically it believes that the Prophet 
predicted that the khilafah will arise again from Bait al-Maqdis (al-Quds) in Palestine 
(Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain 2000: 117).  
Answering those who downplay the khilafah ideal as utopian, HT claims that 
the inevitable return of the khilafah is not only recorded in prophecies, but has also 
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been admitted by Western scholars and intelligence agencies. It repeats arguments 
about the endless effort of the West to destroy and prevent the return of khilafah as an 
indication of their fear of its return to revive Muslim dominance. After the fall of 
communism, HT accuses the West of seeing the return of the khilafah as the most 
serious threat to Capitalism. HTI‘s most recent argument to justify this claim refers to 
a report of the US-based National Intelligent Council (NIC) which discusses the return 
of a ‗new caliph‘ as a scenario for a future world.29  
To strengthen this cause, HT argues that Islam has provided a complete 
political order to replace democracy and other secular systems. HT proposes a draft 
constititution for a khilafah state that adopts the principles outlined in al-Nabhani‘s 
book Nidhaam al-Islam (The System of Islam) (an-Nabhani 2002). It also published 
books about different aspects of the khilafah system.
30
  
While the khilafah message is the hallmark of HT, it is not the only unique 
character of HT.  It also offers a revolutionary strategy that it claims is an alternative 
to failing Islamic movements. The following section discusses this.  
 
C.  The Theory of Change: Reviving Islam as A Political Ideology  
Al-Nabhani‘s theory of change underlies the profound roles of Muslim intellectual 
stagnancy and corruption leading to the fall of the khilafah. This intellectual problem 
takes the form of the Muslim inability to understand the nature of true Islamic thought 
(fikroh), methods to implement this Islamic thought (thariqoh) and the interconnection 
                                               
29
 The report says the rise a ‗new caliph‘ is one of four worst scenarios in 2020, including the 
expansion of US-dominated world (Pax-Americana), a world led by China and India, and a world 
dominated by the proliferation of weaponry and terrorism. The report suggests that in any these 
scenarios the US will remain dominant (National Intelligence Council: 2004: 83).  
30 See for example, Zallum (2009), ―Sistem Keuangan Negara Khilafah;‖ Hizbut Tahrir (2006) 
―Struktur Negara Khilafah: Pemerintahan dan Aministrasi;‖ Hamd (2008), ―Khilafah Rasyidah yang 
Telah Dijanjikan dan Tantangan-Tantangannya.‖ 
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between them. The fikroh is a comprehensive description of the relations between life, 
the universe and God. Such an understanding necessitates the view that all aspects of 
life are controlled and directed by the laws of God. The true Islamic fikroh will show 
that the laws of God provide extensive solutions for all the problems of humanity. The 
thariqah is the method of implementing the laws of God in managing human life. The 
combination of fikroh and thariqah forms ideology (mabda).
31
 Based on this 
argument, the task of HT is to rehabilitate the true understanding of fikroh and 
thariqah, signify their interconnectedness and their combination as an ideology (an-
Nabhani 2001b: 4).  
Understanding Islam as an ideology is crucial in HT‘s narration because it sees 
the Western intellectual and cultural invasion as a ‗war of ideas‘ (ghazw al-fikr) that 
has stolen the ideological character of Islam. This ‗de-ideologsized‘ Islam takes the 
form of a partial understanding of Islam, which separates religion from the state. As a 
part of the Western offense to Islam, Muslims are driven to accept the division 
between Islamic court (shar‟ai) that deals only with family issues and the civic court 
(nizami) that administers all other aspects of life. Islam as a complete system manages 
all affairs of human life is erased from the Muslim mind. The ummah is taught to see 
Islam only as a religious or spiritual matter. The ideological perspective, seen as the 
élan vital of Islam, is buried by corrupted ideas of anti-Islamic colonial power (an-
Nabhani 2002: 58). 
To deal with this intellectual invasion, the task of HTI is therefore to assume 
the intellectual leadership of Islam (al-qiyahad al fikriyah fi al Islam) by reviving the 
                                               
31 HT‘s translation of  ‗mabda‘ into ‗ideology is similar to popular concept of ideology that 
refers to a comprehensive set of ideas, worldview or goals of how society should work and provides 
foundations for political and social action (Blackburn 2005: 178) . By using this conception, HT draws 
Muslim attention of Islam as a political ideology, more than mere spiritual and social teachings.       
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understanding of Islam as an ideology (an-Nabhani 2002: 33). In other words, HT 
works on the ‗ideologization‘of Islamic knowledge or the Muslim understanding of 
reality, and this is to teach the ummah that the establishment of the khilafah is a vital 
issue and therefore the work toward its realization is urgent. Al-Nabhani therefore 
emphasizes the role of HT as an intellectual leader of the masses. This is similiar to 
Lenin‘s theory of change, identified by Taji-Farouki as follows: 
Al-Nabhani used the metaphor of ‗fusing in a crucible‘ to describe 
how the party would purge the ummah‘s intellectual make-up and 
make it one with the party ideology. The early Leninist notion of 
the party as the elite, vanguard, educator of the masses and an 
organization of professional revolutionaries echoes throughout his 
discussions of the character and role of Hizb al-Tahrir (Taji-
Farouki: 1994: 372). 
 
Al-Nabhani‘s past experience with the Ba‘ath party was influential in shaping 
this vision. This is apparent in his familiarity with the ―vanguardist model‖ of 
movement reflected in his theory of change set out in his book ‗Takattu al-Hizb‘ or 
‗structuring a party‘ that centres on the idea of ‗kutla‟ (circle) (an-Nabhani 2001b). He 
argues that raising the awareness of the ummah needs a group of committed 
individuals (fi‟a or vanguard) who will work as a group or party. The vanguard will 
form a first cell that will assume an intellectual leadership in the ummah by moulding 
public opinion in favour of the party ideology. The primary character of the vanguard 
is the ability to understand and present realities from an ideological perspective with 
understanding and commitment to maintain the purity of the party ideology, and 
sensitivity toward the potential influence of foreign thoughts that pose obstacles for 
the party objective. Called fi‟a muhtara mumtaza (most highly sensitive group), the 
vanguard needs an ability to present a clear elaboration of the party‘s ideology. With 
commitment, consistency, and ideological purity, the vanguard forms the first cell (al-
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khalqah al-ula) which will develop into a party (al-kutla al-hizbiyah). Al-Nabhani 
believes that the multiplication of this process will eventually create a new awareness 
in society that will challenge the legitimacy of the existing order. He suggests that like 
a living organism this process will eventually develop into an embryonic force that 
cannot be blocked even by a powerful and repressive regime (an-Nabhani 2001b: 26-
32).  
The focus on this task of preparing vanguards is important for the future 
mobilization that will seize power and initiate total change. The movement should not 
be distracted with attempts at making gradual or partial changes. It only accepts a 
comprehensive and immediate application of Islamic law, ―without delay, 
postponement or graduation... The gradual implementation contradicts the rules of 
Islam totally, and it renders those who implement some of the rules and abandon some 
of the rules, sinful before Allah, whether they were individuals, groups or a State‖ 
(Hizb ut-Tahrir: 268) 
            Arguing against gradual approach for change, al-Nabhani sees the problem 
faced by Muslim societies as fundamental and therefore the only solution is a 
fundamental or systemic change (inqilab shamil).  He believes that the change toward 
the revival of the ummah must start from changing the present system of unbelief. As 
cited by Taji-Faoruki (1996: 76), al-Nabhani proposed this revolutionary vision as a 
critique to the reformist movements in Muslim societies. He wrote: 
The Islamic world today is a Domain of Unbelief, having 
abandoned Islamic government. Consequently most Muslims view 
it as corrupted, and hold that it is in need for reform. However, 
reform signifies eliminating corruption from prevailing situation. 
This is inappropriate because the Islamic world really needs a 
comprehensive and radical transformation (inqilab shamil) that 
will eradicate the rule of unbelief and strive to establish Islamic 
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government: reform actually perpetuates the corruption‖ 
(translated by Taji-Farouki from al-Nabhani (1953: 45).  
 
Al-Nabhani sees the state and its system as an entity that consists of various 
elements; and therefore efforts to oppose the system should be carried out by an equal 
entity - society as a whole. He believes that it is the change of society that will change 
the individual, not the reverse. In his words: ―Aslih al-mujtama, yaslih al fardi wa 
yastamiru islahiha‖ (Reform the society, this will lead to reform of the individual 
constantly) (an-Nabhani 2001a:  61).  
To illustrate the primacy of society in his theory of change, al-Nabhani uses a 
metaphor of a boiling kettle: 
Society is similar to water in a large kettle; if anything that causes 
the temperature to drop is placed beneath the kettle then the water 
freezes and transforms to ice. Similarly, if corrupted ideologies 
are introduced into the society then it would freeze in corruption 
and continue in deterioration and decline. However, if a 
contradictory ideology were introduced into society, then 
contradictions would appear in it, and the society would struggle 
with these contradictions and instability will prevail. However if 
flaming heat was put under the kettle, the water would warm and 
then boil and effuse an intense stirring vapour. Similarly, if the 
correct ideology was introduced into the society it would be a 
flame whose heat would transform the society to boiling point 
and then to a dynamic force… (Ideology) is the fire and light 
which will burn and enlighten, know that society is in a state of 
transformation and it will definitely reach boiling point and the 
points of movement and dynamism (an-Nabhani 2001a: 62). 
 
             Even though the role of the masses is important, HT is aware it cannot move a 
large mass of people because this limits its role to that of a ‗political educator‘ rather 
than a social activist. HT therefore seeks to baypass the road toward mass influence 
by approaching elites within Muslim societies. Once HT has gained the leadership of 
the elite then it seeks to draw the masses into its ideology and programmes like boiled 
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water in a kettle until it is ready to explode; HT will then lead a revolutionary 
movement to establish the khilafah. 
 
D. The Strategy to Change: Mobilizing Political Detachment  
HT‘s heavy emphasis on intellectual struggle is not without practical outcomes. The 
significance of intellectual work to educate the ummah lies in the goal of creating a 
political instability that will justify HT‘s campaign for systemic change. The 
education of the people is part of the goal of undermining the legitimacy of the 
exisitng political order. To achieve this goal, HT rejects violent methods and instead 
advocates the strategy of political detachment.  
            This orientation is encapsulated in several key concepts on the conduct of the 
relationship with the state, including ‗kasyf al-khuttath,‘ (exposing the failures [of the 
rulers]) (al-Nabhani 1958: 5), ‗dharb al-„alaqoh‟ (attacking existing bonds in 
societies and between societies and the state) (al-Nabhani 1958: 3-5) and ‗mufaroqoh‘ 
(separation [between societies and government]) (Al-Wa‟ie 6: 12-16). These doctrines 
are based on an understanding that a society consists of ideas (mafahim), rules 
(maqayis) and a submissive attitude toward rules (qana‟at). The combination of these 
three elements forms a system, which requires implementation by a ruler and 
submission from the people. It is believed that the key to destroying the system is 
therefore eliminating the consent (thiqoh) or submission (wala‟) of the people to the 
other two elements of the state, the political system and the ruler (Al-Wa‟ie 58: 42). 
The following paragraph in HT‘s training manual, Dukhul al-Mujtama (Entering 
Society) (Hizb al-Tahrir 1953), elaborates this strategic vision:  
[the activities of the party are aimed at] attacking all forms of 
interaction in societies in order to influence their relationships is 
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not enough; but all interactions between rulers and their people 
have to be shaken with a full strength...in this way it can 
influence all forms of relationship in societies...as long as the 
hand that hold power to rule societies is not beaten in full strength 
and in a continuous way, societies will not understand their 
failures and the necessity for changes...Therefore it is imperative 
for party members to focus on attacking all forms of relationship 
between rulers and their people (Hizb al-Tahrir 1958: 3). 
 
More practically this vision is further elaborated in a book published by HT 
that equals Lenin‘s ―What is To Be Done‖ titled ―The Method of Hizb al-Tahrir for 
Change.‖32 The central themes of the book include the principles of non-cooperation 
and non-participation. 
The strategy of non-cooperation is reflected in HT‘s emphasis on political 
activity and its principle of rejection to undertake social activities because they are 
seen as strengthening the legitimacy of the existing system. HT critisizes Islamic 
movements that focus on social and spiritual goals (Hizb al-Tahrir 1999: 31). This 
refers to groups that aim to improve the status of Muslim societies in non-political 
areas like education, social service, morality, and spirituality. Although this argument 
does not make reference to specific Muslim groups, this characterization could be 
applied to Muslim social organizations. These include, for example, the Salafis and 
Wahabis who focus on reforming Muslim belief (aqidah) and Muslim social 
organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia that operate in 
spiritual, social and educational areas. For HT, the absence of political orientation 
makes them uncritical of the established non-Islamic system. It sees that Muslim 
activities in these non political sectors are not helpful in uprooting the existing secular 
                                               
32 This book is not written by al-Nabhani but is originally a lecture paper of the delegate of HT 
for a conference of Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) in 22 December in 1989 in Missouri (Al-
Wa‟ie 78: 63). The paper was published in a booklet and republished in Bahasa Indonesia by a 
publisher associated to HTI, Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, entitled ―Strategi Dakwah Hizbut Tahrir‖ (1997). 
The name of the author is not revealed. 
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system. This is reflected in its policy not to help them to create economic, 
educational, social or moral reforms. This is because to provide this type of service is 
a form of support to ―tyrants‖ and helps prolong the life of their corrupt and Kufr 
system‖ (Hizb al-Tahrir 1999: 31).  
Parallel with this non-cooperation doctrine, HT advocates the path of non-
participation in both government and parliament. Even though HT declares itself to be 
a political party, its opposition to the present system leads to non-parliamentary 
activism. It considers participation in a non-Islamic system as a trap that will only 
strengthen the status quo. Except in a few cases in its early stage when few HT leaders 
ran for parliamentary election in Jordan, extra-parliamentary activism has been a 
dominant feature of HT. The book that specifically elaborates this strategy of the 
organization clearly sets out this principle:  
The party also does not accept participation in the ruling system of 
the government, because it is based on the ruling of Kufr 
(Disbelief), and this is a matter that is forbidden for Muslims (Hizb 
al-Tahrir 1999: 23).  
 
Likewise, participation in elections and the legislative process are considered a 
justification of the existing ―infidel‖ system. A book on the method of HT published 
by HT in Britain states ―it should be clear that any attempt at utilising the democratic 
structures that currently exist either through holding ministerial posts in governments 
that ruled by Kufr would be prohibited…Similarly putting forth bills that attempt to 
apply some aspects of the Shari‘ah rules and then voting on them would definitely be 
prohibited as this would be making the decision of man sovereign over the Hukm of 
Allah‖ (Hizb al-Tahrir 1999: 23).   
To implement these principles, al-Nabhani emphasized the importance of an 
uncompromising stance in order to maintain the purity of ideology. Any slight 
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deviation is cosidered dangerous for the movement. Such a stance is essential because, 
in HT‘s view, the influence of Western intellectual and cultural invasion into the 
Muslim world is acute. The most serious threat to the purity of its ideology, according 
to al-Nabhani, is the argument coming from those who claim to work for the 
application of Islamic laws but have fallen into the trap of the reformist approach 
promoted by the enemies of Islam. HT sees the temptation to adopt this reformist 
approach as an intellectual corruption planted by the West to detract Muslim attention 
from its most important goal of resurrecting the khilafah (an-Nabhani 2002: 74).  
A helpful way to understand this confrontational principle is to compare it to 
the theory of ‗minority influence‘ proposed by social psychology theorist, Serge 
Moscovi. In contrast to the conformist view that influence flows from majority to 
minority, Moscovici argues that a consistent or uncompromising stance has the 
potential to exert influence on the majority. The minority group has the ability to 
change the majority group if members of a minority group have an agreed viewpoint 
(synchronic consistency) and maintain this in a determined manner. By being active 
and vocal, the minority group makes its presence felt and by being visible with an 
uncompromising stance it will create instability and conflict. The majority, faced with 
this ‗stubborn‘ radical minority, will inevitably realize the necessity to negotiate with 
the minority in an effort to maintain harmony and stability. However, a consistent 
stance by the minority will block the effort for negotiation. In this situation, 
Moscovici argues that restructuring the majority view in conformity with the minority 
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group will take place. Members of the majority will make an unconscious shift toward 
the minority side (Moscovici: 1976).
33
  
Parallel with Moscovici‘s notion of ―synchronic consistency,‖ Al-Nabhani 
uses the term ‗stubbornness‘ to describe the characteristic of HT activists, especially 
in dealing with opposing groups. This paragraph from al-Nabhani clearly commands a 
non-compromising stance: 
It is obligatory that the da‘wah be open and challenges everything, 
the customs and traditions, the incorrect thoughts and the distorted 
concepts; challenging even the public opinion if it is wrong, even 
if it has to struggle against it; challenging the false creeds and the 
false deens regardless of the stubbornness and bigotry of their 
adherents. Therefore, the da‘wah based on the Islamic ‗aqeedah, is 
distinguished by frankness, daring, strength, thought and the 
challenge to everything that disagrees with the Fikrah and the 
Tareekah and exposing their fallacy, irrespective of the 
consequences and circumstances and of whether the ideology 
agrees or disagrees with the masses, and whether the people 
accept, reject or oppose it. The carrier of the da‘wah does not 
flatter the people, nor compromise with them. He does not praise 
the ruler or influential people in the society, nor does he court 
them, rather he adheres to the ideology and to it alone, without 
giving any account for anything else (an-Nabhani 2002: 74).  
 
Al-Nabhani warns HT members that temptation for compromise can come 
from two factors; first the desire for security in relation to the ruler, both in the effort 
to avoid repression or to satisfy worldly interest and second, a compromise to utilize 
gradual or partial change. He reminds his followers that HT will only be satisfied by 
the immediate and total transformation of the secular system into an Islamic system. 
Al-Nabhani teaches: 
Delivering the da‘wah requires a concern for a complete 
implementation for the rules of Islam without the slightest 
concession. The carrier does not accept any truce nor concession, 
                                               
33 It is unlikely that HT‘s ideology has learned from this theory of change. The parallel of this 
theory to HT‘s approach is not not neglected by an HTI‘s leader I met. He seemed happy when I 
compared this theory to HTI‘s character (Interview with Erwin Permana, Jakarta, 19 September 2009). 
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negligence or postponement. Instead, he maintains the matter as 
a whole and definitely settles it immediately...‖ (an-Nabhani 
2002: 75-76). 
 
He is aware that this uncompromising stance will potentially cause tension not 
only in relation to the state, but also in relation to society. In relation to society, he 
anticipates two difficult options: consistency in facing the anger of the ummah or 
deviation to avoid this anger (al-Nabhani 1953: 50-51). Al-Nabhani argues that both 
options are dangerous and suggests dealing with the situation by holding onto the 
ideology of HT alone:  
It is imperative for the hizb members to adhere to ideology alone 
even though the hizb will be subject to ummah‘s resentment. But 
this resentment is temporary; the hizb consistency will win the 
ummah. There should be no deviation, even slightly. Ideology is 
the life of hizb and its guarantor of survival. (The party) always 
make the hizb points clear, exposing the colonialist plots, and 
remain populist (an-Nabhani 2001b: 48; see the Arabic version 
in al-Nabhani 1953: 51).  
 
E. Actions toward Change: Six-fold Agendas 
HT sets out a framework of action that categorizes its activities into six 
objectives, namely (Hizb al-Tahrir 1999: 29-35): 
1. Concentrated education (tathqif murokkaz), which is aimed at recruiting new 
members (syabab). This programme is carried out through study circles or 
training programmes that target limited audience from Muslim communities.  
2. Educating the masses (tathqif jama‟i) to create public awareness of the 
necessity of the khilafah and to develop sympathy with the organization.  
3. Intellectual struggle (shiro al-fikr) to challenge ideas or thoughts in society that 
are deemed harmful to the goal of resurrecting the khilafah.  
4. Political struggle (kifa siyasi) to undermine an un-Islamic system both in kufr 
or Muslim countries. This political struggle is not limited to challenging the 
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intellectual aspect of the state, but also refers to challenging military, economic 
and political structures.  
5. Caring for the affairs of Muslim societies (tabanni masalih al-ummah), which 
means presenting Islamic solutions on issues of the interests to the ummah in a 
way that confronts them with the policies of the existing government. 
6. Seeking support (thalab al-nusroh) that is aimed at securing political support 
and protection from powerful men, including elites in societies and most 
prominently military when they are opposed to the ideology of HTI.  
    This six fold agenda serves the double moves envisaged in al-Nabhani‘s 
notions of ‗dharb al-‘alaqoh‘ (literally ‗breaking relationship‘) (al-Nabhani 1958: 3-5) 
and ‗kasyf al-khuttah‘(challenging the rulers) (al-Nabhani 1958: 5). Dharb al-‟alaqoh 
can be considered moves toward societies aimed at breaking their loyalty to the state 
and the kasyf al-khuttath represents the move against the state in the form of exposing 
the inherent failures of the government and the political structure in general.  
The relationships between these double moves with the above six categories of 
agendas are not necessarily mutually exclusive; they overlap and are interconnected. 
Nonetheless, this categorization gives a perspective for understanding the roles of the 
different types of HTI‘s activities. In this picture, the agendas of concentrated 
education (tathqif murokkaz), public education (tathqif jama‟) and caring for the 
issues of the ummah (tabanni masaloh al-ummah) primarily serve the move toward 
social mobilization against the state (dharb al-„alaqoh) while intellectual struggle 
(shiro al-fikr) and political struggle (kifah siyasi) are primarily aimed at attacking the 
legitimacy of the state (kasf al-khuttath). Both of these moves are mutually 
interdependent. At the intersection between these double moves lies the endeavour to 
seek support (thalab al-nusroh) from elites in society and the leadership of the state 
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(ahl al-quwah). Success means gaining support from elites in societies that may foster 
mass mobilization. Support from elites in the state would deter the ability of the state 
to repress the opposition and eventually start a political crisis. Figure 2. illustrates the 
places of HT‘s plan of action in its strategy.  
 
Figure 2.2: HT‘s plans of action 
This outcome is similar to what Charles Tilly calls ‗revolutionary situations,‘ 
which are characterized by three conditions: the appearance of contenders competing  
to control the state, commitments to the claims by a significant section of the 
population, and  the inability of the state to deal effectively with the first and second 
conditions (Tilly 1978: 192). HT seeks to create these situations by uprooting the 
legitimacy of the established political system, mobilizing non-participation, and 
presenting itself as a legitimate and potential contender. In the process of creating 
these revolutionary situations, HT seeks to secure political support or protection from 
powerful elites (ahl al-quwwah), especially from the military to back the force of 
change 
 
 63 
 
 
 
 
 64 
 
 
Each of the six agendas of HT has its role, which can be categorized into two 
aims. The first aim includes programmes to educate the people that consists of public 
education (tathqif jama‟i), intellectual oppsition (shiro al-fikr), political opposition 
(kifah siyasi), and using key social issues to demonstrate government failures (tabanni 
masalih al-ummah). These endeavors may bring about (a) mass opposition against the 
system and (b) political detachment (non-participation and non-cooperation). The 
second aim includes programmes that target a specific audience and include 
concentrated education (tathqif murakkaz) that can (c) increase the number of 
members and therefore strengthen its role as the leader of political contention;  and 
seek support (thalab al-nusroh) for the purpose of (d) mobilizing backing from 
powerful leaders. In a situation of political crisis resulting from the existing system, 
HT seeks to play a leading role in initiating a political transition from democracy to 
khilafah. Figure 2.3 above illustrates the roles of HT‘s plan of action in promoting a 
revolutionary change.  
 
F. The Process of Change: Nusroh and Non-violent Transfer of Power 
HT sets out three stages of change. It starts with the formative period (tathqif) in 
which it produces core activists. The main agenda at this stage is running 
unpublicisized or clandestine study circles. After gaining sufficient activists, HT 
moves toward an open campaign or public education (tafa‟ul ma‟a al-ummah). The  
objective in this period is to encourage the public to oppose the existing system and 
enable HT to establish an influencial position in society and to secure support or 
protection from powerful elites. In the final stage, HT looks to seize power. It believes 
that in revolutionary situations when the established political system has lost 
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legitimacy and political crisis is taking place, power-holders will voluntarily submit to 
the force of change led by a popular political leadership (HT), which is supported by 
the masses and backed by powerful elites, especially the military. In this way a 
political transition toward the installation of the khilafah (istilam al-hukm) can take 
place in an extraordinary (extra-parliamentary) process like the Egyptian revolution in 
February 2011.  
This idealist vision is however lacking a historical basis. The leaders of HT 
had attempted to bypass this long process by inviting individual Muslim regimes to 
establish a khilafah government in their respective countries, and eventually serve as a 
point of expansion. This strategy was used in 1979 when the party leadership 
proposed a caliph position for the Iranian leader Ayatullah Khomeini but he ignored 
the offer (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 31). HT also attempted to persuade Libya‘s leader, 
Mu‘ammar Qadafi, to adopt the khilafah but he responded the call by sending HT 
activists in Libya to prison.
34
 
Another possible form of political transition sought by HT is a coup.
35
 This is 
reflected in HT‘s emphasis on thalab al-nusroh (seeking support from powerful elites) 
as an ideal process for political change. This vision is also confirmed by the fact  that 
al-Nabhani has taken part in several coup attempts during his life, including plots to 
overthrow the Jordanian regime in 1968, 1969 and 1971 and against authorities in 
Southern Iran in 1972 (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 27-28). In Indonesia, HTI claims that coup 
is not an option until it has secured sufficient support from the people.
36
 Without this 
                                               
34 In 1978, HTI held a four hours meeting with Qadafi and issued a communiqué calling 
Qadafi to adopt the khilafah (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 9 September, 1978) 
35 Coup attempts were mentioned in the biography of al-Nabhani translated into Bahasa 
Indonesia by an HTI‘s leader, Shiddiq Al-Jawi, but the paragraph that contains this information was 
removed in the last edition of the book (Samara: 2002 and Samara: 2003).  
36 Interview with Muhammad Rahmat Kurnia, Jakarta, 24 July, 2009. 
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any attempt to seize power is considered unsustainable.While the options for the 
process of political transition can be postponsed until the movement is ready to launch 
an attempt at seizing power, the focus of HT at this time is on creating the 
prerequisites for revolutionary situations as discussed above.     
 
G. Conclusion 
HTI is the Indonesian version of the transnational organization (HT) that carries the 
revolutionary doctrines of al-Nabhani. The foremost revolutionary character of HT is 
its call for the establishment of a universal government of khilafah. This represents 
HT‘s challenge to other Islamists movements that participate in the existing un-
Islamic system. HT opposes a reformist or (islahi) or a gradual (tadarruj) approach for 
change. Its doctrine teaches that only an immediate and total change (inqilab syamil) 
is acceptable.  
HT‘s strategy for revolution is however dissmiliar to the conventional model 
of revolution that advocates the use of violence to bring the state down. As an 
alternative to violence, HT focuses on the strategies of non-coperation and non-
participation in order to uproot the existing political system and to undermine the 
state. For this purpose HT applies a double-move strategy. On one hand, it works to 
educate the masses about the failures of the state and provoke political opposition and 
detachment (dharb al-‟alaqoh). As an integral part of this move, HT seeks to establish 
an influential position in society to prepare a future role in political mobilization. On 
the other hand, HT works to undermine the legitimacy of the state by exposing its 
failures and danger (kasyf al-khuttath).   
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HT‘s theory of change emphasizes the importance of actually changing 
societies — rather than changing individuals – in order to delegitimize the existing 
system. It assumes that by provoking mass opposition it will be able to persuade the 
power-holders to co-operate with the demand for a fundamental change. HT envisages 
a revolution from above. At the end of the day, it believes that it will be powerful 
people who will play a critical role in facilitating fundamental change. Therefore, HT 
emphasizes the agenda of thalab al-nusroh (seeking support) to find a political patron 
and secure backing from elites in society and the state, especially the military. This 
vision by implication leads to the coup model for political change. HT however 
believes that by combining social mobilization against the existing political system 
and securing support from powerful elites it can achieve a peaceful transition toward 
the establishment of the khilafah.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Discourse: 
Deligitimation and Conciliation in the Battle of Thought 
 
There is a reason why Nixon Centre‘s analyst, Zeyno Baran, titled her contentious 
work on Hizb al-Tahrir ‗Fighting the War of Ideas‘ (Baran 2005). Discourse is a 
major part of HTI‘s fight for the khilafah. This serves its goal of undermining the 
legitimacy of the intellectual aspect of the existing political system. For HTI, a 
political system (democracy) cannot stand without the consent or trust (thiqoh) of the 
people. It therefore seeks to carry an intellectual battle against democracy by 
continuously exposing the failures of the State and arguing that the only solution is to 
replace democracy with the Islamic political system of khilafah. This chapter analyses 
the discourse aspect of HTI to understand the degree of its commitment in challenging 
the democratic system. To evaluate HTI‘s consistency in opposing democracy, it 
follows references to various aspects of democracy in its publications. They include: 
the political system (state ideology or Pancasila, state form called Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia/NKRI, the constitution, the democratic system and election 
process), the political institutions (the government, the House of Representatives, 
political parties, the police and the military), and the instances of Muslim non-party 
participation in democratic processes.  
The analysis follows the spectrum of orientation for change as discussed in 
chapter one (pages 26-27) that consists of three categories: moderate (political 
integration/participation), radical (critical participation), and extreme (political 
 69 
 
 
disengagement). Cases are analysed in a scale of 1 to 3 that represent the three 
categories. Based on this, it presents frequency and average analyses to identify its 
level of opposition to different aspects of the State.  
 
A. The Discourse on the Political System 
There are 80 references to key aspects of political systems including Pancasila (state 
ideology), the 1945 Constitution (also called Undang-Undang Dasar/UUD 1945), 
democracy, elections, and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia/NKRI (the 
form of the state). Overall, the discourse on political system has never been at each 
end of the spectrum: extreme or moderate. On sensitive or fundamental elements of 
Indonesia‘s democratic system such as Pancasila and the NKRI, the language tends to 
be moderate. In contrast, HTI‘s is highly opposed to democracy and election. 
Discourse on these two interconnected aspects of the political system is however not 
consistent. The nature of the discourse on democracy is more extreme than the 
discourse on election. Between these different trends, a fair mix of extreme, radical 
and moderate discourse appears in the references to the Constitution (see figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1: The frequency and nature 
of discourse on political system 
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Figure 3.2: discourse on state system in continuum 
Democracy is the most frequent discussed subject. The nature of the language 
is almost consistently extreme. Being a dominant subject, the large amount of extreme 
language on democracy drags the overall nature of HTI‘s discourse on the politica l 
system toward an extreme position at the average score of 2.4. Out of 76 references, 
49 extreme representations outnumber nearly 13 moderate and 14 radical. Figure 3.2 
summarizes the spectrum of the nature of HTI‘s discourse on the political system. The 
proportion suggests that HTI‘s strong opposition to democracy is not consistent with 
its discourse on other aspects of the political system that combine both challenging 
and conciliatory discourse.  
 
A.1.Conciliatory Discourse on Pancasila and NKRI  
HTI‘s discourse on these two fundamental elements of Indonesia‘s democratic system 
demonstrates its avoidance to confront them. This is shown in the rare reference to 
them when it criticized the political system. These are only 12 references to these 
elements out of 76 references to the political system. This lack of reference to these 
core aspects of the political system suggests that HTI wish to avoid confrontation. 
This is confirmed by the dominance of moderate representations. HTI however could 
not always hide its opposition to Pancasila and the NKRI. Occasional challenges 
occurred in one extreme representation on NKRI and three radical representations on 
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Pancasila. This combination forms the average nature of the discourse on these 
subjects as 1.7 for Pancasila and 1.6 for NKRI (see figure 3.1 and 3.2).  
 HTI‘s opposition to Pancasila is clear. Its goal to turn Indonesia into an 
Islamic state contradicts the essence of Pancasila that became the foundation for 
Indonesia as a non-Islamic state. This stance is sometimes clear in the publications 
and public statements of HTI‘s leaders. In Al-Wa‟ie, for example, Ismail Yusanto, 
criticized Pancasila as insufficient for managing society. He argued that Pancasila is 
only ―a set of philosophical ideas‖ that lacks practicality and therefore it has been 
understood and implemented in different ways by Soeharto and Soekarno (Al-Wa‟ie 
87: 41). In 2004, during the parliamentary session to reform the Constitution, HTI 
raised its call for a reconsideration of Pancasila as the foundation of the nation (Al-
Wa‟ie 24: 8). In 2007, it opposed the idea to reinforce Soeharto‘s ―asas tunggal‖ (sole 
basis) policy that forced all political and social organization to adopt Pancasila as the 
foundation of their organizations (Republika, 13 September 2007).     
However, such public opposition to Pancasila was rare. Its discourse on 
Pancasila was often uncritical and even legitimating. This is reflected in its opposition 
to the asas tunggal policy.  HTI carefully limited its rhetoric to challenging the policy, 
a common position of many Islamist groups, instead of attacking Pancasila itself. HTI 
countered the view suggesting that the use of Islam as a basis of organization is a 
threat to national disintegration. It argued the reverse. The enforcement of the asas 
tunggal policy is a threat to national integration. For HTI the asas tunggal, not 
Pancasila, is part of the Western conspiracy to eliminate Islam (Al-Islam 373). Instead 
of challenging Pancasila, HTI often referred to Pancasila to justify its arguments. For 
example, to counter the view that the implementation of the shari‘ah in Indonesia is a 
threat to Pancasila, HTI argued that the idea of implementing the shari‘ah should be 
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accommodated by the first pillar of Pancasila, ―belief in the oneness of God‖ (Al 
Wa‟ie 71: 4). This suggests that Pancasila is compatible with the implementation of 
the shari‘ah.  
When comparing other ideologies such as capitalism and socialism with Islam, 
HTI did not make the same argument about Pancasila despite the fact that in Indonesia 
it is considered a national ideology. To avoid being seen as anti-Pancasila, HTI 
cleverly positions itself as an opponent of the West and of capitalism. To do so, it 
resorts to the argument that the demand for the shari‘ah and the khilafah means to 
save Indonesia from the threat of capitalism as a rival ideology (Al-Wa‟ie 87: 14). 
HTI‘s restraint from promoting the argument about the incompatibility of Pancasila 
and Islam is also clear in an article written by an MUI‘s leader, Ma‘ruf Amin, 
published in Al-Wa‟ie. The article promotes the application of shari‘ah under the 
framework of Pancasila (Al-Wa‟ie 71: 28).  
HTI adopted a similar stance in its discourse on the NKRI. In nearly all of its 
references to the NKRI, HTI used conciliatory and even affirmative language. Out of 
eight references, seven are moderate and only one is extreme. HTI opposition to 
democracy and its campaign for a khilafah political system in which a caliph holds 
highest and almost absolute authority naturally contradicts the republic form of the 
NKRI. However, HTI has been keeping its opposition to the NKRI close to its chest. 
This stance is especially important for HTI because public support of the NKRI is 
high. In recent years there has been an increasing sentiment to defend the NKRI from 
the threat of secession in non-Muslim majority provinces because of the fear of the 
rise of pro-shari‘ah regional regulations.37 Publicly attacking the NKRI is likely to 
result in HTI being seen as a national threat.  
                                               
37
 On the report about this concern, see Tempo (2006). 
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A question about HTI‘s commitment to the NKRI arose when it gathered a 
crowd of about 80,000 people in its international conference on the khilafah in 2007. 
To counter the accusation that its khilafah campaign poses a threat to the NKRI, the 
chairman of HTI at that time, Muhammad Al-Khattath, wrote a comment in Al-Wa‟ie 
entitled ‗KKI 2007 Mengokohkan NKRI‖ (the 2007 khilafah conference strengthens 
NKRI). In the publication, Al-Khattath made a comment that HTI shares the common 
view stating that the NKRI is final. He however carefully worded the statement to 
avoid contradicting its goal to establish a trans-national government of the khilafah; 
this means that HTI actually opposes the NKRI. He clarified that his support for the 
NKRI referred to the territory of Indonesia. He claimed that HTI has shown it stands 
for the NKRI and was opposed to the threat to national unity posed by separatist 
movements in Aceh, Papua, and Maluku. Further, Al-Khattath argued that the interest 
of HTI is not only in defending the NKRI but also in expanding the territory of 
Indonesia under the khilafah system (Al-Wa‟ie 85: 6). This conciliatory view on the 
significance of protecting the NKRI did not mean that HTI recognized the republic 
form of the state. In the same paper, Al-Khattath could not hide his advocacy for a 
change in the political system by suggesting that the NKRI is not unchangeable (Al-
Wa‟ie 85: 5; Al-Wa‟ie 47: 3). Still, HTI restrained itself from openly calling for the 
abolition of the NKRI doctrine.  
In spite of this clarification of what NKRI means for HTI, it is clear that HTI 
did not attempt to delegitimize the position of the NKRI in the public mind. The 
language of HTI suggests that there is little conflict between the khilafah and the 
NKRI, at least publically. This paradox indicates the way HTI compromised the 
demand to maintain the khilafah identity, on one hand, and the need to avoid 
oppression and isolation on the other. Sometimes the goal of expanding its audience 
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overshadowed the argument about the khilafah. This was the case when HTI joined an 
ulama meeting held by MUI that issued a declaration that includes a commitment to 
protect the NKRI (Al-Wa‟ie 72: 7).  
This constraint from challenging Pancasila and the NKRI demonstrates the 
importance of securing and maintaining political freedom. The fear of being seen as a 
threat to the State, according to Al-Khattath, became one of the reasons for postponing 
HTI‘s plan to participate in elections.38 It is for this reason also that in 2007 HTI 
sought state recognition by submitting an application as a social organization to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. HTI gained legal status in 22 June 2006.
39
 The statement 
of the paper submitted by HTI includes an explicit recognition of Pancasila and the 
NKRI. In defining the nature of organization, the statute states: ―Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia is an Islamic-based da‘wah movement within the Unitary Republic of 
Indonesia based on Pancasila.‖ This statement however should be seen as HTI‘s effort 
to gain official recognition because this contradicts its self proclamation as a political 
party (Anonim 2008: 200) and the inherent contradiction between the khilafah 
ideology and Indonesia‘s current political system.  
 
A.2. Mixed Discourse on the Constitution (UUD ‘45) 
In response to an extraordinary meeting of the Indonesian parliament in 2004, 
scheduled to discuss constitutional reform, Al-Wa‟ie took the occasion to launch 
attacks against the Constitution. A suggestion that the Constitution be replaced was 
                                               
38 Interview wih Al-Khattath, Jakarta, 16 October 2009.  
39
 A copy of the letter of approval of HTI as a social organization is circulated in a blog of a former 
member of HTI. I visited Ministry of Internal Affairs (Depdagri) in 15 October 2009 and received a 
conformation of this matter. An officer at the Depdagri argued that the decision to approve HTI‘s 
aplication was taken with the goal of accommodating social organization. As the government approved 
the legality of other radical Islamic organizations like FPI, HTI should not be differrent. However, the 
officer also raised a concern about threat of radical Islamic organization like HTI. This information is 
based on my covernsation with an officer from Depdagri‘s unit of national and political unity 
(Kesbangpol).  
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represented by the title of the 24
th
 edition of Al-Wa‟ie: ―De-sacralization of UUD 
1945.‖ This edition criticized both the contents of the Constitution and the effort by 
the MPR to amend it (Al-Wa‟ie 24).  
 HTI characterized the Constitution as a ―human product‖ becuase it gave 
parliament an authority to create legislation and to produce laws. By recognizing the 
sovereignty of the people it contradicts the sole sovereignty of God. HTI specifically 
criticized the adoption of the republic form of the state, which it saw as secular and 
part of the Western conspiracy to destroy Islamic political ideology (Al-Wa‟ie 24: 8-
9).  The Constitution of Indonesia actually gives a special place to the role of religion 
in State affairs stated in the Chapter 19 of the constitution as follows: ―the state is 
based on belief in the Oneness of God.‖ However this did not satisfy HTI. This clause 
on ―belief in God‖ does not make Indonesia a religious state. Such a general principle, 
in the view HTI, is insufficient in promoting the role of religion because it lacks the 
required mechanism of how the state will adopt religious laws (Al-Wa‟ie 24; 8-9).  
As the Constitution was considered secular, HTI criticizes efforts at reforming it. It 
was skeptical of the political process in parliament to amend the Constitution. It saw 
no sign that the agenda included an option for the revision of the position of Pancasila, 
the unitary republic form of the state, and the presidential model of government (Al-
Wa‟ie 24; 8).  
HTI‘s opposition is however not total. Paradoxically, HTI also indicated the 
possibility of supporting the political process to amend the Constitution if it opened 
the possibility for a total revision. HTI required the process to allow a large scale 
participation of the public and it must be open to an alternative proposal of a draft of 
the Constitution (Al-Wa‟ie 24: 7-8). While this demand can be considered naive due to 
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its impracticality, it should be seen as HTI‘s effort to break the taboo of discussing 
alternatives to state ideology and existing political system.  
The less extreme but not affirmative discourse on the Constitution appeared in 
the context of an earlier parliamentary meeting to reform the Constitution in 2001. 
Even though HTI maintained the demand for a total amendment, it endorsed the effort 
of a few Islamic parties to reinsert the so-called ‗seven words‘ of the Jakarta Charter 
(Al-Islam 19). The seven words refer to the discarded phrase of chapter 29 of the 
Constitution stating that the State is based on belief in the ―Oneness of God.‖ The 
erased ‗seven words‘ follow this sentence, ―with the obligation to follow shari‘ah for 
Muslims.‖40 Tolerating a gradualist approach to reform, HTI supported the reinsertion 
of the Jakarta charter because it saw that this clause might open a door for the wider 
adoption of the shari‘ah. To protect this interest, HTI did not criticize the secularity of 
the Constitution. HTI further justified its support to the ‗seven words‘ by identifying 
them with the Muslim role in the founding of Indonesia (Al-Islam 73).  
HTI‘s moderate discourse on the Constitution did not only occur in its 
campaign for the adoption of Muslim interests, but also in its advocacy for non-
interests of the public. It for example used the Constitution, in addition to Islamic 
doctrines, as the basis of arguments to criticize the government‘s privatization policy. 
In Al-Islam it argued that: 
From an Islamic perspective, the privatization of Pertamina (state‘s 
petroleum company) and other public companies is a betrayal of 
God‘s laws, [the words of] the prophet and [the interest of] ummah in 
general. From the perspective of the UUD [constitution]…, this policy 
clearly violates chapter 33 of the constitution that mandates the 
control of government on natural resources … for the benefit of 
people (Al-Islam 26).  
 
                                               
40 For historical accounts about the process toward the omission of the ―seven words‖ of the Jakarta 
Charter form the Constitutions, see Boland (1982) and Anshari (1981). 
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Given these instances of non-confrontational references to the Constitution, HTI‘s 
overall discourse about it is far from extreme. Nonetheless most of the references can 
be considered oppositional but not confrontational. This is indicated by seven radical 
and four extreme representations compared to four moderate representations (see 
figure 3.1). The combination of this mixed representation is reflected in the average 
score of 2.0.  
 
A.3. Confrontational Discourse on Democracy  
Regarding aspects of the political system that are less identified as symbols of the 
state, HTI‘s discourse is more extreme. This is especially the case in HTI‘s view on 
democracy. Out of 33 references to democracy, 32 are extreme and only one is 
radical. This makes the average of HTI‘s view of democracy a score of 2.9.  
Democracy is the most frequent reference to the political system. This 
suggests that democracy was the principal enemy of HTI. It described democracy as a 
part of the Western conspiracy to destroy the Ottoman Empire in the early period of 
the 20
th
 century (Zallum: 2000). A number of Al-Wa‟ie editions used confrontational 
titles such as ‗The Collpase of Democracy‘ (Al-Wa‟ie 42) and ‗Democracy: the Infidel 
System‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 104). HTI challenged the argument that justifies democracy with 
the concept of shuro (consultation) in Islam. Among the fundamental differences 
between democracy and Islam highlighted by HTI is the fact that democratic decisions 
are made by majority voice. This, according to HTI, is contradictory to the Islamic 
concept of shuro in which a consultation to produce policies is based solely on the 
laws of God, not the voice of the majority (Al-Wa‟ie 104: 32).  
Because it believed that democracy is not only un-Islamic but also anti-Islam, 
HTI criticized Muslim participation in the democratic process. It specifically referred 
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to the concept called ‗theo-democracy‘ that it claimed was adopted by the Pakistani 
Islamist ideologue, Abu al-A‘la al-Maududi. It argued that even though Maududi 
recognises the supremacy of God‘s sovereignty, his opposition to democracy is half-
hearted because it tolerates the democratic process when it favors the Muslim chance 
to win. For HTI, such an argument is dangerous because there should be no place for 
compromise between democracy and Islam (Al-Wa‟ie 42: 19).  
Nevertheless, amid this typical hostility toward democracy, once at least, HTI 
was tolerant of democracy when it came to the defence of its interest. This occurred 
for example in HTI‘s protest to some members the House of Representatives (DPR) 
who demanded that the government act against shari‘ah-based regional regulations. 
HTI argued that the regulations were produced by a democratic process and therefore 
no one has the right to challenge them on behalf of the Constitution. A paragraph in 
Al-Islam states:  
The (Islamic) regulations were produced by the House of 
Representatives and local government in democratic process. If 
democracy is a mechanism putting people‘s aspiration into laws, then 
those regulations are legitimate because they are the outcomes of the 
democratic process (Al-Islam 311: 2). 
 
Such an affirmative discourse is however uncharacteristic and insignificant. Overall, 
HTI discourse on democracy was consistently confrontational. 
 
A.4. Delegitimizing Discourse on Elections 
While the discourse on democracy was toward extreme end of the score (2.9), 
paradoxically HTI‘s representation on elections was less extreme (2.5). Out of 16 
references to the subject, the large majority (12) are extreme in nature in which they 
suggested non-participation in the process of election. But HTI‘s language of about 
elections was ambigous and less confrontational compared to that about democracy. 
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HTI is sometimes tolerant of election to the extent of supporting participation under 
certain conditions (see figure 2.1 and 2.2).   
The extreme discourse was most prominent in the period around the 2004 
election. That year, three editions of Al-Wa‟ie took the issue of the election and/or 
democracy as headlines and set out arguments challenging Muslim participation. For 
HTI, the view that Muslim participation was important to prevent the rise of anti-
Islamic forces in power was misleading. It saw this justification for participation as a 
benefit-based (maslahah) argument that contradicts Islamic teaching. It boldly argued 
that elections per se are prohibited (haram). The fact that it sometimes appeared 
helpful to advance Muslim political interests did not make it permissible (halal). The 
sitting of Muslim politicians in the House or in Cabinet, in HTI‘s view, did not 
necessarily guarantee the protection of Muslim political interests (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 10). 
To illustrate its skepticism, HTI highlighted the failures of Islamic parties to 
advocate the supremacy of the shari‘ah. It reminded Muslims that the accommodation 
to specific Muslim interests in the existing system did not justify participation in 
elections; the nature of such accommodation was only partial. It suggested that 
Muslim acceptance of partial adoption of the shari‘ah would only sustain the 
legitimacy of the established system (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 10). The idea of establishing an 
Islamic state through parliamentary struggle made no sense from HTI‘s perspective. 
HTI directly challenged the following logic: ―Run in elections, gain majority seats and 
then ammend the constitution to make an Islamic state‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 49). It argued 
that the success of Islamic parties in elections did not necessarily help the goal of 
establishing an Islamic state. The case frequently referred to in order to justify this 
argument was the annulment of the victory of the Algerian Islamic party, Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS). HTI believed that when Islamic parties democratically won an 
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election, Western countries blocked it from implementing the shari‘ah on the premise 
that this will preserve democracy (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 11).   
HTI therefore urged Islamic political parties to cease expecting political 
change in favour of Islam unless social awareness in favor of a systemic change can 
be created. It was not rare for HTI to encourage ‗non-participation‘ in elections by 
pointing to the rising number of abstentions (golput; literally means white block) in 
elections, even though it denied that it was actually promoting this practice (Al-Wa‟ie 
41: 26).  
Despite these arguments, HTI‘s views of election were not totally extreme. At 
times, it recognized elections as one of methods adopted during the period of khilafah 
rule. Ignoring the different contexts between the khilafah and democratic systems, 
HTI viewed elections as an optional tactic (uslub); and they can be legitimate. Using 
this argument HTI did not therefore completely rule out the option of taking part in an 
election. HTI is open to participation in legislative elections given the possible role of 
parliament as a vocal place to promote shari‘ah alternatives (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 27-29).  
The shift toward a more open position on elections occurred around the 2009 
election. In March 2009, a month before the election, HTI issued a circular (nasyroh) 
encouraging support for Islamic parties and pro-shari‘ah candidates. In the nasyroh 
HTI compared elections to the Islamic concept of wakalah or contractual 
representation. It argued that wakalah is permissible if it meets a number of 
requirements that include: (a) a direct and clearly defined contract between the actor 
(muwakil) and the recipient (mutawakil) to represent them, (b) both the actor and the 
recipient of wakalah must be authorized and capable, and (c) the purpose of 
representation is a matter permissible in Islamic law (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 47-48). Like 
wakalah, casting ballots in elections is permitted if the voters and candidates meet 
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these requirements. The last point (c) of these requirements is significant. As the 
subject of wakalah must be matters that are legitimate from the shari‘ah point of view, 
HTI allowed support for candidates who openly and consistently campaign for the 
implementation of the shari‘ah. It believed that this commitment must be clear in the 
candidates‘ daily life and attitude (HTI, 26 March 2009, Al-Islam 448).41  
The condition of contract between the actor and the recipient of representation 
(wakalah) is less essential than the candidates‘ commitment to a shari‘ah campaign. 
This suggests HTI‘s desire to participate in elections was meant to undermine 
democracy from within the process itself. This orientation is confirmed by Ismail 
Yusanto‘s call for the adoption of a ‗winner takes all‘ system in elections as a 
condition for participation. This means that winning an election as a means to gain 
power to make fundamental changes, including the abolition of democracy, should be 
the prime reason for voting. For this reason, Yusanto demands the removal of a clause 
in the election regulations that prohibit political campaigns that question Pancasila and 
the UUD ‘45 (Al-Wa‟ie 47: 8).42   
 In addition to this ultimate goal, the more tolerant discourse about elections 
occurred in 2009 advocating using the election as means for education the public. For 
this purpose, HTI described elections as a good moment rather a danger. It stated:  
Pemilu tahun 2009 adalah momentum penting untuk meningkatkan 
upaya-upaya dakwah guna membina umat agar memiliki jiwa dan 
pemikiran Islam, wawasan politik Islam, dan aspirasi politik Islam 
serta menjadikan sistem ideologi Islam- baik dalam bidang ekonomi 
maupun sosial- sabagai satu-satunya alternatif (Al-Wa‟ie 93: 7). 
 
This 2009 election is an important momentum to intensify 
propagation to educate the ummah with the Islamic spirit and thought 
as well as with the political aspiration to demand the adoption of 
                                               
41
 See also Yusanto‘s comment on the question of using democracy and election for shari‘ah advocacy 
in HTI‘s website (HTI, 26 March 2009). 
42 This refers to the1999 law on election chapter 47, article 1.a. that states ―In election campaigns, it is 
prohibited to question Pancasila and UUD ‘45) (National Election Commitee).  
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Islamic ideological system as a sole alternative, either in economic, 
political and social system. 
 
Even though the aim to bring about a total change was reasserted, HTI gave 
special conditions for participation. Instead of advocating a boycott, it called for 
Islamic parties to use the election to establish Islamic identity. This can happen when 
candidates advocate the adoption of the shari‘ah in their campaigns (Al-Wa‟ie 93: 7). 
In this way HTI sought to mobilize a sectarian (religious) divide in politics through 
the election process. This stance also gave HTI the flexibility to back parties or 
candidates in elections who agree to carry its agenda.  
More pragmatically, HTI also described elections as an opportunity. This is 
apparent in the statement of Yusanto in 2005. After highlighting many problems 
surrounding local elections, he still saw the possibilities that might come out of local 
elections: 
Dalam era otonomi daerah, pemilihan kepala daerah bisa 
memberikan kesempatan untuk penerapan syari‘ah islam di level 
daerah. Apabila didukung oleh DPRD niat itu akan lebih mudah 
diwujudkan seperti yang terjadi di semumlah daerah. Di kabupaten 
Bulukumba misalnya telah dibuat peraturan daerah tentang busana 
Muslim, pemberantasan buta huruf al-Qur‘an, larangan minuman 
keras yang berhasil menekan kriminalitas hingga 85% dan perda 
zakat yang mampu mendkongkrak PAD yang sebelumhya hanya 9 
milyar rupiah menjadi 90 milyar atau 10 kali lipat (Al-Wa‟ie 59: 44). 
 
In the era of local autonomy, elections for local government can 
give opportunities for shari‘ah implementation. If supported by the 
regional House of Representative (DPRD), the implementation of 
this goal will be easier. This has happened in some regions. In the 
district of Bulukumba, for example, regulations have been made on 
Islamic dress, Qur‘anic literacy, prohibitation of alcohol that have 
reduced crimes by 85 percent and the ruling of zakat that has 
increased local income by 10 times. 
Yusanto maintained the view of the importance of fully applying the shari‘ah. Yet, a 
long side this assertion, he also accepted the gradual application of shari‘ah, as 
reflected in the following part of his comment: 
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Perda itu tentu masih sangat jauh dari mencukupi untuk penerpaan 
shari‘ah islam secara kaffah. Tapi dengan pemimpin yang pro-
shari‘ah (bupati Bulukumba meski dari Golkar, ia sangat 
bersemangat untuk menerapkan syari‘ah) dan dengan dukungan 
DPRD serta rakyat secara keseluruhan peluang penerpana shari‘ah 
Islam tentu lebih terbuka‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 59: 44). 
 
Those Perdas are still far from the ideal goal of the comprehensive 
application of shari‘ah. But the presence of a pro-shari‘ah leader 
(the district head of Bulukumba who, even though he comes from 
the Golkar party, is very enthusiastic in implementing the shari‘ah 
and with support from DPRD [regional House] as well as people in 
general, chances for shari‘ah application will become larger. 
 
The overall nature of HTI‘s discourse on elections was delegitimizing, but it is 
clear that, unlike its consistent opposition to democracy, HTI was not totally against 
elections. This suggests an effort to maintain the balance between sustaining 
opposition to the political system and an interest in securing political opportunities. 
Even though the extra-parliamentary process of change was still the ideal in the minds 
of HTI‘s leaders, they also have begun to see elections as an opportunity to challenge 
the political establishment and an opportunity to mobilize sectarian politics. A 
parliamentary struggle is thus not totally ruled out.  
  
B. Discourse on Political Institutions 
I followed references to elements of political institutions that are essential for the 
functioning of the democratic system. These key democratic institutions include the 
government (pemerintah), the House of Representatives (DPR), political parties 
(including major Muslim-based and nationalist parties), the courts (Supreme Court, 
court, and Islamic court), the police, and the military. It appears that HTI‘s discourse 
on political institutions was nearly parallel to its discourse on the political system. Out 
of 207 references, the average view is radical with a tendency toward an extreme 
stance illustrated by the score of 2.2. This is slightly less extreme than the discourse 
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on the political system, which is 2.4. The discourse on both the intellectual (political 
system) and institutional aspects of the state is not over extreme, but is overtly radical.  
As illustrated in figures 3.3 and 3.4 below, the following discussion shows different 
attitudes of HTI toward different elements of political institutions.  
 
Figure 3.3: Discourse on political structure 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Spectrum of discourse on political structure 
 
B.1. Challenging Discourse on Government and the House of Representative   
HTI‘s line of relationhsip with the State is represented by the concept of dharb al-
„alaqoh or ―attacking illegitimate bonds in society‖ and ―breaking the relationship 
between the ummah and the state.‖  It assumes that the standing of the State depends 
on the commitment or trust (thiqah) of societies to maintain their relationship 
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(‗alaqah) with the State. Therefore the key for a fundamental change is removing this 
trust or commitment (thiqah) to the State; something that will ultimately foster the 
breaking up of social obedience (Al-Wa‟ie 58: 42-46).  
This revolutionary objective was translated in the challenging, yet not 
confrontational, discourse on the Government and the House of Representatives. 
HTI‘s discourse on these two institutions was a mix of radical, extreme and 
sometimes moderate language. Extreme views appeared more frequently in the 
discourse on the House of Representatives, while radical discourse is dominant on the 
references to the government. In agregate, the discourse on the Government (2.1) is 
less extreme than that on the House (2.6), but both are considerably radical (see figure 
3.4). This indicates that despite its criticism of both institutions, HTI tended to be 
more engaging in its attitude toward the government than toward the House. 
 
B.1.a. Discourse on the Government 
There are 86 references to the Government. The majority of the discourse on this 
subject is radical with 40 occurrences – compared to 29 extreme and 17 moderate (see 
figure 3.3).  
The extreme discourse appeared in the form of discussion of the Government 
for its failures and its identification with ―evil characters‖ or ideas such as the West, 
―infidels,‖ secularism and liberalism. In Al-Wa‟ie, HTI confronted the government 
with negative labels such as ‗komprador‘ (puppet), traitor and tyrant (zalim) in 
references to cases such as the alleged inability of the government to challenge US 
wars in Muslim countries and its adoption of capitalism or liberalism in the economy 
(Al-Wa‟ie 95; Al-Wa‟ie 82: 9-12). It accused the Government of permitting Western 
un-Islamic ideas to take root. This referred to the Government‘s adoption of human 
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rights covenant, its inaction against Islamic liberal organizations, and its approval of 
the operation of Western NGOs and companies. To demonstrate the government‘s evil 
character, HTI often referred to the government‘s policies it claimed favouring foreign 
agendas such as the regulation of ‗healthy reproduction‘ (that it considered 
encouraging sex before married), the legislation of law on domestic violence, and the 
permission granted to the US‘s health research unit and the Naval Research Unit 
(NAMRU) to operate in Indonesia. Using these cases, HTI argued that the 
Government has colonized its own people (Al-Islam 412) and led the country into a 
failed state (Al-Wa‟ie 96: 3-4).   
The extreme nature of this discourse is the description of the Government as 
not only incapable, but also inherently dangerous or evil. It therefore demonized the 
Government by indentifying it an evil character mentioned in a Prophet Muhammad‘s 
saying (hadith): 
Kebijakan ekonomi, politik dan sosial pemerintah makin tak 
berpihak kepada rakyat. Mereka hanya menjalanakan blue print 
kebijakan yang disiapkan negara asing dan antek-anteknya. 
Sementara rakyat hidup semakin sengsara. Merkalah orang-
orang zalim yang digambarkan Rasulullah sebagai orang-orang 
bercemeti ekor sapi? (Al-Wa‟ie 95: 10). 
 
The economic, political and social policies of the government 
are increasingly unfriendly to the people. They [the 
government] only implement policies set up by foreign states 
and their puppets. The people meanwhile increasingly suffer. 
They [the government] are the zalim [tyrants] described by the 
Prophet as people with cow‘s tail-looked lash.  
 
The term ‗people with the cow‘s tail-looked lash‖ referred to a desciption of a 
tyrant regime mentioned by the Prophet Muhammad in the following hadith: 
Akan muncul orang –orang dari kalangan umat ini pada ahir 
zaman. Mereka membawa cemeti seperti ekor sapi (untuk 
memukuli manusia). Pada pagi dan petang hari mereke selalu 
dalam kemurkaan dan kebencian kepada Allah (Al-Wa‟ie 95: 15). 
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At the end of the world there will be some people from the 
ummah who carry ―cow‘s tail-looked lash‖ to hit people. From 
the morning through the evening they are always angry and 
hateful to Allah.  
 
With this reference, HTI elevated its opposition to the Government into a 
‗transcendence war‘ between the forces of God and the forces of evil.  
Based on this, HTI suggested that the government was not worth supporting. 
Its failure to be a good Muslim Government meant that the people have to work to 
undermine its legitimacy and refuse to obey or collaborate with it (Al-Wa‟ie 6: 12). 
Such an extreme position was however, not always taken. The majority of HTI‘s 
language about the government is radical; it was criticized, but is hopeful. In this 
model of discourse HTI extended hopes that the Government would take measures on 
specific issues while at the same time it maintained the call for the shari‘ah and the 
khilafah.  
HTI‘s response to the case of the mining operation of the Freeport Corporation 
in Papua is a good example of this type of discourse. HTI criticized the government‘s 
unwillingness to end the contract made by Soeharto. HTI accused the Government of 
neglecting its people and giving away national resources to foreign interests. But 
despite this criticism, HTI demanded Government action on the matter, which 
included the following policies: ending the contract deal with Freeport, ending the 
capitalistic management of natural resources and applying a just management of the 
natural resources based on the shari‘ah (Al-Islam 295).  
In a fewer number of references to the government, HTI used moderate 
language. It addressed the Government advocating policy changes without suggesting 
the necessity of a systemic change or the establishment of the khilafah. This view 
usually occurred in HTI‘s efforts to encourage the government towards favouring 
HTI‘s campaign against perceived foreign enemies. Within this rubric, HTI for 
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example, demanded that the government continue subsidies on fuel and power in 
opposition to the foreign demand for economic liberalization (Al-Wa‟ie 30: 31). It 
encouraged the Government to take over the management of mining and power 
industries from international and private corporations, and to eliminate the separatism 
in Aceh, Papua and Maluku (Al-Wa‟ie 81: 42; Al-Islam 203).43 In the context of its 
confrontation with human rights and liberal Muslim activists, HTI also demanded that 
the Government ban NGOs associated with so called ‗liberal activists.‘ HTI claimed 
that foreign funding of such NGOs served foreign interests that are harmful to 
Indonesia and therefore deserve elimination (Suara Merdeka, 19 June, 2006). HTI‘s 
attempt to persuade the Government to favour the Muslim side and confront its 
enemies sometimes included a symbolic demand that contradicts HTI‘s principles. For 
example, despite the typical argument that shari‘ah laws are only effective when 
implemented in their entirety, HTI paradoxically demanded that the Government 
apply the Islamic punishment of ―an eye for an eye‖ called the qisash law against the 
Christian perpetrators of the Ambon conflict, despite the fact that such a law is not 
recognized in the Indonesian legal system (Al-Wa‟ie 79: 8).44 
Another pattern of HTI‘s friendly discourse on Government occurs in the form 
of its endorsement of Government polices in favour of a desired Islamic political 
agenda. For example, it praised the policies of the local government in Tanjung 
Jabung district in Jambi for providing free education and health services. HTI‘s leader 
at that time, Muhammad Al-Khattath, hailed these policies as the implementations of 
                                               
43 Even though HTI demands that the government take over international companies, it tries to 
avoid an association with socialism, which it opposes. HTI therefore denies the allegation that it 
endorses a form of nationalization that is identical with socialism. It argues that the khilafah policy of 
the government‘s sole authority to explore natural resources is based on an Islamic teaching that is 
dissimilar to the socialist model of nationalization. HTI for example condemned a draft of law on 
foreign investement. Having said this, HTI also asserts that, unlike socialism that requires 
nationalization in all sectors, Islam promotes nationalization of public poverty, but allows privatization 
of personal property (HTI, 28 Maret 2007).  
44 This view is offered by Muhammad Al-Khattah who was the leader of HTI at the time. The 
policy after Al-Khattath‘s departure is however, not dissimilar. 
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the shari‘ah, regardless of its partial nature (Al-Wa‟ie 74: 7).  In these cases political 
reforms leading to a desired outcome was considered better than no reform at all. 
The number of this type of friendly or moderate language is very low compared to 
radical and extreme languages (see figure 3.3). To combine radical and extreme 
discourse, compared to the moderate discourse, the dominant pattern of HTI‘s 
discourse on Government is oppositional. However, it is clear that it also not 
confrontational. This is shown in the significance number of radical and moderate 
discourse. Despite their different degree of opposition, both stances are characterized 
by recognition of the government‘s capacity to make positive changes. This indicates 
the willingness of HTI, when self interests is in mind, to sacrifice the revolutionary 
need to challenge the government.  
 
B.1.b. Discourse on the House of Representative 
HTI‘s discourse on legislative institutions tends to be extreme at a 2.6 score (see 
figure 2.3). I followed references to two aspects of legislative institutions, the lower 
house commonly referred to House of Representatives (DPR) and the upper house that 
refers to the Peoples‘ Consultative Assembly (MPR). Out of 24 references, extreme 
discourse is dominant, with 19 references. Radical discourse occurs 4 times, and rare 
moderate discourse occurs only once (see figure 3.3).  
Like those examples of extreme discourse on the government, HTI‘s extreme 
discourse on the House takes the form of identifying it with foreign powers. The 
House was characterized as a ‗foreign agent‘ in references to a number of laws passed 
such as the alleged pro-liberalization laws on the management of the power industry 
and the exploitation of natural resources and foreign investment (UU No. 4, 2009) and 
the law on the national management of education (UU No. 9, 2009), which in HTI‘s 
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view, favours the interests of non-Muslims at the expense of Muslims (Al-Wa‟ie 95: 
11). It also described the House as incapable of acting in the interest of the people 
because of its unrepresentative nature. HTI argued that members of the House do not 
represent the people because their successes in elections were made possible by their 
money than their role in society. This, according to HTI, led to the tendency of the 
members of House to serve the interests of the elite rather than that of  the people (Al-
Wa‟ie 42: 7-12). To emphasize the un-Islamic nature of the house, HTI usually 
compared its current political system to the idealized political system of the khilafah.
45
 
Despite these criticisms, HTI was not always sceptical of the House. This 
stance was taken in the context of its advocacy of the Muslim political interests. For 
example, in the context of parliamentary sessions to discuss constitutional reform in 
the early 2000s, HTI joined the campaign with some Muslim groups that demanded 
that the House re-insert the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution (Al-Islam 19). HTI 
often called for the House to confront Western influences. HTI identified itself with 
the House in its campaign for the law against pornographic activities in order to 
confront human right activists (Al-Wa‟ie 73: 8).   
Even though in aggregate the nature of HTI‘s discourse about the House is 2.6, 
the number of this type of conciliatory or moderate discourse is significant. There are 
only eight references on the house, and a half is moderate. This indicates that in spite 
of its extra-parliamentary doctrine, HTI also saw oportunities for change taking place 
through the House. This is reflected in HTI‘s argument casting doubt on the House‘s 
members elected in 2009. One of the reasons for the doubt is the dominance of the 
secular parties in the House, not the illegitimacy of the institution.
46
 This indicates a 
                                               
45 For a detailed illustration of the perspective of HTI on the differences between political 
process in democracy and in Islam see Al-Wa‟ie (41: 21-22) 
46 In the 2009 election, as in previous elections, parties with Islamic backgrounds in Indonesia 
lag behind the nationalist parties. The top three nationalist parties including Demokrat, Golkar and 
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desire to push for more Islamic parties in the House and to use the House as a vocal 
point for shari‘ah and khilafah and campaigns.  
 
B. 2. Mixed discourse on political parties 
HTI identifies itself as a political party (Anonim 2008: 200), but emphasizes that it is 
different from the existing parties in two ways: first it rejects participation in the 
secular democratic process and second it considers the existing political parties as 
lacking an ideological credibility and therefore sees them as unreliable. Logically, it is 
mandatory for HTI to oppose political parties because it is the existence of these 
parties that defines the legitimacy of democracy.  
 To investigate HTI‘s discourse on this key aspect of democracy, I followed 
references to major political parties and categorized them into Islamic and non-Islamic 
or secular parties.
47
 Non Islamic-based parties include the Democratic Party, Golkar, 
the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), and two new parties that passed 
the parliamentary threshold in the last election of 2009, namely the Gerindra and the 
Hanura. As for Islamic-based parties, I followed the five top parties including, the 
Prosperous Justice Party/PKS (including its previous name, Justice Party/PK), the 
United Development Party (PPP), the National Mandate Party (PAN), the National 
Awakening Party (PKB), and the Crescent Star Party (PBB). Islamic-based parties are 
parties that originate from Muslim organizations or movements. Some of these like 
PPP, PAN and PBB, formally adopt Islam as an organizational foundation and 
originated from groups that historically advocated for the State to adopt the shari‘ah. 
Others like PKB and PAN chose to adopt Pancasila and were less vocal in advocating 
                                                                                                                                                  
PDIP took 62.9 percent of votes compared to the combined votes of major parties with an Islamic 
background that only managed 29.3 percent. This does not include the emerging nationalist or 
ultranationalist parties like Hanura and Gerindra that successfully make up a presence in parliament 
(source: Indonesian election committee 2009).  
47
 For the use of this categorization, see Suryadinata (2002).  
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the shari‘ah and were more inclusive of non-Muslims. This differrence however, does 
not always translate into practice because politics increasingly blurs ideological 
boundaries. This study nontheless uses this categorization to anticipate HTI‘s 
preference for certain parties over others. In addition to tracking references on the 
names of parties, this study also followed references to general terms such as ‗party‘ 
and ‗Islamic party‘ to capture HTI‘s discourse on party politics in general.  
 The survey result showed that HTI‘s discourse on political parties was not 
overly challenging. HTI‘s combination of extreme, radical and moderate discourse on 
political parties raises the question of its seriousness in challenging this key element 
of democracy. In parallel to its discourse on elections that is less extreme than the 
discourse on democracy (see figure 3.2), HTI‘s discourse on political parties is 
slightly less extreme than its view of elections. There are 69 references to these 
subjects, out of which 44 references are extreme. The extreme discourse is dominant; 
but the number of radical discourse that occurs 19 times is not insignificant. 
Additionally, the reference to political parties is occasionaly moderate - occurring 6 
times. Overall, HTI‘s discourse on political parties (both Islamic and secular parties) 
is overtly radical as illustrated in the average score of 2.4. Although it is not extreme, 
this clearly demonstrates HTI‘s strong challenge of the legitimacy party politics (see 
figure 3.3). 
 The core of HTI‘s extreme discourse was based on the view that the party 
system is a modern invention of the West; and this system is incompatible with Islam. 
The Western model of political parties centres on ‗winning an election‘ as the primary 
task of political activity. This model contrasts with HTI‘s view of politics (siyasah). 
Siyasah means ―activities to address public issues.‖ The goal of Islamic politics, in 
HTI‘s view, is promoting the shari‘ah as the sole foundation of the management of 
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public affairs. HTI therefore defined political parties in Islam or an Islamic political 
party as an association where a group of people works to achieve this goal of 
enforcing the shari‘ah in public affairs. Based on this, HTI excluded elections as the 
primary role of Islamic political parties. Its ‗map of action‘ (see page 60-61) defines 
the ideal roles of Islamic parties; they include: (a) the intensive recruitment to 
strengthen a party‘s structure, (b) public engagement to create political awareness 
about the importance of the shari‘ah, (c) challenging un-Islamic ideas and laws, (d) 
educating the ummah about the danger of Western ideas, and (e) supporting the role of 
the shari‘ah over public affairs with the shari‘ah in all aspects of life (Al-Islam 159). 
Contrasting its version of party activism, HTI argued that unlike the existing parties 
that focus on gaining votes in an election, HTI emphasized that the main task of a 
political party is to ―educate the masses‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 34) 
 HTI‘s strong opposition to political parties was set out in the third issue of Al-
Wa‟ie published in November 2000. The question and answer section of this edition 
took as its theme the issue of the legality of Islamic advocacy in parliament. The 
answer was boldly negative; it stated: ―[with no doubt or qath‟i thubut and qath‟i 
dilala] it is prohibited (haram) to participate in a government that implements un-
Islamic laws, both as members of the house or as a member of the government‖ (Al-
Wa‟ie 3: 25). In its extreme language, HTI hailed the dangerous nature of political 
participation by referring to an alliance of Christians and Jews with Muslims, which 
was addressed in the Qur‘an (5: 51).48  
HTI therefore openly accused Muslims who take part in party politics as 
committing what is prohibited (haram). This is clear in the paragraph in Al-Wa‟ie: 
                                               
48 The verse states: ―Oh you, who believe, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. 
They are (in fact) allies of another. And whoever is in ally to them among you- then indeed he is (one) 
of them. Indeed Allah Guides not wrongdoing people.‖ 
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Memang penguasa di negeri Muslim sekarang bukan Yahudi 
ataupun Nashrani. Namun mereke itu berwali kepada kaum kafir 
tersebut. Oleh sebab itu siapa saja yang berwali kepada kepada 
orang yang berwali kepada orang Yahudi dan Nashrani maka ia 
telah berwali kepada yahudi dan Nashrani. Tidak dapat dikatakan 
bahwa menerapkan hukum kufur itu bukan berarti memberikan 
loyalitas wala (loyalitas). Sebab loyalitas itu harus ditunjukkan 
dengan hati dan perbuatan; termasuk menentang pemerintah 
demikian itu (Al-Wa‟ie 3: 25).   
 
Even though the present rulers of Muslim countries are not Jews and 
Christians, they ally with those infidels. Therefore everyone who 
allies with these who ally with the Jews and Christians allies with 
the Jews and Christians.  It is not true that implementing infidel 
laws is not a form of loyalty [wala] (to the un-Islamic system). This 
is because loyalty should be demonstarted by faith and action, and 
this includes challenging such a Government.  
 
There is a tendency that HTI avoids mentioning the names of parties when 
attacking political parties. At times it refers to specific party names (see for example 
Al-Wa‟ie 41: 7-8, Al-Islam 47). For example, a few months before the 2004 election, 
HTI focused on criticizing the role of Islamic parties in the election. An editorial in 
Al-Wa‟ie titled ―Parpol Islam; Apa yang Kamu Cari?‖ (―Islamic parties, what are you 
looking for?‖) countered Muslim arguments for participation in elections. HTI 
challenged the view that political participation will open opportunities for the 
application of the shari‘ah. It argued that, as history has shown, democracy will never 
accommodate Islam. It therefore urged Islamic parties to realize that the presence of 
Muslims advocating Islamic norms in democratic systems only serves a ‗democratic 
game‘ that preserves the political establishment (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 4). HTI also rejected 
the argument that Muslim participation in the democratic process is beneficial for 
preventing the rise of anti-Islamic leaders. It argued that ―preventing evil‖ cannot be 
supported by committing what is prohibited. As democracy was seen as the tool of the 
infidel to destroy Islam, participation in democracy was considered a major sin (Al-
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Wa‟ie 41: 4). In this criticism to Islamic parties, HTI did not make reference to the 
names of the parties.  
This suggests that HTI‘s attack was focused more on the way Islamic political 
parties behave rather than on the parties as organizations. This is illustrated by the fact 
that HTI‘s language was sometimes hopeful of the role of Islamic parties. This is 
apparent in its recurring call for Islamic parties to compete in elections with non-
Islamic (nationalist) parties.  
The differentiation between Islamic and non-Islamic parties is interesting not 
only because it is inconsistent with HTI‘s opposition to a party system, but also 
because in reality the ideological differences between Islamic and non-Islamic parties 
is often blurred. This differentiation appears in HTI‘s language about Islamic and 
nationalist or secular parties. The 69 references on political parties can be divided into 
46 references to Islamic parties and 23 to nationalist parties. The amount of 
conciliatory discourse is higher in the references to Islamic parties than it is to 
nationalist parties. Figure 3.5 below demonstrates that even though extreme discourse 
is dominant in describing both Islamic and secular parties, the combination of 
moderate and radical discourse on Islamic parties is nearly equal to extreme 
discourse. In contrast, extreme discourse on secular parties is largely dominant over 
the combine number of moderate and radical discourses. This makes the average 
discourse on Islamic parties less extreme than the discourse on non-Islamic parties- 
2.4 over 2.7. This means that even though HTI was highly critical of both Islamic and 
secular parties, it tended to be more engaging toward Islamic rather than secular 
parties.  
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Figure 3.5: Discourse on Islamic and nationalist parties 
HTI‘s moderate discourse on Islamic parties occurred mostly in the context of 
their support of the Islamic political agenda. When the radical and moderate discourse 
on Islamic parties is combined into a conciliatory category based on their optimism 
toward Islamic parties, the conciliatory discourse appears 21 times, only one less than 
the extreme discourse. This is especially significant because the extreme discourse 
mostly appeared in general phrases terms like ―Islamic parties‖ rather than explicitly 
referring to the names of the parties. This means that in spite of the dominant nature of 
HTI‘s challenge to political parties it tended to avoid confrontation with Islamic 
parties.  
A good example of HTI‘s conciliatory discourse on Islamic parties is when it 
criticized Islamic parties like the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS), the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the Crescent Star Party 
(PBB) for their rejection of the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution 
during the parliamentary session in 2001. In the same edition of Al-Islam that 
published this criticism, HTI praised other Islamic parties like PPP and PBB for their 
campaign in favour of the reinsertion (Al-Islam 19). This demonstrates HTI‘s 
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expectation that Islamic parties will play a major role in the campaign for the 
implementation of the shari‘ah. This is, however, not without conditions. HTI 
suggested that a partial campaign in favour of the  shari‘ah is tolerable so long as it is 
carried out while campaigning for a comprehensive change (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 53). That is 
why the core of HTI‘s criticism of Islamic parties is largely directed toward their lack 
of ideology rather than their participation in the democratic process.  
 
B.3. Conciliatory discourse on the police and the military as ‗ahlul quwwah‘ 
Compared to the dominance of challenging discourse on the other elements of the 
state institutions, the discussion of the role of the police and the military is much more 
conciliatory, with an average score of 1.4. Figure 3.3. shows 16 references to these 
subjects in which the majority of them are moderate. This reflects their special 
(especially military) place in HTI‘s appeal for support. 
 HTI focused on seeking support from the military more than from the police. 
This is based on the view that the military has a crucial role in political transitions. In 
HTI‘s view, the process of the government transition in 2001 from Abdurrahman 
Wahid (Gusdur) to Megawati is an example of the key role played by the military. It 
argued that when Gusdur issued a decree to dissolve parliament, it was military 
insubordination that prevented the decree from being effective (Al-Islam 195).
49
 HTI‘s 
concept of ahlul qowwah (power holder) applies to diverse groups of elites in societies 
including religious leaders, Islamic political parties, national leaders, intellectuals, as 
well as the police and the military. However HTI believed that the real and most 
critical holder of power (ahlul quwwah) is the military. This is reflected in its specific 
mention of the military when discussing the importance of ahlul quwwah in the 
                                               
49 This view is partially true, but ignores the fact that without a wide scale of support from major 
political forces, it was unlikely that the military would have taken insubordination. 
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process of political change (istilam al-hukm). HTI was however sometimes critical of 
the military as shown by its reaction to the rise of Megawati to the presidency and the 
Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon in 2000. But such negative language has been 
directed to specific units in the military rather the institution as a whole (Al-Islam 63; 
Al-Wa‟ie 79: 7). 
HTI envisaged the military will support efforts at seizing power after it had 
successfully moulded public opinion in favour of shari‘ah. It believed that the existing 
regime and international powers would prevent the rise of Islam to political power; so 
it saw the vital role of the military as necessary to protect the forces of change. This 
vision was set out as follows: 
Jika dukungan mayoritas terwujud, opini umum untuk tegakkanya 
Islam terbentuk, organisasi/parpol Islam ideologis (read: HTI) yang 
memimpin perubahan hidup di dalam masyarakat ditopang oleh para 
ahlul quwwah, maka penerimaan kekuasaan (istilam al-hukm) dari 
rakyat oleh orang-orang yang dipercayainya akan menggantikan 
Islam—sosialisme-komunisme dan kapitalisme....Di sisi lain fakta 
sejarah menunjukkan bahwa rezim lama maupun pihak luar negeri 
tidak akan berdiam diri. Untuk itu, mutlak adanya dukungan 
kalangan pemilik ahlul-quwwah dari berbagia kalangan, termasuk 
militer (Al-Wa‟ie 62: 23). 
 
If majority support is gained, public opinion for the establishment of 
Islam is moulded, and an ideological Islamic organization/party 
[read HTI] that leads change of life in societies is supported by ahlul 
quwwah [power holders], then there will be a transfer of power 
(istilam al-hukm) from the people to those they trust.  [The new 
leader] will replace socialism, communism and capitalism with 
Islam...On the other hand history shows that older regimes or 
foreign powers will not stay quiet. Therefore the support of ahlul 
quwwah  from various segments, including the military, is by 
necessity.  
 
 It is therefore understandable that while many pro-democratic groups feared 
the return of military to politcs, HTI in contrast desired it. For HTI the political role of 
the military is especially relevant in the context of fundamental change. It suggested:  
TNI memang tidak terlibat lagi dalam kegiatan politik sehari-hari. 
Tapi dalam menyangkut kepentingan-kepentingan strategis, seperti 
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perubahan konsitusi, perubahan bentuk negara, dan pemilihan kepala 
negara, TNI harus tetap berperan (Al-Islam 69).  
 
Even though the military is no longer involved in political affairs it 
has to take a part in strategic affairs such as changes of constitution 
and form of the state, the appointment of military commanders and 
the appointment of the head of state.  
 
C. Ambivalent Discourse on Muslims’s Participatory politics  
What I mean by ―Muslim participatory politics‖ here is Muslim activities that 
advocate Islamic norms or the shari‘ah applied within the democratic framework. This 
includes a range of agendas, from a less political demand for Islamization of the 
educational system and minor demands for enforcing anti-heretic regulations to a 
wider demand of the adoption of a shari‘ah economy and the reinsertion of the Jakarta 
Charter into the Constitution. To investigate HTI‘s views on this model of Muslim 
politics, I followed references to Muslim organizations, Islamic political parties, 
Muslim leaders, and issues of key significance in Indonesian Muslim politics. Because 
of HTI‘s anti-systemic doctrine, its view on participatory politics is essential if it is to 
challenge democracy. Its doctrine requires it to oppose involvement in political 
participation because it can undermine its goal of exposing the failures of the existing 
political system (see page 56-69).  
In spite of this doctrine, HTI‘s discourse on various forms of Muslim politics 
appears ambivalent. On the one hand, HTI asserted the importance of a total change. 
On another hand however, it did not only tolerate reforms, but also joined reformist 
Muslim groups to proactively advocate state enforcement of specific cases of Islamic 
norms. The inconsistency of the discourse on participatory politics is especially 
obvious in the variation of HTI‘s representations on unspecified and specified cases in 
Muslim participatory politics as discussed below.   
 
 100 
 
 
C.1. Challenging Unspecified Participatory Politics: Islahi and tadarruj  
Based on its doctrine of non-participation, HTI called for Muslim attention to what it 
saw as an anti-Islamic conspiracy. Citing a report written by Ariel Cohen about the 
role of Muslim participation in democracy to tame Islamic extremism, HTI urges 
Muslim leaders to see the point that Muslim participation in democracy is a Western 
trap to destroy Islamic movements (Al-Wa‟ie 78: 3).50 To discourage Muslim 
participation in democracy, HTI distinguishes two models of change: ‟thariqah 
islahiyah‘ (partial reform) or tadarruj (gradualism) and ‗thariqah taghyir 
(fundamental change). Reformist change can only take place in a legitimate political 
system. But when the fundamental aspect of a problem is not legitimate, such that in 
the case of democracy, then islahi da‟wah or ―propagation of changes‖ within the 
framework of the existing political system is considered illegitimate (Al-Wa‟ie 6: 17-
20).  
 To call attention to the importance of a fundamental change, a leader of HTI in 
Yogyakarta proposed an analogy to da‟wah (proselytization). He argued that when the 
target of da‟wah is a non-Muslim, the purpose of the da‟wah should be to persuade 
the person to embrace Islam. Persuading non-Muslims to perform sholat (prayer) or 
zakat (alm giving), for example, was considered useless because sholat and zakat are 
only an obligation for those who already embrace Islam. Likewise, because Indonesia 
does not adopt Islam as a political system it was considered a non-Islamic state. Thus 
the purpose of da‟wah in the country should be first directed at converting the country 
to embrace Islam or to become an Islamic state. Only after the state adopted the 
                                               
50 Cohen‘s report is available at Cohen (2003). His recommendation to support democracy and 
political participation as a way to counter the influence of HT is one of four recommendations he 
propses.  
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shari‘ah as a constitution would it be legitimate for islahi da‟wah.51 On this basis, HTI 
attacked Islamic movements that work within the framework of the existing system by 
accusing them of ―clothing‖ an anti-Islamic system with an Islamic cloth: 
Gerakan-gerakan Islam yang cenderung pada system yang ada 
dengan melakukan aktifitas islahiyah telah melakukan kompromi 
dengan system tersebut …mereka berkeinginan  mewarani system 
tersebut dengan waran Islam, walaupun sebatas kulit, sementara 
pada saat yang sama mengekalkan bagian pokok yang kontra Islam 
tetapi berbaju Islam (Al-Wa‟ie 6: 20). 
 
Islamic movements that embrace an existing system by islahiyah 
[reformist] activities means that they have compromised with the 
system...They colour the system with Islamic colour though at the 
surface level. At the same time they strengthen the fundamental 
aspects of the system that are against Islam with an Islamic cloth. 
 
 HTI also described Muslim particiaptory politics as a boomerang that could 
kill the struggle for an Islamic state:  
Ketika sebuah gerakan Islam menerima ide bergabung dengan 
penguasa yg kufur seperti masuk dalam cabinet, ikut membuat 
hukum..maka apa yang dilakukannya sama dengan menusukkan 
belati beracun ke arah jantungnya sendiri. Artinya gerakan Islam 
yang melakukan tindakan demikian pada dasarnya sedang 
melakukan tindakan bunuh diri (Al-Wa‟ie 9: 33)  
 
When an Islamic movement accepts an idea to participate in a kufr 
[infidel] government by becoming a cabinet member and taking part 
in law making...that means stabbing a poisonous knife into his own 
heart. This type of action by an Islamic movement is suicidal. 
 
In a lengthy discussion of the concept of tadarruj (gradualism), Al-Wa‟ie 
provides examples of Muslim gradualist approaches deemed harmful to achieving a 
fundamental change. These include the idea of establishing an Islamic state that is 
limited to a one nation state, and starting changes from the level of the individual, 
                                               
51
 This argument was delivered in a progamme called HIRO (―Halaqoh Islam Rahmatan Lil 
Alamin‖Forum for Islam for the Good of Mankind) held in the State Islamic University (UIN) of 
Yogyakarta on 8 August 2009. The workshop targeted selected Muslim leaders from different 
organizations. Even though the conference was framed around an inclusive topic ―Bersinergi Wujudkan 
Islam Penebar Rahmah‖ (cooperation building for the realization of Islam that spreads social good), the 
speakers who all come from HTI spoke uncompromisingly about the necessity of transforming 
Indonesia into an Islamic state. My presence in the workshop was made possible by the permission of a 
good friend who is a leader of HTI in Yogyakarta and who was a speaker in the workshop.  
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family, and society before creating the Islamic state. HTI saw this approach as a 
betrayal of the Islamic opposition to democracy (Al-Wa‟ie 45: 24). Likewise HTI did 
not see the rise of Islamic study groups among urban people, the booming of shari‘ah 
banking, Islamic fashions, and Islamic programmes on radio and in the media as 
positive developments for the khilafah campaign. HTI was aware of the 
delegitimating potential of such activities. It focused on starting with an Islamic state 
and described activities as ―ironical Islamic enthusiasm‖ that were irrelevant to the 
Muslim political interest (Al-Wa‟ie 78: 11). HTI asserted that the implementation of 
the shari‘ah, especially for those in the area of public affairs (ri‟ayah su‟un al-
ummah), is the sole authority of a khilafah government (Al-Islam 261). Therefore, no 
individual, group, or States in the current world has the right to implement shari‘ah. 
With this argument HTI challenged the implementation of shari‘ah by non-khilafah 
states like Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan (Al-Wa‟ie 11: 14-19).  
 HTI however refrained from demanding that Muslims stop participating in this 
form of politics. It suggested that da‟wah for moral and spiritual development is not to 
be left aside but to be used proportionally to support the campaign for total change 
(Al-Wa‟ie 45: 27). Likewise, HTI refrained from urging Muslims to leave parliament. 
It argued that da‟wah through parliament is legitimate so long as it is aimed at using 
the parliament as a vocal point for da‟wah to correct government misconducts and 
legislate for the laws of God to be implemented (Al-Wa‟ie 45: 29).  
 This restraint is in line with the ambiguity between HTI‘s challange on 
unspecified Muslim participatory politics and its support or lack of criticism in 
specific instances when Muslims seek political accommodation. HTI‘s criticism of 
what it called ‗ironical Islamic enthusiasm‘ is a good example of its ambivalence on 
this matter. The column criticized the da‟wah model that focuses on individual 
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morality (referring to a popular TV preacher, Aa Gym) but it avoided making direct 
judgments on people and organizations. The name of Aa Gym or his organization, 
Qalb Management, are absent from the discussion (Al-Wa‟ie 11: 14-19). As discussed 
in the next section, HTI‘s response to specific cases of Muslim politics is 
paradoxically both uncritical and yet supportive. 
 
C.2. Limited Support for Specified Participatory Politics  
The democratic struggle for shari‘ah in Indonesia provides HTI with a context for its 
argument on the illegitimacy of enforcing shari‘ah within a democratic political 
system. Even though the adoption of the shari‘ah in Indonesian legal system is not as 
extensive as in Saudi Arabia, an Islamic court is available to resolve family issues 
based on the shari‘ah. Some aspects of criminal law against gambling, alcohol, 
prostitution and others have been passed by some local governments. HTI was often 
critical and skeptical of partial shari‘ah enforcement in Indonesia. However, when 
dealing with specific cases of Islamic political aspiration HTI tended to be supportive 
of Muslim advocacies for the partial adoption of the shari‘ah.  
 
Figure 3.6: Discourse on specific issues related to Muslim interets
52
 
                                               
52 Issues surveyed include comments on to the following issues: Jakarta Charter,  alleged 
heresies or blasphemy against Islam, immoralities (most notably pornography issue), sharia‘ah banking, 
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To investigate HTI‘s views on instances of Muslim participatory politics, I 
surveyed references to key issues of Islamic political affairs. Thirty-eight references 
occur on various issues including heresy, Islamic morality (maksiat), the Jakarta 
Charter,
53
 Islamic banking or the shari‘ah economy, zakat collection, and various 
pieces of Islamic legislation. The dominant pattern of HTI‘s discourse on these 
subjects is critical but non-confrontational. Falling under this category are 10 
moderate and 13 radical discourses. This means HTI has mostly been supportive in 
specified cases of participatory politics. However, it also demonstrated an effort to 
avoid appearing reformist or moderate by sustaining the argument of systemic change. 
HTI‘s extreme discourse on specific cases of participatory politics is not rare. It occurs 
15 times - only lower when the moderate and radical discourses are combined (see 
figure 3.6). Most of these extreme responses refer to ―far enemies‖ such as Western 
governments or media (Al-Islam 256, Al-Islam 262, 287). This is understandable 
because attacking foreign enemies is safer for HTI than confronting the Indonesian 
Government or Muslim communities. In aggregate, the nature of HTI‘s discourse on 
this aspect is radical at 2.1. This indicates HTI‘s aim is to sustain its anti-systemic 
opposition without being isolated from the Muslim struggle for the shari‘ah through a 
democratic process.  
                                                                                                                                                  
zakat collection, shari‘ah influence regulations (perdas), and a range of other issues such as 
Muhammad cartoon and the plight of Muslim countries.  
53 The Jakarta Charter is a draft of a constitution proposed in the early period of Indonesian 
independence in 1945. The seven words about the obligation for Muslims to observe shari‘ah are 
included in the draft as a form of Muslim compromise to the agreed status of the state as a unitary 
republic, not an Islamic state, which was originillay demanded by Muslim leaders. But in the next 
session of the meeting to discuss the constitution, the would be President Soekarno asked Muslim 
leaders to defer the adoption of the clause for national integration arguing that in the later stage such a 
political aspiration could be realized if Muslim gained majority seats in parliament. But this never 
happened becuase Islamic partes never gained majority of votes. Later mainstream Muslim 
organizations including Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah declared their commitment to 
democracy and Pancasila that further put the Islamic state aspiration into the periphery. For further 
reading on the history of the Jakarta Charter, see Boland (1982) and Saefuddin Anshari (1981). 
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 Unlike its persistent rejection of a gradualist approach at the normative level, 
HTI supported a range of initiatives and policies in favor of Muslim political interests. 
 This includes legislation that can open a wider adoption of the shari‘ah in a 
legal system such as its advocacy for the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter (Al-Islam 
19), the inclusion of specific aspects of Islamic morality in the revision of Indonesia‘s 
criminal law (KUHP) (Al-Islam 175) and the inclusion of the Islamic legal code (KHI) 
in the criminal law KUHP.
54
  HTI was not reluctant to defend or support minor scale 
legislation or Government policies that favour Islamic political interests. Some 
examples of Islamic political issues endorsed by HTI include government regulation 
of deviant Islamic sects (Al-Wa‟ie 63, 94), pornography laws (Al-Islam 287, 288), 
inter-ministrial regulations on religious buildings (Al-Islam 272), health regulations 
that ban abortion (Al-Islam 271), laws on a national education system (known by the 
acronym Sisdiknas) that require all schools to provide Islamic lessons (Al-Islam 147), 
the enforcement of canning as a punishment for crime in Aceh (Al-Islam 261), and 
various regulations about Islamic morality in local government (Al-Islam 331, 336).  
 In addition to the extreme tendency in its discourse on ―foreign enemies,‖ 
HTI‘s most consistent extreme discourse appears on the subject of zakat (alm giving). 
Following the doctrine of the caliph‘s authority in the enforcement of shari‘ah, HTI 
argued that the collection of zakat by either the government or Muslim charity 
organizations is illegitimate (HTI, 24 September, 2009).  It is interresting that HTI 
selectively applied the doctrine on the caliph‘s authority in the context of zakat 
collection and abandons the same doctrine in other cases of Islamization. The reason 
for this could lie in HT‘s anti-social work doctrine. Involvement in social work is not 
recommended because it is considered supportive of the established system. The 
                                               
54
 At present, The KHI is applied only to family issues in Islamic court (Al-Wa‟ie 52: 38). 
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distribution of zakat is especially seen as providing direct support to Government‘s 
social services and thus strengthens the legitimacy of the system. Unlike the direct 
contribution of zakat, HTI sees the adoption of the shari‘ah law in other aspects like 
the law on pornography and abortion as opportunities to demonstrate the viability of 
the shari‘ah. The exemption of zakat could also be motivated by HTI‘s policy that 
encourages members‘ financial contributions.55  
In spite of this case, the dominant pattern of HTI‘s discourse on specific 
instances of Muslim politics is supportive of participation. This reflects the 
prominence of the struggle for gaining recognition. The fact that HTI tended to adopt 
extreme discourse in the context of relationship with ―far enemies‖ in contrast to the 
dominance of moderate or radical discourse in dealing with ―near entities‖ is 
indicative of HTI‘s objective to avoid isolation. HTI often reasserted its call for the 
khilafah or comprehensive change after delivering its support for Muslim 
participatory politics, but this has to be seen as its effort to sustain anti-systemic 
identity without sacrificing its chance to exert influence.  
 
C.3. Actors in Muslim Participatory Politics: The ―Bandwagoning Strategy‖                                  
Antara HTI, NU dan Muhammadiyah ada kespahaman dan 
pembagian tugas. NU fokus pada pembentukan akhlaqul karimah 
masyarakat, Muhammadiyah…fokus pada penguatan ekonomi umat. 
HTI fokus pada penguatan politik umat. Secara berkelakar saya 
sampaikan, dalam masalah politik biarlah suara NU dan 
Muhammadiyah diserahkan kepada HTI (Muhammad Al-Khattath in 
Al-Wa‟ie 89: 8). 
 
There is a sense of common understanding and job description 
between HTI, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Nahdlatul 
Ulama focuses on educating the ummah about Islamic conduct, 
Muhammadiyah...focuses on the economy of Muslim society. HTI 
focuses on the political education of the ummah. Jokingly I said, in 
                                               
55 In the organizational statue of HTI submitted to the Internal Affairs Ministry, members‘ 
contributions consist of obligatory (iltizamul maaliyat) and optional contributions (tabarru‟at) (Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia 2007: 5).  
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politics let the political affairs of NU and Muhamamdiyah be taken 
care of by HTI. 
 
This statement comes from Muhammad Al-Khattath when he was still with 
HTI after a seminar in Kalimantan on 8 December 2007 where he sat on a panel with 
Said Agil Siroj from Nahdlatul Ulama and Anwar Abbas from Muhammadiyah. 
Although Al-Khattath claimed that the statement represents the view of the two 
leaders, this is hardly the case. A number of leaders from NU and Muhammadiyah 
have not only asserted their disagreement of HTI‘s khilafah policy, but also have 
raised concerns about the aggressiveness of HTI.
56
 Rather than a description of reality, 
this statement is more a representation of HTI‘s strategy of what is described by Hanif 
(2007b) as ―bandwagoning on the influence of other movements.‖ As a new 
organization with the new and controversial idea of the khilafah, HTI‘s influence is 
limited. Its ability to gain influence is also challenged by its doctrine that emphasizes 
political education and considers social activities running counter to its opposition to 
the existing system. HTI is more a movement of words than a movement of action. To 
gain influence in societies, HTI seeks to identify with larger Muslim organizations to 
create the perception that its objective is parallel to the mainstream.  
It is therefore understandable that HTI‘s discourse on Muslim actors has been 
dominantly conciliatory regardless of their acceptence of the established political 
system. Under the second stage objective of interraction with the ummah, HTI targets 
a wide range of Muslim communities, including those in the mainstream. It appears 
that HTI was hard on the issues and soft on the actors - both individual leaders or 
                                               
56 The concern over the aggressiveness of the mobilization of HTI is for example reflected in 
Aula, an East Java-based journal associated to NU that accuses HTI of taking over the control or 
management of many Mosques originally founded by NU‘s ulama. To prevent a further damage from 
this allegation, HTI made a clarification notes rejecting the accusation (HTI, 11 November, 2007). A 
member of NU regional board in Java, Ghazali Said who has been a vocal critics of HTI in East Java 
suggested that HTI has been systematically aiming to seize control of mosques by encouraging its 
members to seek housing or accommodation in surrounding mosques (Interview with Ghazali Said, 
Surabaya, 30 October, 2009). HTI itself due to its non-co-operative doctrine, focuses on political 
struggles and discourages social activities and does not attempt to build its own mosques.  
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organizations. This is obvious in the far more moderate nature of the discourse on 
Muslim non-party actors (1.1) compared to the discourse on Islamic issues (2.1) (see 
figure 3.7). The same pattern occurs in HTI‘s less radical discourse on specified 
political parties and party politics (see figure 3.8). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Discourse on Muslim actors 
and Islamic issues 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Discourse on Muslim non-party actors 
There are 81 references to Muslim organizations that include a dozen  
prominent organizations, ranging from Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, the Ulama 
Council (MUI), and a number of minor Wahabi and Islamist groups such as Persis, 
Al-Irsyad, Hidayatullah, the Islamic Defenders‘ Front (FPI), the Indonesian Mujahidin 
Council (MMI), and the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI). Out of this number, a large 
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majority of them (68) are moderate in nature compared to only a small minority 
radical (10) and extreme (3)  (see figure 3.8).  
The Indonesia Ulama Council is the organization most frequently referred to 
by HTI. With 25 occurrences, it is far above the 15 references on the FUI in second 
place and 13 references on Nahdlatul Ulama in third place. Given the fact that the 
dominant nature of the representations are moderate, the prominence of MUI in HTI‘s 
target of mobilization is interesting. Rather than focusing on building a coalition with 
ideologically closer groups like FUI, FPI and MMI, mainstream groups are the central 
target of HTI‘s mobilization. MUI is a semi-government Muslim organization that 
includes representatives of diverse Muslim organizations. Delegates from major 
organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah normally hold a dominant position 
although small organizations, including HTI have also gained representation in recent 
years. MUI has been fighting for more adoption of Islamic teachings about the value 
of shari‘ah economy, halal food certification, and the protection of Islamic theological 
teachings. Nonetheless, the dominant role of the delegates of the two largest 
organizations in the organizational structure of MUI and its status as a quasi-state 
organization maintain MUI‘s stance within the framework of state ideology and the 
Constitution. MUI is keen to push the development of Islamic accommodation, but 
this is carried out to the extent that it does not pose a serious threat to national unity. 
Therefore MUI would not support larger scale legislation, such as the inclusion of the 
Jakarta Charter in the Constitution that can become a threat potentially threatens 
religious harmony.  
Despite its pro-establishment nature, in recent years MUI has become 
inclusive to more radical Islamists. MUI‘s support for Islamization may have 
motivated the leaders of HTI to target MUI‘s support. As a result HTI is now happy to 
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see two of its members sitting on the organizational structure.
57
 Its penetration has 
also taken place in MUI‘s regional offices. This presence in MUI is beneficial to HTI 
in two ways. First, the fact that MUI is an inter-group organization, which is often 
seen as a legitimate representation of Indonesian Muslims, provides a foundation for 
HTI‘s politics of presence. Recognition by MUI would boost HTI‘s place in Muslim 
communities. This is especially crucial for a new organization like HTI that carries the 
radical agenda of the khilafah. Identification with the mainstream is expected to 
facilitate HTI‘s penetration into Muslim communities. It was not rare for HTI to use 
its affiliation to support its activities. Second, as a melting pot of diverse Muslim 
strands, MUI is seen by HTI as a venue to break the traditional ―cleavages‖ of Muslim 
communities. Established organizations like NU, Muhammadiyah, and Persis 
normally have a deeper hold on their members because of their long-term roles in 
education, spiritual and social activities. By emphasizing Islamic identity over 
organizational affiliation, HTI attempted to develop a new bond among Muslim 
communities that emphasizes Islamic unity and supremacy over the traditional 
Muslim schism. Inter-group organization like MUI, are good venues for this 
campaign. 
This interest in breaking old religious affiliations is also shown from HTI‘s 
effort to gain roles in other Muslim inter-group organizations, such as the Islamic 
Ummah Forum (FUI), a new coalition group aimed at defending Islamic political 
interests and coordinating the shari‘ah campaign. HTI‘s leaders took a leading role in 
the founding of FUI. Although the new organization does not carry HTI‘s khilafah 
objective, its strong support for the shari‘ah plays into the hand of a HTI campaign for 
a comprehensive application of the shari‘ah. The FUI is the second most frequently 
                                               
57 Confirmation about these two members is given by the secretary general of MUI, Ikhwan 
Syam. These two members are Ismail Yusanto and Fanani who are members of research department 
(divisi pengkajian) of MUI (interview with Ikhwan Syam in Jakarta, 17 October 2009). 
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referred to group after MUI. Like MUI it also facilitated HTI‘s politics of presence 
and supported its objective to develop a new identity among Muslims that transcend 
the older traditional affiliation with major Muslim organizations. Until August 2008,
 
HTI was very closed to FUI.
58
  
The high number of conciliatory references to MUI and FUI does not mean 
that these two groups are the primary target of HTI‘s mobilization. The recurrent 
alliances between HTI and these two organizations were largely made possible by 
HTI‘s close relationship with FUI and the MUI‘s more inclusive policy toward 
hardline groups. In fact, HTI also targetted mainstream groups like NU and 
Muhammadiyah for support. This is primarily carried out by presenting a public show 
of support and affiliation with the NU and Muhammadiyah. HTI often quoted leaders 
of these organizations to support its ideological stance. When successful in recruiting 
members from the two organizations, HTI emphasized this affiliation with Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The most notable and controversial effort of HTI in 
targeting the mainstream was a banner raised during the khilafah conference in 2007 
saying ―Warga Nahdliyin Dukung Khilafah‖ (NU People Support the Khilafah).59 
The prominence of moderate discourse on actors in Muslim politics is also the case 
with references to Muslim leaders. There are 23 references to prominent Muslim 
leaders including Hasyim Muzadi and Gusdur from NU, Dien Syamsudidn and Amien 
Rais from Muhammadiyah, Hidayat Nurwahid from PKS, and Aa Gym. Moderate 
discourse appears 18 times and there are four examples of radical discourse. In 
                                               
58 In August 2008, HTI decided to abandon its affiliation with FUI. This is shown in an 
internal instruction (nasyroh) that required its members to leave affiliation with external organizations 
unless they are able to gain control. Individual participation in external organization is however 
permitted (Solihin, O. 10 October, 2008b).  
59 A picture of the banner was adopted in a blog that echoed the claim, but was eventually 
removed from online because of its counter-productive effect. One of such backlashes is the formation 
of facebook forum named ‗Warga Nahdliyin Dukung Pancasila Tolak Khilafah‖ (NU People Support 
Pancasila, Reject Khilafah) that portrays HTI as a threat to national integration and echoes NU 
opposition to HTI and its khilafah campaign.  
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contrast to its repeated criticism of Muslim participation in democracy (Al-Wa‟ie 9: 
15), HTI was uncritical of the above pro-democratic leaders.  
The fact that HTI‘s discourse on Muslim actors is far more moderate or 
conciliatory than the discourse on Islamic parties has a significant value in the nature 
of HTI‘s politics. A comparison of figures 3.7 and 3.8 shows that discourse on 
Muslim actors is far more moderate than the discourse on Islamic parties at a value of 
1.1 compared to 2.4. Even though HTI does not totally reject party politics, this 
indicates HTI‟s emphasis more on non-party politics than party politics.  
 
D. Conclusion 
The da‘wah based on the Islamic ‗aqeedah‘ [faith], is 
distinguished by frankness, daring, strength, thought and the 
challenge to everything that disagrees with the Fikrah [thought] 
and the Tareekah [method] and exposing their fallacy, 
irrespective of the consequences and circumstances and of 
whether the ideology agrees or disagrees with the masses, and 
whether the people accept, reject or oppose it (al-Nabhani 2002: 
74).  
 
This quote represents the doctrine of HT that mandates a confrontational stance 
against elements of opposition. In HTI‘s battle of ideas, discourse is aimed at 
challenging the state and the elements of the political establishment by exposing their 
inherent fallacies and failures. Evidence, however, suggests that HTI has failed to 
maintain consistency in achieving this goal. Its discourse was critical and often 
challenges aspects of the state, but was never totally extreme. HTI‘s discourse on both 
elements of the state (system and structure) shows the prominence of political 
radicalism, or a combination of delegitimation and conciliation attitudes.  
With the average score of 2.4, HTI tended to be overtly radical at the 
discourse level. The discourse on different elements of the state and related aspects of 
political establishment is however not consistent. The variation follows these patterns:  
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First, HTI tended to be more challenging on non-sensitive elements of the 
political system such as democracy and elections. It was more confrontational about 
these ideas because attacking them was less dangerous to its freedom. In contrast, 
HTI‘s discourse on more sensitive elements of the political system, including 
Pancasila and NKRI, was much less confrontational and often conciliatory. It is for 
this reason that the discourse is characterized by a more persistent campaign for the 
khilafah and the shari‟ah rather than confronting the elements of the existing political 
system.  
Second, HTI was more challenging about elements of the state that were less 
likely to become allies or to have no direct effect on its political freedom. For this 
reason HTI‘s discourse on the House of Representatives and secular parties is more 
challenging than those on the Government and Islamic parties. For the sake of 
mobilization and penetration, HTI‘s discourse on the Government is ambiguous. At 
the normative level, it is hostile to the government as far as identifying it as a puppet 
of the anti-Islamic West. Overall representation of the Government is however far 
from extreme because HTI often lended legitimacy to the Government by demanding 
that it accommodates Muslim political interests and to join its side in confronting ―far 
enemies.‖ The same pattern occurred in HTI‘s discourse on the House of 
Representatives.  
Third, HTI tended to be challenging at the normative level but more 
conciliatory at the practical level. This is apparent by the fact that HTI presented 
stronger opposition to unspecified practices of participatory politics than those of 
specific cases of Muslim participatory politics. Normatively HTI often continued 
reiterating its doctrine against gradualism and the danger of Muslim participation in 
the process of government and Parliament. However, when it came to the real issues 
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related to Muslim political interests, such as advocacies for adoption of the shari‘ah in 
regional regulations and campaigns against anti-Islamic developments in society, HTI 
was tolerant or supportive to participatory politics. Such a discrepancy is also apparent 
in the fact that HTI was more confrontational about democracy than elections.  
Fourth, the discourse of HTI demonstrates its tactic of being harder on issues 
and softer on actors in order to maintain a balance between anti-system campaigns 
and the opportunities for mobilization. This is obvious in the far more moderate 
discourse about actors than issues of Muslim participatory politics. The target of 
mobilization is especially directed to non-party actors of Muslim politics as shown by 
the more moderate discourse on specified leaders and social Muslim organisations 
than on Islamic parties.  
These ambiguities represent the strategy of HTI in solving the dilemma 
between the ideal goal of delegitimizing the state and the pragmatic need for 
conciliation in order to secure political opportunity.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Action: 
From Non-Participation to Participatory Radicalism 
 
As an alternative to violence as a means to undermine the State, HT employs the 
strategy of ―non-participation‖ in the existing democratic system. In addition to its 
intellectual battle to uproot the legitimacy of the existing political system (as 
discussed in the previous chapter of HTI‘s discourse), the doctrine of HT also requires 
its members to encourage public detachment from Government and the political 
process in order to disrupt their function (see pages 55-60). Creating a crisis of 
Government and challenging the political process is essential for HT‘s argument for 
an alternative political system. To evaluate the degree of HTI‘s faithfulness in 
following this strategy, this chapter analyses the nature of HTI‘s activities recorded in 
Al-Wa‟ie in the period of 2001 -2009.  
This chapter shows two different patterns of the action. On one hand, HTI 
demonstrates a strong opposition to the State when interacting with societies. This 
pattern is shown in the discussion on the form of HTI‘s action, and thus shows the 
prominence of a radical character. On the other side, it demonstrates a positive 
attitude toward participation when interacting with various aspects of the democratic 
state, including political institutions (Government, House of Representative, and 
political parties) and non-state actors in democracy illustrated in examples of Muslim 
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participation in democratic process (here called ‗Muslim participatory politics‘). This 
ambiguity represents the shift of HTI‘s strategy from total non-participation to 
selective participation that guarantees political freedom and sustains the social 
mobilization against democracy.  
 
A. Forms of Action 
In addition to publications that are central in its activism, HTI runs various kinds of 
activities. They can be categorized as follows (for discussion about key terms used in 
HTI‘s agendas, see pages 60-61): 
1. Mass rallies. This programme is important to demonstrate HTI‘s presence. HTI 
uses public issues to raise its call for the khilafah or the shari‘ah and to address 
authorities to take favorable policies. This fall into HTI‘s agenda of educating the 
masses (tathqif jama‟i).  
2.  Seminars. This includes various forms of public forums, from classroom 
discussion to seminars that attract a large number of people. Seminars usually 
address public issues and are open to the public. Like rallies this also supports 
HTI‘s goal of educating the masses (tathqif jama‟i). 
3. Training programmes. This programme is more intensive than seminars and 
usually targets a specific audience. It is usually not open to the public. Among the 
targeted audience recorded in Al-Wa‟ie include students, Muslim journalist, 
housewives, female teachers (mubalighoh), Friday preachers (khatib), and Muslim 
clerics (ulama). The topics of training are usually about the importance of the 
khilafah and the strategy of HTI, which are framed according to the need of 
audience. Within the framework of specified education (tathqif murakkaz), this 
programme is mainly aimed at recruiting new members. An important part of this 
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agenda is the study circle; but since this programme is usually unpublicized, this is 
not covered in this study.  
4. Leadership meetings. HTI seeks to approach influential leaders from different 
segments of society (including political leaders, government officers, religious 
leaders, and military officers). It runs this programme in two ways: visiting the 
leaders in their offices or inviting them to HTI activities. This programme serves 
the key agenda for ‗seeking support‘ from the elites (thalab al-nusroh).  
5. Advocacies. HTI sometimes initiates or takes part in activities to advocate 
shari‘ah-based policies. This ranges from visiting law makers, meeting with 
government officers, to drawing up petitions and lawsuits. This program is part of 
HTI‘s agenda of ‗caring for the issues of the ummah‘ (tabanni masalih al-
ummah).  
6. Religious gatherings. HTI seeks to make presence by organizing religious services 
and public sermons. They are usually organized for the celebration of Islamic 
holidays. This porgramme helps HTI in educating the public (tathqif jama‟i) and 
promotes its own importance.   
In the period of 2002-2009, Al-Wa‟ie recorded more than 560 activities.60 
Seminars and other similar forms of discussion forums are HTI‘s most frequent 
activities. Occurring 193 times, this programme has been the hallmark of HTI because 
of its multipurpose nature. It serves both the objectives of educating the masses and 
challenging the State. The record of HTI‘s activities also demonstrates the prominence 
of thalab al-nusroh (seeking elite support). Within this framework, HTI approaches 
elites through leadership meetings and visits to influential figures and institutions. Out 
of 560 activities, this type of action appears 101 times. Leadership meetings are 
                                               
60 Al-Wa‟ie started publication in 2000, It was not until June 2001 (Al-Wa‟ie 10) that it started 
including news reports on the activities of HTI. This is because at this stage, HTI was still in transition 
from the tathqif (formative) stage toward a public campaign (tafa‟ul) stage.  
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organized locally to promote khilafah and establish alliances based on common 
interests such as support for the shari‘ah or opposition to alleged anti-Islamic 
incidents. In 2009, the public education and leadership meetings in local areas 
culminated in the organization of a series of national leadership gatherings in Jakarta. 
Learning from the impact of the 2007 international conference in Jakarta in term of 
publicity,
61
 each of these gatherings was designed to attract leaders from different 
segments of the Muslim community. These include national conferences on ulama 
(Muslim leaders),
62
 Muslim students,
63
 and women preachers (mubalighoh).
64
 In 
addition to targeting Muslim leaders, HTI emphasizes the number of participants that 
normally attracts a few thousand people at a minimum. This is to support HTI‘s claim 
that these gatherings demonstrate wide-scale support. Even though the true motivation 
and commitment of participants to join HTI are not necessarily represented by HTI‘s 
claim, the presence of the large number of participants at conferences is useful for 
propaganda purpose.
65
  
Other significant forms of actions are mass rallies and training sessions that 
occurred 55 and 43 times respectively. Mass rallies are aimed at both challenging the 
                                               
61
 See HTI‘s coverage on the conference in Al-Wa‟ie 85.  
62 This gathering was held in July 21, 2009. This programme was bolstered the title of 
―National Congress of Ulama‖ (MUN) and brought around 6,000 participant from across the country. 
For HTI, coverage of the congress, see Al-Wa‟ie 108.  
63 This programme was organized by HTI‘s student wing, Gema Pembebasan, and was called 
the congress of Indonesian Muslim student (KMII). It was held in October 18, 2009. The programmes 
was planned to be held in basketball hall of Jakarta‘s Bung Karno‘s stadium, but due to organizer 
failure to secure police clearance, the meeting was moved to the parking lot of the hall. The organizer 
claimed it was attended by 4,000 students from across Indonesia (Republika 19 October, 2009).  
64 This programme was bolstered by the title of ‗The Congress of Indonesian Mubalighoh 
(Women Preachers)‖ and HTI claimed it was attended by 6,000 participants from across the nation (Era 
Muslim, 9 April 2009). 
65 I met with some leaders who were invited for the conferences. Many claimed that the major 
motivation for many participants, especially those from outiside Jakarta, is to be able to come to 
Jakarta. Many of those from remote districts are coming to the capital city for the first time. They come 
to Jakarta for free because HTI provides accommodation and airfares. Many also come to satisfiy their 
curiosity about HTI (Interviews with Ikhwan Syam of MUI‘s central board on 17 October 2009, 
Nidhom Hidayatullah of MUI Malang on 28 October, 2009, Zuhdi Mulkian, senior leader of 
Muhammadiyah in Kendari on 30 October 2009, Abdullah Umar, great imam of Jami Mosque in 
Kendari on 30 October 2009, and Hadid of MUI  Kendari on 30 October 2009). It however should not 
be neglected that many also come becuase of their perception that HTI is struggling for the interest of 
Islamic supremacy (‗izz al-Islam).  
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State and gaining social leadership. Therefore, issues central to the public such as the 
price of fuel, economic liberalization, and anti-Westernism are frequently used by HTI 
to raise anger toward the State. HTI also sees this model of action as a part of the 
agenda to expose the failures of the state (shiro al-fikr) and propagate the superiority 
of Islamic alternatives (tabanni masholi al-ummah). HTI‘s rallies however do not 
always serve the goal of inciting raising anger toward the state. Many of them instead 
lend legitimacy to the Government and other State institutions by seeking their 
adoption to Islamic interests. The demand that the Government acommodates Islamic 
interests implies an acknowledgment of the capability of the State.
66
 
While mass rallies serve the goal of attacking the State, HTI‘s training 
programme is primarily aimed at recruiting supporters. Anti-state discussions are 
however normal in the training session. To encourage participation, HTI normally 
adopts more inclusive titles of programme such as ―Islamic study‖ (dirasah 
Islamiyah), ―comprehensive Islam‖ (kaafah), ―how to be a good student,‖ and 
―creating an Islamic family.‖ HTI rarely uses the word ―khilafah‖ in the titles of its 
training programmes even though their content emphasize the necessity of adopting 
Islam as a complete ideology that necessitates the establishment of the khilafah.
67
  
The character of HTI‘s activities is varied. Its most extreme action appears in 
the realizations of the tathqif murokkaz program that takes the form of training 
sessions. Because this type of action tends be closed and independent it facilitates the 
                                               
66 For example, in June 2003, HTI held a rally in front of the House of Representative‘s 
building to support to passing of a draft of law on the national education system (Act on Sisdiknas) that 
forces schools (including those run by non-Muslim institutions) to provide religious classes by teachers 
of the same religion. HTI sent a delegation to meet the House‘s committee that worked on the law (Al-
Wa‟ie 35: 30).  
67 For example, in a workshop in Yogyakarta on 8 August 2009 that brought Muslim leaders 
from different organizations, HTI framed the programme with an inclusive topic of ―Bersinergi 
Wujudkan Islam Penebar Rahmah‖ (co-operation building for the realization of Islam that spreads 
social good), but the speakers who all come from HTI spoke uncompromisingly about the necessity of 
transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state of khilafah within the unique methods of HTI. 
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formation of an anti-system awareness and movements. Out of 54 cases, the nature of 
HTI‘s training programmes is extremely oppositional to the state with the score of 2.9.  
Compared to the training programme, HTI appears less oppositional in its open 
programmes such as leadership meetings, mass rallies and seminars. These 
programmes are not extreme because of their frequent engagement with the 
government and other elements of the political system such as the House of 
Representatives and political parties. This takes the form of demanding elements of 
the political system to take action favorable to HTI. However these programmes can 
be categorized as radical or not extreme because the persistent campaign for khilafah 
as an alternative system. The natures of the opposition degree of these programmmes 
range 1.9 to 2.6.  
At the other end, HTI tends to be moderate in translating the programme of 
tabanni masalih al-ummah into advocacy and social work. The advocacy work is 
moderate because it engages with elements of the political system in a conciliatory 
way. Likewise, social work is equally moderate because instead of undermining the 
role of the State, it supports the State by helping it with social services (see figure 
4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1: The frequency and nature of HTI‘s activities 
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Overall, HTI‘s action tends to be radical with an average score of 2.3, almost 
an equal stance with the discourse aspect that scores 2.4. This means opposition to 
participation in the democratic system has been a dominant message of HTI‘s 
activities. However, tolerance of participation and engagement with State institutions 
are not infrequent. As shown in figure 4.1, the majority of radical and extreme aspects 
of HTI‘s action appear in its interaction with society. In contrast, most of the 
moderate aspect of HTI‘s action takes place in its interactions with elements of 
democratic institutions (the Government, the House of Representatives, political 
parties) and ‗Muslims participatory politics‘. The following section discusses this 
more positive part of HTI‘s behaviour.  
 
B. Interactions with government: Engaging the tyrant (zalim) regime 
Following its doctrine of non-participation, HTI published an article in the early 
edition of Al-Wa‟ie (published in 2000) explaining al-Nabhani‘s doctrine of 
mufaroqah (separation or detachment). In the context of interaction with Muslim 
regimes, HTI suggests the application of this doctrine in three ways. The first is the 
rejection of co-operation with a government that implements un-Islamic laws. This is 
specifically carried out in the context of governments in Muslim countries that reject 
the struggle to implement Islamic law.  The second is by calling Muslims to avoid 
―entering palaces,‖ which implies a suggestion for non-participation in government 
structure. And the third is urging Muslims not to praise the Government as a way to 
expose the inherent failures of the regime (Al-Wa‟ie 6: 12-16). 
However, as soon as HTI attempts to implement this doctrine it faces the 
reality that regimes in Muslim countries cannot be identified in the stark binary 
fashion of dar al-kufr (battling countries of infidels) and dar-al-Islam (countries under 
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a Muslim rule). Even though the Indonesian government does not implement an 
Islamic order as it desires, most officials are Muslim and the authorities adopt some 
aspects of Islamic law and this deters HTI from implementing the mufaroqoh doctrine. 
As a result, HTI differentiates between a zalim (tyrant or oppressive) regime and a 
kafir (infidel) regime. The mufaroqoh policy is applied to a zalim Muslim regime or a 
government that does not implement Islamic laws.  This model of mufaroqoh is 
considered less extreme than the ideal attitude toward a kafir regime that suggests an 
overthrow or a regime change, as stated in this paragraph: 
―Terhadap imam yang jahat, zalim dan fasiq, syari‘at 
memerintahkan kepada kita untuk mufaroqoh (memisahkan diri); 
tidak condoong kepada mereka, tidak membantu mereka dalam 
melakukan kejahatan, serta tidak memberikan pengakuan dalam 
bentuk apapun terhadap sikap dan tindakan mereka di hadapan 
umum. Bahkan tidak cukup dengan mufaroqoh terhadap mereka, 
tetapi kita pun harus melakukan upaya sungguh-sungguh untuk 
memperbaiki atau mengubah mereka. Namun, terhadap penguasa, 
kaum Muslim—sebagai sebuah prinsip—tidak boleh rela dipimpin 
oleh orang kafir di negeri mereka sendiri. Jika hal ini terjadi, kaum 
Muslim harus melakukan perubahan, tidak sekedar mufaroqoh‖ (Al-
Wa‟ie 6: 11). 
 
To a tyrant, zalim and fasiq imam, shari‘ah orders mufaroqoh 
(separation); [we should] not rely on them and not assist them in 
committing crimes, and not give them any form of public 
recognition for its public services. And mufaroqoh [separating] 
ourselves from them is not sufficient, we should also seriously 
endeavor to remind or change them. But to a Muslim government, it 
is not allowed to submit to a kafir in their own countries. If this 
happens, Muslim should attempt to seek a change, not only 
mufaroqoh) 
  
HTI therefore uses the terms ‗correct‘ in addition to ‗change‘ in dealing with a 
zalim regime, compared to the sole use of the term ‗change‘ to a kafir regime. This 
suggests that the objective to overthrow is more applicable in the context of its 
relationship with a kafir rather than with a zalim regime. If we follow HTI‘s 
differentiation between khilafah and non-khilafah governments, a zalim regime can 
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only exist in the context of a khilafah government. However, paradoxically HTI 
identifies the Indonesian government as a zalim regime rather than a kafir regime and 
therefore an overthrow of the Government is not a desired goal. 
Because of this differentiation, HTI‘s attitude toward the government is 
ambiguous. There are 27 activities that address the government, both in terms of 
policy or officials. Out of this number, 18 cases are critical (radical) of the 
government but none of these are extreme in terms of suggesting mufaroqoh 
(disengagement). The conciliatory tone of the actions is strengthened by 9 cases that 
can be considered moderate. The absence of extreme action or suggestion for 
disengagement with regard to the government makes the overall pattern of HTI‘s 
attitudes toward the government conciliatory, with the score of 1.6 (see figure 4.2). 
This is far less radical than the discourse on government, which scores 2.3. Instead of 
mobilizing non-participation, HTI shows not only a willingness but also pro-
activeness in engaging with the Government. This is shown by the fact that many of 
HTI‘s activities were held in Government related offices or facilities. The uses of 
Government buildings as a location for activities are essential because they are 
typically only used with the co-operation of government officers or agencies.
68
 HTI‘s 
activities took place in Governmental facilities 80 times out of 327 recorded locations 
of HTI activities. This is only slightly lower than the use of Islamic houses such as 
mosques and Islamic centers; many of the Islamic centers belong to the Council of 
Ulama (MUI) that is partly funded by the Government. These activities took various 
forms including seminars, leadership meetings and participation in festivals organized 
                                               
68 Examples includeHTI‘s co-operation with government workshops on reproductive health 
with office of education ministry in Ngawi, East Java (Al-Wa‟ie 81: 38), screening of the video on 
khilafah conference in the official residence of the governor of Southeast Sulawesi (Al-Wa‟ie 86: 37),  
joint programme with Malang Metropolitan police on anti-drug campaign (Al-Wa‟ie 82: 38), and co-
operation with office of Education Ministry in Bogor, West Java, on training school teachers of Islamic 
history (Al-Wa‟ie 87: 38). 
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by local government. More independent locations include hotels and other private 
venues (44 times), universities and schools (53 times), and the facilities of external 
Muslim organizations (20 times). Additionally, Government is a frequent target of 
either mobilization or alliance. It is not rare for HTI to seek meetings with the 
Government agencies to advocate government adoption of specific Muslim political 
interests. Figure 4.3. below shows the share of HTI‘s mobilizational targets and 
location of activities.  
 
Figure 4.2:  HTI‘s activities related to the state 
 
Figure 4.3: Locations of HTI‘s activities 
 HTI‘s critical actions against the Government take different forms including 
mass rallies, seminars and other forms of public forums that openly criticize 
government policies on public issues such as liberalization, the rise of fuel and food 
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prices, attitude toward Western governments, and other policies it sees as unfriendly 
to the Islamic movement. These challenges however are not an application of the 
mufaroqah campaign because they are limited to speeches in seminars and rallies 
rather than actual effort of, for example, campaigning for public disengagement from 
support for the Government. Moreover, it is not uncommon for HTI to engage the 
Government in an attempt to accommodate its demands. For example, when opposing 
Government policies to increase fuel and food prices, HTI held a series of rallies to 
condemn the policy. However, instead of marching to mobilize public distrust for the 
Government, HTI‘s rally in Surabaya, East Java, ended up around a shared table in a 
government office to demand a cancellation of the policy, rather than calling for a 
systemic change from the street (Al-Wa‟ie 30: 31-32). 
 HTI‘s engagement with the Government is not extraordinary. In 2006, it 
submitted an application to the Government to gain official recognition as a social 
organization. It did so by recognizing Pancasila and the unitary and Republic form of 
the state (NKRI) in its organizational statue. Despite the fact that HTI‘s goal to 
establish the khilafah runs counter to State ideology, Indonesian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs accepted HTI‘s application.69 Given HTI‘s self-proclamation as a political 
party that seeks to replace democracy with an Islamic government of khilafah, this 
move should be understood more as strategy to secure political freedom rather than a 
genuine recognition of the democratic system. Nonetheless this also represents HTI‘s 
willingness to engage the Government rather than confront it. 
 Another instance of HTI‘s inconsistency in implementing the mufaroqoh 
doctrine in its relationship with the Government is the reality that many members of 
HTI work as civil servants; as university lecturers, bureaucracy officers, and experts 
                                               
69 A copy of the letter of the acceptence of HTI as a social organization from the Internal 
Ministry and organizational statute submitted by HTI to the Ministry are included in appendices.  
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in national research agencies (LIPI). HTI‘s policy prohibits its members from 
occupying positions that support (wasilah) a prohibited conduct (haram) such as bank 
interest and legislation of un-Islamic laws. Included in this category are employment 
in banks, insurance companies, and being members of the House of Representatives.
70
 
For this reason, HTI justifies professions such as lawyers and judges on the condition 
that they only make decisions based on shari‘ah laws regardless of the fact that this is 
unrealistic because judges in civil courts are bound by national laws. In reality HTI 
has used the service of a lawyer to defend Muslim rights within the parameters of he 
current laws in Indononesia (HTI, 1 January, 2010). 
 Al-Nabhani‘s doctrines of dharb al-„alaqoh and mufaroqoh imply a call for 
the ummah to choose non-participation from the state in order to undermine its 
legitimacy. This policy of non-participation does not entail illegal activities that are 
harmful to the security of the organization such as involvements in acts  of terrorism, 
riots and boycotts (Al-Wa‟ie 54: 29). In other words, the policy of non-participation is 
implemented when the ummah has a legal choice to do so. However, in reality HTI 
does not always implement the non-co-operation doctrine even when doing so is safe. 
The choice to allow members to work in professions that require participation and 
adoption of the current system are examples of HTI‘s inconsistency in implementing 
the non-participation doctrine.   
 Such a tolerance toward participation is inevitable for HTI to expand the 
audience of its message, including officials in government bureaucracies. Entry into 
bureaucracies was often made possible because of shared interests between HTI and 
the Government officials. The Government itself uses Muslim audiences to gain 
                                               
70
 Interview with Malik, head of HTI in Malang, East Java, 25 October 2009.  
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legitimacy. Meanwhile, for HTI, the Government support is essential for its freedom 
to mobilize support and attract supporters from among government officials.  
One of HTI‘s most successful stories of its  positive interactions with 
Government is its repeated co-operation with the Governor of South Sumatra, 
Mahyuddin, a medical doctor and a politician of the ruling Democratic party. 
Mahyuddin was notorious for his banning of the Islamic sect, Ahmadiya (Kompas, 1 
September 2008; see also Syababnews, 5 September 2008). Aside from this, 
Mahyuddin has no record of implementing shari‘a friendly policies. But HTI has 
collaborated with the Governor on a number of occasions. For example they 
collaborated to bring representatives of Muslim organizations, local companies, and 
government agencies to a seminar on the exploration of natural resource based on 
shari‘ah (Al-Wa‟ie 86: 37) and organized a town hall meeting between Government 
and Muslim leaders (Al-Wa‟ie 82: 37). Both programmes took place in the Governor‘s 
office. On another occasion, HTI also took benefit from its relationship with the 
Governor‘s wife to hold a seminar on the political roles of Muslim women, which was 
sponsored by the Government (Al-Wa‟ie 82: 37). The background of a political leader 
targeted by HTI does not seem to bother it. Aside from the policy to ban Ahmadiyah, 
Mahyuddin was a politician in the ruling Democratic party and a nationalist.  
Even corruption does not prevent HTI from taking an opportunity to engage 
with a Government leader. An example of HTI‘s actions with this type of leader is its 
interaction with Ali Mazi, former governor of Southeast Sulawesi who during his 
period in office was temporarily removed because of a graft charge relating to the 
management of Indonesia‘s national stadium in Jakarta. Ali Mazi was removed from 
office in 2006, but regained his position in 2007 after the court failed to prove the 
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charge.
71
 The engagement took place in 2007, after the international khlafah 
conference in Jakarta. HTI organized a series of promotional programmes based on 
the result of the conference in many cities across Indonesia. In Southeast Sulawesi, 
HTI gained support from Ali Mazi to organize a screening of the video of the khilafah 
conference in his office that brought together representatives from various Muslim 
organizations (Al-Wa‟ie 86: 37). When Ali Mazi was temporarily inactive due to the 
corruption charge, HTI approached his deputy, Yusron A. Silondae.  Knowing that 
Silonde was preparing to run as a candidate for governor in the next election, HTI 
paid him a  visit and suggested that he initiate the application of shari‘ah once in 
power (Al-Wa‟ie: 39).  
 In other places, HTI joined government campaigns and used them to expand 
its audience. Through this strategy, it seemed to gain successes in infiltrating school 
systems in several cities. In Bogor, for example, HTI co-operated with local offices of 
the Ministry of Education to hold a series of training sessions on teaching Islamic 
history for school teachers and principals in the region (Al-Wa‟ie 87: 37). This 
provided HTI with an audience to preach its version of Islamic history that focoses on 
the importance of the khilafah.  
Similiar progress occured in Pasuruan, East Java, where HTI was successful in 
gaining permission from the local office of the Education Ministry to organize Islamic 
study groups in schools (HTI, 11 March 2009). Sometimes the topic offered by the 
government is unusual or contradictory to HTI‘s views. In Ngawi, East Java, HTI 
collaborated with local office of Education Ministry to hold a workshop on ‗healthy 
reproduction‘ (Al-Wa‟ie 82: 36), a campaign it usually sees a part of Western 
propaganda (Al-Wa‟ie 64: 9-14).  
                                               
71 For information about the charge against Ali Mazi, see Indonesian Corruption Watch (6 
November 2006). 
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 Another model of HTI‘s engagement with the government takes the form of 
involving officials in its activities.  HTI often hold leadership meetings using 
government‘s facilities and bringing in representatives from the government to deliver 
opening speeches (see for example Al-Wa‟ie 49: 31; Al-Wa‟ie 35: back cover). In 
contradiction to the mufaroqoh doctrine that requires opposition to regimes in Muslim 
countries, HTI‘s support of government policies in favor of Islamic political interests 
is not uncommon. This attitude for instance occurred in HTI‘s participation in a 
parade organized by government and Muslim groups in Bandung in which HTI 
carried a banner with the words ―supporting and and encouraging the government of 
Bandung to develop Bandung as a religious and shari‘ah adhering city‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 35: 
back cover). On the banner HTI chose to use the conciliatory word ‗mendorong‘ 
(encouraging) rather than terms such as ‗menuntut‘ (demanding). 
Through engaging with the government in this way the benefits to HTI were 
various: gaining recognition from the government, avoiding governmental repression, 
exerting influence on governmental officials, and gaining an advantage in terms of a 
‗war of position.‘ However, the cost of this endeavor is also substantial. In 
contradiction to the mandate of breaking the relationships between society and the 
Government (dharb al-alaqoh), HTI instead is often bridging the relationship between 
societies and the government.  
 
C. Engaging the House of Representatives: The ‘Arena’ of da’wah 
 
In contrast to its overtly radical discourse, HTI‘s interaction with the House of 
Representative is no less friendly than its interaction with the Government. The 
interactions take various forms including rallies to address the house, meetings with 
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members, seminars, workshops and leadership meetings where house members are 
invited as guest speakers and activities that take place in the house‘s venues.  
The nature of HTI‘s interaction has never been extreme in the sense of 
demanding the dissolution of the House or suggesting that the public eschew their 
support for the members of parliament. It sometimes demonstrated a radical stance by 
attacking the laws produced by the House and yet it then maintained the demand that 
the House implement the shari‘ah.72  
However, the dominant nature of HTI‘s interaction with the House is moderate 
in the sense of expecting the House or its members to side with HTI in its campaign 
for shari‘ah-based policies without calling for a change of the existing political 
system. It is typical to see HTI meeting House members to demand specific 
legislation. Issues that are close to HTI interest include the usual issues such as 
Islamic education, heresy and pornography and the Jakarta Charter and less sectarian 
issues such as opposition to economic liberalization and the privatization of national 
energy companies (Al-Wa‟ie 95: 32-37). Sometimes, HTI‘s engagement with the 
House is part of a larger Muslim effort to advocate for Islamic Muslim political 
agendas. HTI, for example, joined a petition of Muslim leaders to support the 
legislation against indecency delivered to the members of the House (Gatra, 19, May 
2006).  Instead of strengthening argument against the failure of the House, HTI‘s 
presence in the House was often aimed at demanding the House to takes its side in 
opposing government policies (Al-Wa‟ie 85: 31; 34: 31; 68: 73; 70: 73). 
                                               
72 In 2008, for example, HTI organized a series of rallies in major cities in Indonesia to 
criticize the liberal tendency of the House of Representative citing legislation on foreign investment 
and fuel price that favor economic liberalization. However despite this criticism, HTI seemed to 
acknowledge the House by calling it to take policies favoring the ‗nationalization‘ of power companies 
and to oppose government policy to increase fuel price. One of the common banner carried during the 
rallies said: Tolak Liberalisasi Migas, Dengan Syari‘ah Menuju Indonesia Lebih Baik, Batalkan 
Kenaikan BBM, dan Nasionalisasi Perusahaan Migas Asing (Oppose liberalization of oil and gas 
companies with shari‘ah for a better Indonesia, can fuel price rise, and demand the nationalization of 
foreign oil and gas companies)  (Al-Wa‘ie 95: 32-37). 
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With the absence of extreme attitude, the average HTI interaction with the 
House tends to be moderate with 1.3 points (see figure 4.2). HTI nonetheless denies 
the view that its engagement with the House contradicts its extra-parliamentary 
ideology. It argues that coming to the House follows the method of the prophet 
Muhammad who delivered da‟wah (preaching) to everybody regardless of his/her 
background. This includes da‟wah to unbelievers to invite them to embrace Islam. If 
unbelievers could be a legitimate target of da‟wah, the members of parliament who 
are the Muslim majority are a legitimate audience (Al-Wa‟ie 26: 32).  
This comparison however neglects the different context of the Prophet‘s da‟wa 
and HTI‘s struggle. While the Prophet Muhammad preached to unbelievers to 
embrace Islam so to support the establishment of a new government, HTI‘s interaction 
with the House is aimed at persuading members to adopt Islam within the framework 
of the existing democratic process.  
This evidence suggests that what HTI means by an ―extra-parliamentary 
struggle‖ is the avoidance of direct participation in the parliamentary process which 
requires it to become a political party. This does not mean demanding that those in 
parliament leave the perceived ‗dirty job‘ of participating in the democratic system. It 
is therefore understandable that HTI is not troubled by the presence of its members in 
the House working as a staff for an MP. This is illustrated by the profession of the 
president of HTI‘s student wing, Gema Pembebasan (literally means echo of 
liberation), who works for a member of the ruling Democratic party.
73
  
 
  
 
                                               
73 I found  the co-ordinator of Gema Pembebasan after he invited me for an interview in his 
workplace in the house. A day before the interview he led a massive gathering of more than 3000 
students from different cities in Indonesia (Interview with Erwin Permana, 19 September 2009).  
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D. Military and Police: Ahl al-Quwwah 
HTI sees the military as a key power holder (ahl al-quwwah). Its role in future 
political change is crucial, especially when it has to take the extraordinary position 
that HTI prefers (see pages 64-65). It is therefore not surprising that HTI‘s 
interactions with these institutions are mostly positive. Direct interactions with 
military and police occur 9 times. These include joint programmes and visits to 
military officers. The joint programmes include for example, working in partnership 
with the military in relief work for the Aceh tsunami victims (Al-Wa‟ie 54: 30), 
partnership with the Malang metropolitan police (Polresta) and the Central Java 
regional police (Polda) in campaigns against drug abuse (Al-Wa‟ie 82: 38) and a visit 
to the military commander in Yogyakarta (Al-Wa‟ie 77: 37). Sometimes HTI visited 
law enforcement officers such as the police to encourage its pro-active role in 
implementing Muslim policies favoring Muslim interests. For this reason HTI paid a 
visit to the head of the East Java regional police to demand the enforcement of the 
recommendations of the Ulama Council (MUI) to ban Ahmadiyah (Al-Wa‟ie 51: 33). 
 There are a few retired generals who frequently appear in HTI‘s activities. The 
most notable of these are former army commander, General Tyasno Sudarto,
74
 and 
Colonel Herman Ibrahim, former head of the public affairs office of the regional 
military commander III Siliwangi (Suara Islam, 28 September 2009). There is no 
evidence that these two figures formally joined HTI, but their support of HTI is clear. 
In addition to being regular speakers in HTI‘s rallies and seminars, Tyasno Sudarto, 
for example, is quoted as publicly endorsing HTI‘s manifesto (released in June 2009) 
                                               
74 Retired general Tyasno was known as a pragmatic and Maverick general. He was closeto 
Wiranto in the early period of Reform era, but later moved closer to former president Abdurrahman 
Wahid who ran against Wiranto. After the impeachment of Wahid, Wiranto was known as one of active 
or retired generals closed to Megawati who eventually replaced Wahid. 
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that outlines a comprehensive concept of HTI‘s alternative of the khilafah government 
(HTI, 3 Jun, 2009).  
 There is also speculation that the influential retired general, Wiranto, secretly 
backs HTI. This comes from a leader of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) in 
Malang, East Java. He claimed that he has witnessed HTI‘s representative attending a 
public gathering of Muslim leaders along with Wiranto.
75
 The evidence that may be 
used to confirm this speculation is HTI‘s implicit support for Wiranto when he ran for 
the presidency in the 2004 election. With the purpose of seeking out potential pro-
shari‘ah leaders, HTI went to meet two candidates out of six running in this election. 
They were Amien Rais whose running mate was a nationalist Siswono Yudohosodo 
and Wiranto who run with a Nahdlatul Ulama leader, Solahuddin Wahid.  HTI 
managed to meet Amien Rais, but the meeting with Wiranto was cancelled due to a 
clash of schedule (Al-Wa‟ie 47: 31). The speculation about HTI‘s relationship with 
Wiranto however cannot be substantiated as there is no concrete evidence to confirm 
it.  
The evidence does show that HTI has a strong desire to gain the support of 
members of the military or at least retired military leaders. While the same support 
from the military has not occured, what is essential for HTI is not the direct support 
from military or police, but also presenting the image that HTI is not a threat to the 
State in the eyes of the military. In the short term, the absence of opposition from the 
military is essential for HTI‘s continued operation. In November 2006 HTI for 
example illustrated some situations that it claimed showed progress. One is the claim 
that HTI is able to exercise political freedom without disruption or repression from the 
security forces.  HTI sees this as a sign of support from the military and it believes 
                                               
75 Interview with the secretary general of MUI Malang, M. Nidhom Hidayatullah, 25 October 
2009 
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this will eventually turn into real support (nusroh) for the installation of a khilafah 
government (Al-Wa‟ie 75: 20). Before an actual attempt at seizing power takes place, 
support from the military cannot be more concrete than the absence of the military 
restriction, and this is essential to secure its success. 
 
E. Political Parties and Leaders: Targets of an Alliance 
HTI‘s actions relating to political parties and leaders demonstrate its eagerness to 
positively engage Muslim actors in the democratic process. The party system is often 
seen as the core weakness of Indonesia‘s democracy. Because of the lack of 
ideological distinction between political parties, pragmatism has been the dominant 
factor in party politics. Political parties often fail to recruit leaders that represent the 
people (Centre for Electoral Reform, 2009). In spite of this reality, the nature of HTI‘s 
actions relating to political parties tends to be moderate. This is different to the 
overtly radical discourse about political parties.  
The nature of HTI‘s actions relating to political parties has never been 
extreme. Al-Wa‟ie records 20 cases of HTI‘s interactions with political parties and 
leaders. The majority of them (16) are moderate. A few of them are radical and those 
take the form of discouraging support for political parties. However, HTI tends to 
present a friendly face when directly interacting with political parties or leaders. 
While some forms of participation by its members were justified, it should be no 
surprise that HTI was even more tolerant of the political participation of other people 
in the political process.   
 A good example of HTI‘s positive engagement with political parties is its 
partnership with a major Islamic party, the United Development Party (PPP) to 
organize a seminar to initiate the founding of the Riau Syari‘ah Council (Dewan 
Syari‘ah Riau) (Al-Wa‟ie, 76: 38; Riau Online, 5 December 2006). Mutual but not 
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necessarily common interests were essential to achieve this friendliness. In HTI‘s 
point of view, the programme was not only an opportunity to raise public awareness 
of the importance of the shari‘ah, but it was also a part of the effort to gain a position 
at the centre of the Muslim struggle to implement the shari‘ah. PPP however, did not 
share HTI‘s view on the khilafah nor its opposition to democracy. Historically 
commited to Pancasila, the likely interest of PPP was more of tapping into Islamic 
emotions for political mobilization by appearing pro-shari‘ah rather than a systematic 
programme of advocating shari‘ah as an alternative system to democracy. That the 
aim of the programme was to form alliance organizations to advocate the partial 
adoption of the khilafah by local government or law makers shows that the nature of 
the alliance was not equal to HTI‘s opposition to the democratic system.  
HTI‘s friendliness with Islamic parties sometimes went as far as providing 
campaign forums for their candidates in elections. This is reflected in a seminar 
organized by HTI in the remote district of Wahyuni Mandira in the province of 
Lampung. Even though the title of the forum promoted the shari‘ah and the khilafah,  
interestingly, two candidates in the local election were from a ―Muslim Brotherhood‖ 
party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and Wiranto‘s nationalist party, Hanura 
party, were brought to speak in the session (Al-Wa‟ie 104: 73). This is further 
evidence that despite its opposition to democracy, HTI does not always demand 
Muslims cease participation in elections. Moreover this indicates an attempt to build 
an alliance with political leaders running in elections with the aim of persuading them 
to support shari‘ah campaigns in the political arena.  
 HTI‘s interaction with political parties also demystifies the perception that 
HTI and PKS are arch-rivals. Evidence for this occurred prior the 2004 election, when 
a number of HTI‘s top leaders visited the headquarters of the PKS. Abandoning the 
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typical rhetoric attacking the pragmatism of Islamic parties, HTI‘s news reports about 
the meeting emphasized a common interest to strengthen the Islamic da‘wah, Islamic 
supremacy („izz al-Islam) and to sustain a brotherhood relationship between them (Al-
Wa‟ie 47: 30). Paradoxically the report about this visit is in an edition of Al-Wa‟ie 
entitled ‗the danger of political pragmatism‘ that strongly criticized Islamic parties 
because of their lack of ideological integrity (Al-Wa‟ie 47: 13).  
 The above involvement of an election candidate from the nationalist Hanura 
party indicates that this did not limit it from seeking alliances with Islamic parties. On 
another occasion HTI visited a ‗nationalist secular‘ party, the Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle (PDIP) (Al-Wa‟ie 80: 40). However this is uncharacteristic because 
Islamic parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the United Development 
Party (PPP), and the Crescent Star Party (PBB) are the most frequent allies sought by 
HTI. Out of 20 activities that address political parties, either as the only target or part 
of multiple targets, only 3 activities concerned with secular parties; this includes the 
visit to PDIP (Al-Wa‟ie 80: 40), and the presence of the leaders of Hanura, Golkar and 
Demokrat parties in some of HTI‘s discussion forums (Al-Wa‟ie 95: 39; Al-Wa‟ie 104: 
73). This preference is understandable because they are closer to HTI in terms of 
ideology regardless of their other differences. This indicates the orientation of HTI to 
Islamic parties is to encourage their unity and to emphasize Islamic identity. That the 
discourse on Islamic parties is less radical than those on secular parties confirms this 
pattern. This is also in line with HTI‘s ‗secular versus Islamic parties‘ categorization 
(Al-Wa‟ie 106: 44-47).  
HTI‘s appeal for support from political leaders sometimes appears desperate 
by going as far as, for example, to suggest that the PKS‘ leader, Hidayat Nurwahid, 
was qualified to lead Muslim countries as a caliph. The suggestion was made by 
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Ismail Yusanto in a joint rally with PKS to condemn the US war in Iraq. In the context 
of the nomination of Hidayat Nurwahid to run in the presidential election in 2004, 
Yusanto endorsed Nurwahid to be a leader of Muslim countries. Yusanto attempted to 
keep from distinct khilafah message by emphasizing the role of uniting transnational 
Muslim countries. Nonetheless, the endorsement that occured when Nurwahid was 
nominated as a Presidential candadate is inconsistent with HTI‘s opposition to 
democracy and party politics (Hafez.wordpress, 26 May, 2007).
76
 While there might 
be a question of whether or not this compliment to PKS‘ leader truly represents HTI‘s 
views, it demonstrates HTI‘s effort to play a bridging role between Muslim parties.  
HTI typically justified its engagement with the elements of the political 
system, including political parties with the goal of delivering da‘wah to diverse 
audiences indiscriminately. In this logic HTI engagement with those within the system 
was meant to incite internal dissent. The above evidence shows HTI also engaged 
political parties and leaders to seek policy changes favoring Islamization. Both the 
revolutionary goal of gaining position in society and the reformist objective of playing 
an indirect role in pushing gradual Islamization have led HTI to tolerate party politics; 
this policy deviates from the mandate of non-participation.  
 
F. Election and participatory politics: opposition and indirect participation 
Apparently HTI‘s tolerance of political participation is also justified by the 
international leadership of HTI. This comes from the chairman of HT in Britain, 
Jalaluddin Patel during his visit to Jakarta to attend HTI‘s ‗National Ulama Congress‘ 
                                               
76 Grown from the same movement of LDK, HTI and PKS took opposite directions. HTI 
rejects the belief in democratic process and takes non-participatory path, while in the other direction 
PKS embraces democracy and grows as a centrist party. Many PKS leaders sees HTI anti-democratic 
stance as a threat to PKS constituency, while at the same time hostility to PKS is normal among HTI 
activists. For further reading about the role of Tarbiyah and LDK to the emergence of HTI, PKS and 
other Islamist movements, see M Imdadun Rahmat and Khamami Zada (2004: 30). 
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(MUN) in July 2009 that gathered around 6000 Muslim leaders from across Indonesia 
and international delegates. Patel defended HTI‘s policy supporting the partial 
adoption of the shari‘ah as a part of the campaign to demonstrate the superiority of the 
shari‘ah. Patel however saw this as a strategy to gain acceptance. For Patel, this 
strategy is unavoidable because of HT‘s goal of gaining leadership in societies. He 
suggested that HT should not think of launching a coup to seize power unless support 
from the majority of population had been first secured. Without extensive support 
from the people, a political change was seen as unsustainable.
77
  
Seeking wide scale support is however problematic for HTI. Indonesian 
society is shaped by participation in the democratic system by a wide range of 
political and social means, including those advocating Islamic political agendas. Here 
HTI faces the dilemma. On the one hand, following the flow of Muslim participatory 
politics hurts its anti-systemic opposition; on the other hand, distancing itself from 
Muslim participatory politics can isolate HTI from the centre of Muslim political 
struggle, which means eroding its chance for attracting support from the populace. 
The answer to this dilemma for HTI is reflected in Patel‘s suggestion to support the 
partial legislations of the shari‘ah. He argued that this should not be understood as the 
legitimation of the current system, but must be considered as a means to present 
examples of the viability of shari‘ah in contrast to the failures of the present system. 
In order to sustain opposition to the system, it was recommended that the campaign 
for smaller changes should be carried out along with the constant call for a total 
change that can only happen in the form of establishing a khilafah government.
78
  
The most visible aspect of HTI‘s anti-system stance is its extra-parliamentary 
struggle. Since launching the public interaction stage (tafa‟ul am‟a al-ummah) in 
                                               
77 Interview with Jalaluddin Patel, 23 July 2009. 
78
 Interview with Jalaluddin Patel, Jakata, 23 July 2009. 
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2000, HTI has witnessed two elections in 2004 and 2009. At the discourse level, HTI 
has been largely opposed to elections. During election periods HTI would typically 
raise skeptical arguments about elections to discourage the public from hoping for 
improvement through the democratic ritual. Although it avoided campaigns 
encouraging people to abstain from voting (also called ‗golput‘ that literally stands for 
white group), an explicit opposition to voting came from an HTI leader in Lampung 
before the 2004 election (Gatra, 26 April, 2004). The typical argument of HTI‘s 
campaign against elections was a legal, not Islamic, view suggesting that voting is an 
individual right, not an obligation. People have a choice to take or not to take their 
right to vote. HTI challenged party politics by highlighting the alleged increasing 
number of voting abstentions (See for example Al-Wa‟ie 97: 9-13, Al-Islam 440, 441, 
426). HTI usually emphasized that the major reason for voting abstention is the 
absence of political parties that advocate a strong ideological stance. During election 
periods, HTI usually organized public forums to bring public attention to political 
crises caused by political parties and to emphasize what it called ―non-ideological‖ 
political parties or coalitions
79
.  
 This, however, does not mean that HTI fully rejected participation in the 
democratic process. A former leader of HTI, Muhammad Al-Khattath, admitted that 
in 2007 HTI was considering submitting an application to become a political party, 
but this did not materialize because of media reports about HTI‘s international 
conference that cast fear of it being a threat to Indonesian Constitution and national 
ideology.
80
 A different source suggested that HTI‘s restraint from officially being a 
political party was also caused by a lack of internal confidence about its ability to 
                                               
79 For HTI‘s criticism of Islamic parties, see Al-Wa‟ie 47: 7-17; Al-Wa‟ie 41: 32-35. 
80
 Interview with Muhammad Al-Khattath, Jakarta, 16 October, 2009. 
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provide sufficient structures required by the election committee.
81
 Nevertheless, while 
direct participation in the process of forming a political party has not materialized, 
HTI has demonstrated a willingness to play indirect roles not only during election 
periods, but also when Islamic political interests are at stake. To justify this behavior, 
the head of HTI‘s department of leadership relations (lajnah fa‟aliyah), Muhammad 
R. Kurnia, argued that organizationally HTI does not take part in Islamic advocacies 
and social activities, and does not prohibit personal participation in the political 
process.
82
 This paradoxical argument represents HTI‘s defence of its supportive 
attitude toward Muslim participatory politics and an attempt to sustain the ideal 
strategy of non-participation. This strategic ambiguity is reflected in HTI‘s actions in 
regard to elections and other forms of Muslim participation in the political process, 
demonstrating the mixing of opposition with indirect participation.  
  This position took precedence both in the 2004 and the 2009 elections. Before 
the 2004 election, HTI tested the water by visiting a number of Muslim Presidential 
candidates including Amien Rais and Wiranto and PKS (Al-Wa‟ie 47: 30-31). The 
goals of this were to propose HTI‘s political orientation, to persuade political leaders 
to adopt the shari‘ah in their campaigns and to suggest the formation of an Islamic 
political alliance. Such a move was not only attempted in the context of the national 
elections, but also in local elections. For example, prior the governor elections in 
Jakarta in 2007, HTI organized a meeting called ‗Muslim convention‖ to seek 
candidates who would ―lead Jakarta with shari‘ah‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 81: 36). Speaking to the 
press about the goal of the conference, the organizer from HTI did not challenge the 
viability of the local election; instead he spoke about abstract objective of removing 
―capitalistic, opportunistic, hedonistic, individualistic and materialistic [elements] 
                                               
81 A former member of HTI admitted that the idea to become a political party has occurred 
since 2004, but was met with internal resistance (Interview with anonymous source, 22 August 2009).   
82
 Interview with M. Rahmat Kurnia, Jakarta, 1 August 2009. 
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from Jakarta‖ (Detik (8 April 2007). Rather than urging political leaders to cease 
participation in elections, the conference invited candidates competing for election to 
attend the convention but no candidate  bothered to attend (Al-Wa‟ie 81: 36).  
After constant failure in making real political progress in previous elections in 
persuading political leaders to adopt a shari‘ah campaign, a new approach of indirect 
participation was made in July 2008 to anticipate the 2009 election. This was when 
HTI raised the idea of building an ―Islamic alliance‖ (poros Islam).83 The initiative 
was raised in a high profile seminar in Jakarta entitled ―Building an Islamic bloc in the 
2009 election.‖ It appeared that only small Islamic parties such as the National Ulama 
Awakening Party (PKNU) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB) were interested in the 
idea. The goal to create a coalition between Islamic parties is clear from the fact that 
those invited to speak in the forum were representatives of Islamic parties and Muslim 
organizations. However in order to avoid appearing too conformist to party politics, 
Yusanto argued that the goals of the initiative were to ―advocate the implementation 
of the shari‘ah in Indonesia so that Indonesia is led by a leader who is willing to 
submit [to the obligation] of implementing the shari‘ah‖ (untuk memperjuangkan 
syariat Islam agar bisa ditegakkan di Indonesia dan Indonesia nantinya dipimpin oleh 
para pemimpin yang mau tunduk dan menjalankan syariat Islam) (Antara, 21 July 
2008).  
The definition of ‗poros Islam‘ (Islamic bloc) was left open to avoid making a 
concrete or explicit suggestion about creating a coalition between Islamic parties, 
although such an outcome was likely to be welcomed. This carefulness was necessary 
because the chance for success was small. History has shown that uniting Islamic 
parties is a tremendous task. Not surprisingly, the initiative was neglected by major 
                                               
83 The term ―poros Islam‖  (Islamic block) was first used by Amien Rais in 1999 when he 
supported the rise of Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency by defeating Megawati who was supported 
by mostly nationalist parties.  
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Islamic parties, including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) that is historically closer 
to HTI in terms of ideology. Nonetheless, such an outcome was not the only target. 
No less important, this strategy was a political statement of HTI to show its role in the 
Muslim struggle for the shari‘ah—something which is essential for its effort to 
success in mobilizing support for its campaign.   
 Despite this failure, the evidence shows that HTI was not only tolerant in 
supporting but also in proactively taking indirect roles in elections. This move can 
help HTI tests the willingness of Muslim leaders to adopt the shari‘ah. If an 
immediate fundamental change was not feasible, an intermediate outcome in the form 
of the formation of an Islamic block in parliament would be welcomed by HTI. If 
such a block could build significant power in parliament then there is hope for a 
constitutional amendment in favor of the adoption of the shari‘ah in a larger scale.  
The indirect role that HTI can offer is a mobilization at the social level. This strategy 
is contained in a report published in Al-Wa‟ie after the visit of HTI leaders to the PKS 
before the 2004 election. Opening the possibility for a future alliance it described the 
meeting positively as follows: 
The meeting between HTI and PKS that proceeded in a warm 
situation has produced an understanding that both parties will 
continue improving Islamic brotherhood and communication and 
information [sharing] in order to strengthen da‘wah 
 
Pertemuan (between HTI and PKS) yang berlangsung cukup hangat 
itu melahirkan kesepahaman, yakni kedua belah pihak akan terus-
menerus meningkatkan jalinan persaudaraan Islam dan komunikasi, 
dan informasi sehingga tercapai penguatan dakwah (Al-Wa‟ie 47: 
30). 
 
 Outside election periods, HTI‘s attitude toward Muslim participatory politics 
was sometimes even more direct. Before August 2008, HTI‘s participatory politics 
was primarily carried out through its intense involvement in an inter-group alliance 
called the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI). The fact that HTI‘s leaders in that period, 
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especially Muhammad Al-Khattath, played a leading role in the founding and 
operation of the FUI suggests that HTI was using it as a vehicle to gain a position in 
society through a combination of advocacy for Islamic policies and the call for the 
establishment of the khilafah.
84
 Such an impression was also confirmed by the fact 
that HTI‘s leaders frequently appeared in the media delivering FUI‘s statements.  
A monumental event was a meeting held at Darunajah Islamic school in 
Jakarta on June 28, 2008, in response to the violent clash between Islamist groups and 
the nationalist alliance in Jakarta Monas Square. Driven by the shared antagonism to 
so-called liberal Islam, the meeting involved about 200 Muslim leaders and HTI 
claimed it was a ‗historical day‘ for the role of Islam in the nation.‘ The meeting 
produced an agreement called the ―Darunnajah Declaration‖ that includes four 
recommendations: support for the purification of the Islamic faith; the co-ordination 
between Islamic movements; the defense and protection of Islamic da‘wah, and the 
adoption of the shari‘ah-all solutions to the problems of the ummah. More practically, 
the meeting also supported the formation of a movement called the United Ummah 
Committee of the Islamic Ummah Forum (DKU-FUI) and it recommended the 
founding of the FUI at the local level (Al-Wa‘ie 96: 7-8, 39; HTI, 2 August 2008).  
The nature of this movement is clearly reformist or participatory. This is 
reflected in the central role of the Muslim leaders from MUI, Ma‘ruf Amien and Nazri 
Adlani in addition to other Muslim leaders from different spectrums as well as 
representative from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Al-Wa‘ie 96: 7-8). Critical issues 
that united the leaders were: opposition to Islamic liberalism and support for the 
unspecified concept of shari‘ah. Because of the diverse nature of the alliance, HTI had 
to accept the reality that the khilafah proposal was not included from the list of 
                                               
84 The role of HTI in founding FUI is for example apparent in the launching of FUI in 
Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi (Al-Wa‟ie 79: 38) 
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recommendations (HTI, 2 August 2008). Nevertheless what matters for HTI is gaining 
recognition in Muslim society through taking part in ―participatory politics.‖ By doing 
so it hoped to exert dominant roles in the movement in order to to allow the inclusion 
of the khilafah message at the practice level.  
Through this network, HTI initiated the founding of pressure groups called the 
‗shari‘ah task forces‘ to pressure the Government to adopt the shari‘ah in many cities 
such as Bogor (Al-Wa‘ie 69: 63), Kediri (Al-Wa‘ie 80: 39), and Surabaya (Al-Wa‘ie 
87: 37). These groups however, did not live for long because they could only be 
mobilized in support of sporadical issues sensitive to Islamic morality. None of these 
initiatives brought about a concrete result in the form of the Government‘s adopting 
the shari‘ah. This involvement is however important for HTI to gain role and exert 
influence among Muslims.  
Not only did these initiatives fail to deliver concrete outcomes, HTI eventually 
realized that trying to form a dominant role in a wide range of alliance groups was 
unrealistic. For this reason, HTI decided to leave the Islamic Umah Forum (FUI) in 
August 2008. HTI‘s leader at that time, Muhammad Al-Khattath, who occupied a 
strategic position at FUI as a secretary general, was given the options to choose 
between FUI or HTI.
85
 Al-Khattath chose the FUI and his position as the chairman of 
HTI was taken by Hafidz Abdurrahman.
86
  
Since leaving the FUI, HTI tended to work alone. It focused on mobilizing its 
sources by persuading Muslim leaders to join its campaign although it did not totally 
leave the political arena. Because FUI has been the channel of HTI‘s reformist 
politics, the attention on specific issues of Islamic significance seems to be less 
                                               
85 The succession was marked by the replacement of a regular column of Al-Khattath in Al-
Wa‟ie by Hafizd Abdurrahman. 
86 The reason for the departure from FUI, see the appendix on the takmim (internal circulation) 
of HTI regarding FUI.  
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intense. However, the departure from the reformist FUI did not mean that HTI was 
becoming more revolutionary or disengaging from reformist politics. As individual 
participation is permissible, HTI activists continued seeking active roles in 
participatory politics. A recent example is HTI‘s attempt to block the appeal for 
judicial review to the Supreme Court by a nationalist coalition to annul the blasphemy 
law (UU No 1/PNPS/1965). HTI‘s involvement in this case was intense as it played a 
prominent role in a Muslim coalition by appointing a team of lawyers.
87
  
 A shift towards a more tolerant attitude to participatory politics is also obvious 
in HTI‘s implementation of the tabanni masholih al-ummah agenda. Under this 
framework, HTI is mandated to present Islamic solutions to social problems. It 
appeared in practice that this goal was aimed at promoting the Islamic alternative to 
confront the government‘s secularity, but it is also an opportunity to promote its 
version of Islamic solutions to issues to be adopted by the Government. Such an 
attitude was apparent during my interview with the chairman of HTI in Kendari, 
Southeast Sulawesi. Discussing the problem of poverty, the chairman, a civil servant 
who works as an advisor to the Rector of a State University in Kendari, offered HTI‘s 
typical solution on land problems of opening unused lands for landless people. When 
asked about the possibility of advocating the adoption of this model of land reform by 
the Government along with other social organizations, the chairman answered without 
hesitation, ‗why not?‖ This reflects the openness of HTI‘s activists to gradual 
change.
88
 
 
 
                                               
87 To support its argument against the request to annul the law, HTI wrote a counter-argument 
paper, see HTI (02 February 2010). The role of HTI in delegating the defence for the law to a lawyer 
team is mentioned in Hukumonline (02 February 2010).   
88 Interview with Fitriaman, spokesperson of the Southeast Sulawesi branch of HTI, Kendari 
28 October 2009.  
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G. Conclusion 
 
The core of al-Nabhani‘s theory of non-violent revolution is the objective of 
separating the people from the State. Ideally this goal can be achieved by mobilizing 
social distrust as well as advocating non-participation in the Government structure and 
political process. However, the translations of this doctrine to the action level are 
unmatched with this orientation. Many of HTI‘s activities tend to be directed at the 
structures of the alleged secular political system. HTI‘s participatory politics took 
various forms from persuading or pressuring the State institutions to taking measures 
in favor of Islamic political interests to friendly interactions with the elements within 
the political system. This engagement occurred in HTI‘s activities that frequently took 
place within the State institutions. By doing this, HTI did not undermine the State or 
drive Muslims away from participation in Government and in the political process but 
in contrast often it helped bridge their interaction with the State.  
HTI‘s commitment to operate within the legal framework to secure its 
operation in the democratic environment limits its choices for undermining the state. 
By ruling out boycotts and violent mechanisms to disrupt the stability of the 
democratic state, HTI relies on legal options. But this clearly is not the orientation of 
HTI. Not only did HTI abandon non-participation doctrines when such a behavior was 
harmful to its political freedom, but it also allowed its members or other actors to 
participate in the State when non-participation was legally possible. From the legal 
point of view, people, for example, have the right to seek professions outside the 
Government or parliament. But this was not advocated by HTI. Instead it chose to 
infiltrate political institutions in order to trigger internal battles and it does this by 
allowing its members to seek professions within the structure of the State.  
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So far, the limit of HTI‘s participatory politics is in regard to direct 
participation in elections. But this indirect role can be a stepping stone toward a direct 
participation in the form of becoming a political party. This is not impossible as HTI‘s 
doctrine allows participation in legislative elections with the condition that shari‘ah-
oriented candidates are allowed to compete. However, its tolerance to participation 
should be seen as part of its strategy to mobilize support and to create an environment 
favorable to its long term goal of undermining democracy and creating a support base 
for an Islamic political system. This is shown in the prominence of the radical 
character in HTI‘s activities. The significant of this varied attitude of HTI to its 
‗refolution‘ is discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
 
The Quest for a Third Path 
The Establishment of ‘Refolutionary’ Politics 
 
A. Introduction  
HTI‘s mixed character of radical, moderate and extreme as elaborated in the previous 
chapters demonstrates its inconsistency in challenging the democratic system it seeks 
to destroy. A prominent pattern of this is the discrepancy between theory and practice. 
In theory, HTI opposed democracy, challenged gradual approaches for change and 
criticized party politics. In practice, it engaged with the democratic system by building 
positive interaction with the players of democracy (the Government, the House of 
Representatives and the political parties), justifying elections as a means to propagate 
the shari‘ah and supporting Muslim advocacy for shari‘ah-based policies within the 
democratic framework.  
Following this tendency, one may suggest that HTI is undertaking a process of 
de-radicalization. Such an account may come in light of the ―de-radicalization‖ theory 
proposed by Robert C. Tucker, an expert in the transformation of Communist 
movements. According to Tucker one of the hallmarks of movements that have 
undergone de-radicalization is the discrepancy between revolutionism in theory and 
reformism in practice. Deradicalized movements do not necessarily transform into a 
totally new movement because they maintain some aspects of revolutionary character. 
But this, in Tucker‘s view, is a tactic to preserve internal integrity and prevent 
disunity. This type of movement tends to reassert its ideological revolutionism at the 
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time when it increasingly engages in reformist politics (Tucker 1967: 350). He 
described the process of de-radicalization as follows:  
Deradicalization signifies a subtle change in the movement's 
relation to the social milieu. Essentially, it settles down and adjusts 
itself to existence within the very order that it officially desires to 
overthrow and transform. This is not to say that the movement 
turns into a conservative social force opposed to social change. 
Rather, it becomes "reformist" in the sense that it accepts the 
established system and its institutionalized procedures as the 
framework for further efforts in the direction of social change 
(Tucker 1967: 348).
89
 
 
 Tucker is right in arguing that such a discrepancy is an indication of a 
movement‘s departure from its revolutionary ideology. HTI has settled down and 
adjusted itself into the democratic environment of Indonesia. It failed to carry out its 
revolutionary doctrine that requires it to consistently undermine the legitimacy of the 
system, challenge its supporting institutions and mobilize movements to disrupt the 
stability of the system by advocating political detachment or non-participation. Instead 
HTI engaged with the democratic institutions it aimed to destroy.  
 However, Tucker‘s argument suggesting that this type of movement is 
becoming reformist or de-radicalized is inapplicable to HTI. Focusing on the non-
revolutionary character of the movement is misleading because it ignores the 
significance of the radical and extreme characters of HTI compared to those that are 
moderate. Instead of seeing the movement‘s persistence in some aspects of its 
revolutionism is a way of covering deviations from the movement‘s ideology, as 
suggested by Tucker (1967: 35), I argue that this combination is part of HTI‘s 
translation of its ideology into a different model of what some scholars called 
                                               
89 The term ‗radical‘ used by Tucker refers to movements that reject existing orders and seek 
to overthrow the order to establish an alternative ideology that will create a perfect or ideal world 
(Tucker 1967: ). Given the characteristics of comprehensive change and an overthrow of the existing 
order sought by such movements, the term ‗radical used by Tucker is equivalent with the term 
‗revolutionary‘ used in this study. That is why in other parts of his paper, Tucker also characterizes 
radicalism with revolutionism.  
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―contentious politics.‖90 The shift toward non-revolutionary behaviour is merely 
tactical. The end goal remains the same but the method of how to achieve it is altered 
to adapt with changing situations. In this way, HTI seeks to establish an alternative 
path between revolutionarism and reformism that is close to a model of political 
change called by Garton Ash ‗refolution‘ or a hybrid combination of revolution and 
reform (Ash 1989: 3). The core of refolutionary politics is for a fundamental change 
without taking necessary steps to overthrow the existing ruler.  The main objective of 
refolutionary politics is changing the political system rather than the political ruler. 
Instead of attempting to overthrow the government, it seeks to persuade or to mobilize 
pressure on the ruler to abandon the exisiting political order and share power with the 
emerging contenders to intitiate a change in the political order (Ash: 1989: 3-10). This 
matches with HTI‘s tendency to focus more on attacking the legitimacy of the 
political system than attacking political institutions. It engages with actors within the 
institutional elements of democracy to force them to abandon the democratic system 
and encourage them to adopt the khilafah as an alternative.   
The following discussion shows how the different characteristics of HTI 
contribute to its strategy of a ‗refolution.‘  
 
B. The Quest for a Third Path: Between Al-Baghdadi and Al-Khattath  
A key illustration of the path that HTI embraces is the dismissal of two of its former 
leaders who played central roles in its early period. The two are Abdurrahman al-
Baghdadi and Muhammad al-Khattath. Al-Baghdadi was one of the trio-founders of 
                                               
90 The term ―contentious politics‖ is used by prominent theorists of social movements such as 
Tilly, McAdam, and Tarrow (2001). Tilly defines contentious politics as "interactions in which actors 
make claims bearing on someone else's interest, in which governments appear either as targets, 
initiators of claims, or third parties" (Tilly: 2008: 5). This definition covers a wide spectrum of 
movement from a mere protest group that demand policy change on specific issues to a revolutionary 
movement that seeks a fundamental change of political order.  
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HTI. With the support of local activists, Abdullah bin Nuh and his son Mustafa bin 
Nuh, Al-Baghdadi set up the first HT cell in bin Nuh‘s boarding school. Current 
leaders of HTI such as Hafiz Abdurrahman and Ismail Yusanto were among the first 
pupils of Al-Baghdadi.
91
 There is no report of the date of the dismissal of al-
Baghdadi, but it is clear that he has not been active in HTI since the early 2000s when 
HTI began launching the second stage of interaction with the public. He has not 
represented HTI since this time.    
In 2008, the first national chairman of HTI, Muhammad Al-Khattath, was 
asked to leave by other members of the central board. The dismissal of al-Khatttah 
related to an internal note (takmim) that required its members to leave an Islamist 
alliance group called the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI). The circulation stated that it 
does not prohibit its members to associate with other organizations, but this has to be 
carried out on the condition that they are able to make HTI‘s role prominent. 
Affiliations with external organizations and succumbing to the others‘s agendas are 
not allowed.
92
 HTI‘s leaders, especially al-Khattath, played an instrumental role in the 
founding of FUI and it is clear that HTI founded this group to expand its own 
influence. However, it appeared that HTI was not always dominant. Its leaders then 
                                               
91 The reason of the dismissal of Al-Baghdadi has never been officially revealed by HTI. 
Different sources gave different accounts on the matter. A former member of HTI‘s propaganda house, 
who was himself dismissed, denied that claim of HTI leaders that al-Baghdadi resigned from the 
organization. He claimed that al-Baghdadi was fired because of his criticism of HTI‘s deviation on 
understanding a number of Prophet hadiths (Prophet tradition). He however, does not reveal the 
disputed hadiths (Interview with a former of HTI in Bogor, 22 August, 2009).  Other sources said that 
al-Baghdadi is no longer in HTI because of his disagreement on the decision of HTI to launch public 
mobilization in early 2000s. A contradictory account was given by an external source, the director of a 
traditionally pro-shari‘ah magazine Sabili, who said that al-Baghdadi‘s departure was driven by his 
opposition to HTI‘s affiliation with the international HT. Al-Baghdadi insisted that HTI should become 
a local organization instead (Interview with Luthfi Tamimi, Jakarta 13 October 2009).  
92 The complete reduction of this point from the takmim in Indonesian language states ―Tidak 
ada larangan membangun hubungan baik dengan jamaah atau forum-forum lain, tetapi kita harus 
menjaganya pada batas-batas ketentuan syara‘. Namun, kita tidak boleh meleburkan diri di dalam 
jamaah atau forum ini, sebaliknya badan (syakhshiyyah) kita tetap jelas menonjol ketika melakukan 
hubungan baik dengan pihak lain.‖ This is unpublicized circulation, but was leaked by a former 
member of HTI in his blog (Solihin, 18 October, 2008b). But interrestingly this policy does not aply to 
many of current leaders of HTI who are still afilliated with MUI, including Ismail Yusanto.  
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asked its members to choose between FUI and HTI.
93
 Al-Khattath opted to stay in his 
position as a secretary general of FUI.
94
 Like al-Baghdadi, the role of Al-Khattath in 
the transformation of the first cell into a network movement that developed into a 
legal organization was significant. Al-Khattath‘s past experience as an activist of the 
Campus Da‘wah Network (LDK) was essential in the success of HTI in using the 
premise of the LDK‘s network for mobilization during its formative stage.95  
Considering the significant contributions of these two leaders, their dismissals 
introduced a critical period in the direction of HTI. Apart from personal matters that 
could have possibly contributed to their dismissals, al-Baghdadi and al-Khattath 
represented different orientations to the movement‘s strategy. Given the direct 
interaction of al-Baghdadi with the founding leaders of HT in Jordan (Rahmat 2005: 
101), it is likely that al-Baghdadi aspired for a revolutionary direction as required by 
al-Nabhani. The timing of his dismissal in the period when HTI began the shift toward 
the second stage of its struggle supports the argument that his dismissal was driven by 
his insistence that HTI continues clandestine activities by focusing on the recruitment 
of core activists. This position is discussed in an article in 2009 entitled ―Is it true that 
Muslims‘ da‘wah cannot progress without an Islamic party?‖96 He criticized the 
policy for channeling da‘wah through other political parties. Although the article does 
not make a specific reference to HTI, his criticism about what he calls a ‗political 
                                               
93 When some of HTI‘s leaders were still dominant at FUI, more moderate members of the 
groups begun questioned the use of HTI‘s symbol, including its flag and banners on khilafah, in FUI‘s 
activities. This led to internal resistence to the role of HTI at FUI. This could be an indication of HTI‘s 
lost of dominance at FUI. Information about the resistance to the use of HTI‘s symbols among more 
moderate members of FU was given by the secretary general of MUI, Ikhwan Syam (Interview with 
Ikhwan Syam, Jakarta, 17 October, 2009). 
94
 Al-Khattath claimed that he never resigned from the group and has never been given the 
reason for the dismissal (Interview with al-Khattath, Jakarta 16 October 2009).  
95 Salim provides a brief profile of prominent leaders of HTI, including al-Khattath. Salim 
records his leadership positions in campus da‘wah network. See sub-chapter on ―The Founding of 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and the Emergence of organized leaders‖ in Salim‘s thesis (Salim 2005).  
96 Interestingly this article appeared on the website of ‗Suara Islam‖ (the voice of Islam) ran by 
al-Khattath.  The criticism of HTI that is implicitly suggested by the article might have motivated the 
publication of the article by al-Khattath.   
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party with a khilafah label‘ makes a clear inference to HTI. Al-Baghdadi criticizes the 
contradiction in the behavior of this ‗anonymous‘ political party that prohibits its 
members from participating in elections but allows participation when it has its own 
legislative candidate. He wrote:  
Di arena berpartaian, ada partai politik yang berlebel ―khilafah 
Islam‖ dan berpanji hitam yang melarang anggotanya mengikuti 
pemilu, kecuali jika sewaktu-waktu partai sudah punya calon 
legislatif, maka fatwa berubah sehingga yang haram bisa menjadi 
halal (baca:mubah), meskipun caleg yang dicalonkan oleh partai 
tetap dilarang mengakui sistem pemerintahan sekuler yang ada. 
Mereka bermimpi akan berhasil menegakkan Negara Islam 
(khilafah), dan begitu yakin hanya merekalah yang akan berhasil 
menegakkan pemerintah Islam bukan yang lainnya..! Maka mereka 
mewajibkan atas setiap muslim ikut berjuang bersama partai 
tersebut, sebab perjuangan tanpa partai adalah sia-sia dan tidak 
akan berhasil..! (Suara Islam, 26 Mat 2009, Benarkah Dakwah 
Islam Dan Umat Islam Tidak Akan Maju Tanpa Partai Islam?‖).  
In party politics there is a party with the label of ―Islamic khilafah‖ 
carrying a black flag that prohibits its members from participating 
in elections; but in situations when it nominates legislative 
candidates, the fatwa is changed to turn what is prohibited (haram) 
into something permitted (mubah) although it prohibits the 
candidates from recognizing the secular system of existing 
government. They dream of establishing an Islamic state (khilafah), 
and are so confident that only they can establish the Islamic 
government, not others. Therefore they call for all Muslims to join 
their struggle, because [they claim] that a struggle without a party 
is useless and will not succeed! 
This account can be traced to statements of HTI‘s leaders and publications that 
considered election as an optional tactic (uslub) (Al-Islam 448). This view opens the 
possibility for HTI‘s participation in future elections. Al-Baghdadi‘s opposition to 
party politics suggests that he represented an extreme position in regard to the debate 
on the orientation of the movement. 
In contrast to al-Baghdadi, al-Khattath drove the organization more toward 
involvement in reformist Muslim politics, especially through the FUI. This does not 
mean that the current leaders of HTI reject involvement in reformist politics. The 
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attitude of the movement after the departure of al-Khattath demonstrates its continuing 
tolerance to participatory politics. The difference between al-Khattath and HTI‘s 
leaders may lie in the nature of reformist politics. HTI encouraged its members to be 
pro active in seeking involvement in external social and political activities yet it 
required its members to exert a dominant influence by upholding its khilafah ideal and 
its basic opposition to the present political system (Al-Wa‟ie 73: 23). Contesting al-
Khattath‘s heavy involvement in FUI‘s reformist struggle, the current leaders of HTI 
however saw that a full involvement in Islamist participatory politics would 
overshadow its own opposition to the present democratic system.  
Instead of embarking on either a fully extreme or reformist position, HTI‘s 
leaders envision a path between the two poles. On the one hand, in contrast to the 
suggestion that it focuses on the mobilization of revolutionary vanguards and inciting 
public opposition toward the state, HTI engages with the state and thereby promotes 
its own its influence. On the other hand, HTI rejects full support of reformist politics 
that focuses solely on pressuring the existing political establishment to gradually 
adopt the shari‘ah without addressing the inherent failure of the established system. 
HTI therefore supports participatory politics as an intermediate goal or an instrument 
to stir rebellion against the established political system both in society and within the 
elements of the government bureaucracy.  
This policy is illustrated in two tendencies of HTI: (a) the prominence of its 
radical character and (b) the discrepancy between its attitude towards the state and its 
attitude towards society.  
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B.1. The Significance of Its „Radical‟ Character  
As elaborated in chapter one (page 27), the term ‗radical‘ here refers to a position of 
ambiguity between opposition and participation. On the one side of the coin it is 
oppositional in the sense of suggesting the illegitimacy and inherent failure of the 
rejected political system. However, on other the side, it does not advocate detachment 
from the opposed system and instead engages with the supporting elements of the 
system, accepts changes with the framework of the existing system while at the same 
time promoting a fundamental change of the system.  
 A significant pattern of HTI‘s attitude toward different aspects of the 
democratic system of Indonesia is radical in this sense. The following table illustrates 
this: 
Moderate Radical Extreme 
Non-confrontational 
rhetoric (discourse) on 
the fundamental 
aspects of democracy, 
Pancasila and the 
NKRI. 
 
Engagement (actions) 
with democratic 
institutions (the 
Government, House 
of Representatives, 
political parties) 
 
Participation in 
Muslim advocacies 
for shari‘ah-based 
policies within 
democratic 
framework.  
Ambiguous rhetoric 
(discourse) on election 
 
Oppositional rhetoric 
(discourse) democratic 
institutions (the 
Government, House of 
Representatives, 
political parties) 
 
Oppositional activities 
in engaging the public 
(seminars, leadership 
meeting programmes).  
Confrontational 
rhetoric 
(discourse) on 
democracy 
 
Confrontational 
rhetoric 
(discourse) on 
unspecified 
practice of 
participation in 
democratic 
process. 
 
Activities that 
encourages non-
participation  
Training (tathqif 
murakkaz) 
activities that 
encourage 
political 
detachment  
 
Table 5.1: The distribution of the characteristics of HTI 
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This table shows HTI‘s tendency to employ a moderate or non-oppositional 
stance on aspects that can affect its political freedom, hampers its chance for 
penetration and limits its roles in society. This is illustrated in its moderate rhetoric on 
the sensitive aspect of the democratic system, namely the state ideology (Pancasila) 
and the republic form of the state (the NKRI). Publically attacking these key symbols 
of the state will give legitimacy for oppression from authorities on grounds of treason. 
HTI‘s non-confrontational activities relating to democratic institutions are important 
to help it gain accesses into the democratic system to advocate the shari‘ah alternative 
among the key actors of democracy (the political and military leaders). In the same 
vein, it supports Muslim advocacies for shari‘ah-based policies through the 
democratic process. This is unavoidable for HTI because its absence from Muslim 
politics will isolate it from the pro-shari‘ah circle and therefore reduce its chance to 
exert influence.  
However, this attitude should not be seen as the genuine aim of HTI to 
integrate itself into the democratic system. This is because it tends to employ an 
oppositional and confrontational stance in situations that do not directly affect its 
political freedom and its opportunities for mobilization. This is apparent in the radical 
and extreme aspects of HTI‘s character. HTI continues its confrontational discourse 
on democracy even though it takes part in the Muslim democratic struggle for 
shari‘ah-based policies. It however limits its participation to cases that are central to 
Muslim politics such as the opposition to Amadiyah, the support for Jakarta Charter 
and the enforcement of the Blasphemy law. Because short-term policy changes are not 
the main goal of HTI, it does not involve itself in the systematic effort to advocate 
shari‘ah-based policies within the existing legal system.  
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Likewise, although HTI is often non-oppositional when interacting with the 
democratic institutions or actors, it shows a tendency to employ an oppositional 
(radical) attitude toward them at the discourse level. This signifies its ambiguous 
stance. On the one hand, it emphasizes the failures of the democratic institutions and 
asserts its call for a fundamental change, but on the other side it does not encourage 
non-participation by calling them to adopt pro-shari‘ah polices and the khilafah.  
To apply the theoretical formula explained in chapter one (page 17), HTI‘s 
mixed attitude toward the state is better placed in the middle path of ‗refolution.‘ At 
the discourse level, it shows an ambiguous attitude toward the intellectual (political 
system) and institutional aspects of the democracy. At the action level, it shows a 
conciliatory attitude toward the democratic institutions. This is illustrated in the table 
below.  
 Revolution ‘Refolution’  (HTI) Reform 
State  
Elements 
Discourse  Action  Discourse  Action  Discourse  Action  
Political 
System 
Negative  Negative  Negative/
Positive 
    ---  Positive  Positive  
Political 
Institutions 
Negative  Negative  Positive/ 
Negative 
Positive  Positive  Positive  
 
Figure 5.2: The refolutionary position of  
HTI‘s battitude toward to the state 
 
B.2. Discrepancy between Attitude toward the State and Engagement with Society 
In addition to the significance of the radical and extreme attitude toward the state, the 
‗refolutionary‘ character of HTI is also clear in the contrast between its attitude 
toward the State and its engagement with society. The targets of HTI‘s activities can 
be categorized in two directions. The first moves toward mobilizing supports within 
the State. For this purpose, HTI often eschews its anti-democratic stance in its 
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interaction with the democratic institutions. The second move aims to mobilize 
support in Indonesian society. In this endeavour, HTI tends to play anti-democratic 
stance and often encourages non-participation in the democratic system. This is 
illustrated in the prominence of the radical and extreme character of HTI‘s social 
mobilization programmes such as seminars, trainings, and leadership meetings (see 
figure 5.2 below).  
 
 
Figure 5.3: The spectrum of HTI‘s attitude toward the state and society 
 This shows that HTI‘s inconsistency in undermining the legitimacy of the state 
is more part of its ―strategy of ambiguity‖ than its genuine intent to integrate into the 
democratic system. In this way it tolerates selective participation in the democratic 
system to expand opportunities and sustains its mobilization for the support of a future 
political change towards the khilafah.  
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Despite this intent, the outcome however, can be different. Changing emphasis on the 
different character of HTI can lead toward different outcomes.  
  
C. Outcomes: Nusroh, Political Radicalism, Destruction or Moderation  
This varied character of HTI can be defined in three categories: (A) political 
engagement that takes the form of a positive interaction between HTI and state 
structures, political actors (especially Islamic parties) and the critical participation in 
the democratic process; (B) an anti-system campaign that primarily takes place at the 
social level in which HTI continues educating the masses to raise anti-system 
awareness and emphasizes a pro-shari‘ah identity; and (C) the mobilization of the elite 
(thalab al-nusroh) that appears in HTI‘s focus on targeting supports from political and 
social leaders.  (C).  
These desired outcomes may lead to different trajectories. With different 
degrees of likelihood, the impacts of these outcomes may lead to three different 
results as follows (see figure 5.4 for an illustration):  
 
C.1. Nusroh 
The first outcome is the realization of the doctrine of nusroh (‗support‘) for an extra-
ordinary political change. The combination of successfully mobilizing support from 
the elite, especially the military (C) and the anti-system campaign (B) — necessarily 
made possible by the occurence of political crisis and a failing state — will motivate 
HTI to initiate extra-ordinary political change, including the option of a coup when it 
is supported by the military (see figure 2.3 in page 63).  
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Nusroh is the most desired outcome. It is based on the da‟wah model of the 
Prophet Muhammad in Medina. It believes that the key for the success of the Prophet 
in building a new government was supports from elites in societies. With the support 
of the leaders of the ‗Aws and Khazraj tribes in Medina, Prophet Muhammad was able 
to establish an Islamic Government in Medina (Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain 2000: 103). 
Following this model, HTI targets the support of powerful people (ahl al-quwwah) 
including influential leaders from different segments of society from political Muslim 
leaders, political leaders to military officers. However, HTI emphasizes the 
importance of support from the military, which in turn indicates the desirability of a 
coup as a way of making the political transition. This is confirmed by the fact that the 
founders of HT, including al-Nabhani, have attempted several coups in the Middle 
East (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 31). HT also sought nusroh from authoritarian regimes in 
Muslim countries by asking them to accept the offer of the role of a caliph if they are 
willing to adopt HT‘s political concept of khilafah. Political leaders who were 
approached by HT include Iran‘s Khomeini (Taji-Farouki: 1996: 31) and Libyan 
leader Mu‘ammar Khadafi. 97 All ignored the offer.  
However, in reality the leaders of HTI seem to rule out an actual coup as an 
option. A biography of al-Nabahni translated into Indonesian by a publisher 
associated with HTI, Al-Azhar Press, removed a paragraph from the earlier edition of 
the book that contained information about coup attempts by al-Nabhani.
98
 Declining 
to acknowledge a coup as an option, one of the heads of the central board of HTI, 
Muhammad R. Kurnia, spoke about a political change similiar to the processes that 
                                               
97 In 1978, HTI held a four hour meeting with Qadafi and issued a communiqué calling Qadafi 
to adopt the khilafah (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 9 September, 1978). 
98 This publication is an excerpt from a book by Ihsan Samara ―Mafhum Al „Adalah Al 
Ijtima'iyah fi Al Fikri Al Islami Al Mu'ashir” (Samara 1991), translated into Bahasa Indonesia by 
Muhammad Shiddiq Al Jawi who is currently a member of the central board of HTI. The paragraph 
about al-Nabhani‘s coup attempts is mentioned in the earlier version of the book (Samarah 2002: 13). 
This paragraph is however not found in the later version of the book published in 2003 (Samarah 2003).   
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led to the fall of Soeharto and the Iranian revolution. He used these cases as examples 
of the feasibility of a political change through a process outside the existing political 
system. He argued that both changes took place after the regimes lost legitimacy and 
people-led protest successfully demanded political transitions.
99
 However, the two 
situations are very difficult although there was a common fact; both Pahlevi and 
President Soeharto were authoritarian rulers. The difference now is that Indonesia has 
introduced a democratic structure where the President is elected by the people and can 
serve in office for only two periods. This makes Kurnia‘s view very unlikely.  
In addition to the efforts by HTI in mobilizing elite support, political and 
economic crises are necessary conditions for this path to succeed. Such situations are 
however unlikely to occur because support for the existing political system in 
Indonesia is still high.
100
 In addition to a movement‘s attitude toward the State, the 
State‘s attitude toward the movement is also essential in shaping the behaviour of the 
movement. As suggested by Goldstone (1998: 128) a revolutionary direction or 
outcome is only likely when the State represses a movement. As long as the State 
remains neutral and makes no effort to eliminate the movement it will motivate a 
group to evolve into a social movement that seeks changes in policy or power 
relationship rather than a revolution that seeks to change the social or political order. 
Therefore, even though a political transition in the form of a seizure of power through 
mass revolt or a coup is the desired outcome, this is unlikely for HTI.  
 
 
                                               
99 Interview with M. Rahmat Kurnia, Jakarta, 1 Agust 2009.  
100 Undoubtedly post-Soeharto democracy that is no more than a decade old still faces many 
problems. In spite of this, however, some surveys show that the majority of Indonesians are committed 
to Pancasila (69.6 percent compared to 11.5 percent support for a Middle East modeled Islamic state) 
(Lingkaran Survey Indonesia 2006) and 82 percent support for compared to only 5 percent  of 
disagreement to democracy (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2006).   
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C.2. Political Radicalism 
As the prospect of HTI‘s succees in achieving nusroh is not promising, political 
radicalism is more likely, even if it is not the desired outcome. This trajectory can 
come from the prominence of two of the three aspects of HTI‘s characteristics: anti-
system campaign (B) political engagement (A). The opposition to the existing 
political system shapes entry into political institutions. This takes the form of efforts 
at establishing an anti-system party that plays a democratic game to undermine 
democracy from within the system. Achievements in elite mobilizations that are 
unlikely to materialize into the nusroh model of political change can strengthen this 
objective. The ultimate goal is to create a coalition united by its aim to implement the 
shari‘ah.101 The minimum outcome of this strategy is the increase of shari‘ah-based 
legislation and policies. If this change continues to grow, it can develop into a new 
political coalition that may be strong enough to manipulate the democratic process 
and then amend the constitution and eventually replace democracy with an Islamic 
government (see figure 5.4).  
This process resembles the model of parliamentary or democratic intervention 
with the aim of fostering a breakdown similar to the process followed by the rise of 
Hitler in Germany and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. In Germany, Hitler seized power 
by transforming his small party, the Nationalist Socialist Party of Germany 
(Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei/NSDAP), into one of significance that 
was capable of breaking the dominance of the older parties. The breaking up of the 
established parties allowed Hitler to gain a position in government as Chancellor with 
the support of just one faction of the old order. He was then able to alter the 
democratic process by manipulating elections to facilitate the establishment of his 
                                               
101 This goal is reflected in HTI‘s attempt to broker a coalition between Islamic parties, see 
discussion about this in page 140. 
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absolute power and to destroy the Weimar republic.
102
 While Hitler used a political 
party, the NSDAP, as his vehicle to seize power, in Venezuela, Chavez came to power 
as an independent candidate in a presidential election. In a situation of economic and 
political crisis that delegitimized the two dominant parties (partyarchy), Chavez won 
the election and manipulated his support to create a new constitution that granted him 
absolute power and that eventually destroyed the structure of democracy in the 
country (Raby 2006). These cases from Germany and Venezuela show that destroying 
democracy by manipulating the existing democratic process is not impossible.  
Even though the democratic route is a less than an ideal path compared to 
nusroh, there are indications that the leaders of HTI find this route more feasible. The 
desirability of this transformation is indicated by four characteristics of HTI: 
1. HTI is more open to legislative elections than Presidential elections 
because to destroy the existing system is only logical in parliament. This is 
because the position in bureaucracy is seen as the executor of polices 
within the un-Islamic system; in contrast being a member of parliament 
gives an opportunity use to the parliament as a vocal point to mobilize 
opposition toward the existing political system without necessarily taking 
part in the legislation of un-Islamic laws (see page 80-81). 
2. Despite criticism of the established parties, HTI allows support for 
candidates who consistently campaign for the shari‘ah (see page 82).  
3. HTI demands the removal of a clause in election regulations that prohibits 
political parties or candidates from questioning the national ideology and 
the constitution in their election campaigns (81).  
4. HTI demands the adoption of a ‗winner takes all‘ system in legislative 
elections, which means allowing the winner of an election to replace the 
existing constitution with a new one; if they have the required majority 
(see page 81).   
                                               
102 For a good analysis on the transformation of Hitler‘s party, NSDAP, from a small party into 
a vital party, see Mommsen (1989: 318-357).  
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An illustration of this approach occurred in 2008 when HTI welcomed the idea 
of the leader of the Islamic Defenders‘ Front (FPI), Rizieq Syihab, to found what was 
called ‗partai Islam ideologis‘ (the ideological Islamic party). He envisioned the 
founding of an Islamic party that emphasized a ‗shari‘ah-guided politics‘ over 
‗interest-based politics.‘103  
Internal HTI sources admitted that the aspiration for becoming a political party 
had been raised. HTI had its opportunity, but declined because it did not have 
sufficient structures in local areas throughout the country.
104
 The situation today is 
however different as HTI has made its presence felt in most provinces in Indonesia; 
this has given it more confidence to start a new political party. The requirement for 
participation in elections is for parties to have branches in more than half of the 
provinces.
105
 HTI now has a presence in more than a half of the provinces and cities 
across the country even though this presence may include only a handful of highly 
committed members (syabab). The challenge for HTI as it transforms itself into a 
political party is to include people outside its core membership (syabab) as party 
administrators.  
HTI does not appear to be worried about objections from the HT international 
leadership should it registers as a political party. Recently after a large conference 
organized by HTI in Jakarta (in July 2009), the chairman of HT in Britain, Jalaluddin 
Patel Patel, indicated his support for the transformation of HTI into a political party by 
                                               
103  This was related to the idea to transform FPI into a political party during the congress of 
FPI in December 2008 (Front Pembela Islam, 11 December 2008).  
104 This is based on unverified information from a blog discussion of a self-declared former 
member of HTI. The posting includes a letter it says has in an internal mail group called ―partai islam‖ 
that is no longer active. The letter stated that the idea to file an application for a political party occurred 
in 1998, soon after the fall of Soeharto, when a courier (mandub) of Abdul Qadim Zallum named Abu 
Mahmud visited Indonesia. Mahmud suggested applying for recognition as political party or 
nominating members as independent candidates. The idea did not go forward because of election 
regulations that prohibits opposition to Pancasila in political campaigns and because HTI has limited 
presence at the local level (Mantanht, 2 August 2008) 
105 This is stated in 1999 law on election chapter 39, article number 1.a. (National Election 
Commitee).  
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arguing that the strategic, not ideological orientation of HT is close to the anti-
establishment politics of the Irish Nationalist Party, Sinn Fein. While the ideological 
nature and the extent of the change demanded by Sinn Fein and HTI are not 
comparable, the reference to Sinn Fein indicates a common desire for a parliamentary 
route.
106
  HTI‘s strategy confirms the desire to establish a party like no other, whose 
goal is, in Daalder‘s definition an anti-system party, to ―participate in order to 
destroy‖ (1966: 64).  
For HTI, starting a new party is however a difficult step because of the 
election regulations on parliamentary threshold that requires parties to win at least two 
percent of the vote to gain seats.  
Alternatively this evolution may also take the form of seeking an indirect role 
by pushing a coalition of Islamic parties or political leaders that will support the pro-
shari‘ah campaign. This vision for shari‘ah-oriented coalitions between Islamic parties 
was apparent in Al-Wa‟ie prior the 2009 election. A paragraph of a collomn by HTI‘s 
leadership in Al-Wa‟ie states:  
Umat yang bergerak dengan dasar akidah dan kesadaran 
politik—bahwa segala persoalan hidup ini harus diselesaikan 
dengan hukum syariah—ini akan menjadi kekuatan politik 
yang luar biasa….partai-partai Islam pada tahun 2009 nanti 
para jurkam tidak lagi sekadar mengeksploitasi emosi umat 
dengan simbol-simbol agama, tetapi betul-betul melakukan 
paparan solusi syariah yang komprehensif...  Massa pun tidak 
sekedar takbir serta memberikan applause, tetapi memberikan 
respons yang cerdas dengan pandangan-pandangan yang 
ideologis (Al-Wa‟ie 97: 7-9) 
 
The ummah that has been moved by faith and political 
awareness that all problems have to be solved with shari‘ah 
will become a powerful political force …The campaigners of 
Islamic parties in 2009 will not only exploit the emotion of the 
ummah with [the use of] religious symbols, but also genuinely 
promote the value of comprehensive solutions of 
shari‘ah…[Similarly] the masses will not only respond with 
                                               
106
 Interview with Jalaluddin Patel, Jakarta, 23 July 2009. 
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the takbir and applause, but with smart responses to put into 
action the ideological views. 
 
This strategy however did not become a reality because other Islamic parties were not 
interested in adopting the shari‘ah in their campaigns. The challenge for HTI is to 
create support for pro-shari‘ah movements. If anti-democratic sentiment among the 
people is strong enough to persuade Muslim political actors to adopt the shari‘ah 
agenda then it will be successful. The success of democracy in Indonesia is therefore 
essential to this aim of HTI.  
 
C.3. Destruction or Moderation 
HTI‘s strategy of political radicalism may end up with the least desired outcome of 
either destruction or moderation. This can happen in a situation of the strengthening 
legitimacy of democracy in Indonesia. In a situation of a high support for democracy, 
HTI‘s anti-system argument of replacing democracy with an Islamic system of the 
khilafah will become irrelevant. In these circumstances, HTI will have to either 
choose a path of moderation or face organizational destruction. A move toward 
moderation will give it a chance to survive and empower the role of political Islam in 
influencing the ‗colour‘ of democracy in Indonesia. This can be carried out by 
emphasizing the political engagement aspect of its character, eschewing its anti-
democratic rhetoric (including renouncing its khilafah message) and more genuinely 
integrating itself into the democratic system.  
 In contrast, if HTI responds to the democratic progress confrontationally by 
maintaining its anti-democratic opposition it can be isolated from the pro-shari‘ah 
circle that is integrated into the democratic system. This choice can lead HTI toward 
destruction.  
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 However, the deficiencies of the Indonesia democratic system could motivate 
HTI to maintain its anti-democratic rhetoric while at the same time embrace the 
democratic process. Indonesia‘s ‗democratic deficit‘ is evident in the declining 
confidence of the public in democratic institutions. Surveys by the Indonesian Survey 
Institute (Lembaga Survai Indonesia/LSI) found some alarming facts. In general 
public support for democracy is still high. According to the survey in 2008, 69 percent 
see democracy as the best political system for Indonesia (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 
2008). However, public support for the President dropped from 85 percent in 2009 to 
as low as 45 percent in 2010 (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2011).  
The post-Soeharto multi-party system also reveals its weakness. The survey 
(by the Lembaga Survei Indonesa) found that people are increasingly sceptical of 
political parties. This is shown in the declining electability of some parties, both 
opposition and ruling parties. This makes the number of abstentions as high as 31.1 
percent (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2011). It is therefore understandable that some 
political observers predict the continuing instability of the Indonesian party system 
because of inter-party competition (Tan 2006: 98).  
The deficiency of democracy in Indonesia also appears in its shortcoming in 
delivering economic prosperity. In spite of recent economic growth there is growing 
disillusionment of the economic condition. The level of public satisfaction dropped 
from 56 percent in 2009 to 30 percent in 2010. It is not surprising therefore that more 
people are happy to return to the Soeharto era. This is evident in the earlier survey by 
the Indonesian Survey Circle (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia) in 2006 that found 62 
percent of respondents think the economic situation under Soeharto was better than 
that of the current administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Lingkaran Survei 
Indonesia 2006). 
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HTI‘s persistence in its anti-democratic opposition can also be energized by 
the rise of a pro-shari‘ah feeling in society. Even though political polls indicate the 
continuing decline of Islamic parties and of the interest in shari‘ah ideology, social 
developments over the last ten years indicate a rise of religious intolerance among 
Muslims. A survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society 
(PPIM) indicated that Muslims tend to oppose living along side people of other faiths 
(Jakarta post 19 September, 2009).  
Similiar recent surveys have also indicated the rise of favourable attitudes 
toward the shari‘ah as an alternative to the shortcomings of Indonesia‘s current legal 
system. Forty percent of the population in the survey of Roy Morgan Research in 
March 2010 believe that the shari‘ah should be implemented in their areas (Roy 
Morgan 2010). Support for derivative aspects of the term ‗shari‘a‘ such as the law on 
stoning, hand chopping) are however slightly lower than the support to the general 
term of ‗shari‘a‘ in the findings of Roy Morgan Research. Another survey conducted 
by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) in 2007 found 34 percent support for the 
shria‘ah based law of hand cutting and 43 percent for stoning. More strikingly, LSI 
survey also found 31 percent of support for an election specifically designed for the 
implementation of Islamic teaching (lembaga Survei Indonesia 2007). This indicates 
that a significant number of Muslim desire the adoption of the Islamic law at the state 
level. The survey question ‗about the implementation of shari‘ah‘ as offered by Roy 
Morgan Research (2010) implies support for rule a shari‘ah type government. This 
suggests to HTI that people are becoming more in favour of Islamization.  
This development is assisted by the weakness of Indonesia‘s ‗Hate Crime‘ 
law. Article 156 (a) of Indonesia‘s Criminal Code targets those who ―deliberately in 
public, express feelings of hostility, hatred, or contempt against religion with the 
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purpose of preventing others from adhering to any religion, and targets those who 
disgrace a religion‖ (Ministry of Law and Human Right, 1965a). Related to this article 
is a presidential decree (No. 1/PNPS/1965) on the prevention of Blasphemy and the 
abuse of religions that prohibit ‗deviant interpretation‘ of religious teachings (Ministry 
of Law and Human Right, 1965b). This clause, however, has been used largely to 
justify the Muslim persecution of minority groups and neglects monitoring intolerant 
speeches by radical leaders of all religions. This already weakened understanding of 
the ‗Hate Crime‘ law is further affected by its inconsistent enforcement by authorities 
who often appear to ignore violence perpetrated by radical Muslim groups against 
minorities.
107
  
  This situation provides HTI with the supportive grounds to carry on with its 
strategy of ‗refolution.‘ The problems in Indonesian democracy that encourage the use 
of sectarian issues for political mobilization motivate HTI to embrace the democratic 
system as a means of undermining the legitimacy of democracy. The pendulum 
however does not move between ‗refolution‘ and revolution. HTI may move toward a 
reform model of change if democracy in Indonesia improves.  
 
E. Conclusion 
HTI offers a unique political path. In the spectrum of most to least violent, HTI 
embraces a non-violent approach; but in the continuum stretching from reformist 
politics to revolutionary politics, HTI is at neither extreme end. Figure 5.5 illustrates 
the unique position of HTI compared to other Islamic movements in Indonesia.  
Its opposition to the existing political system prevents HTI from being either moderate 
or reformist like the majority of Islamic movements in Indonesia. However, its 
                                               
107
 I have discussed this argument elsewhere, see Ahnaf (2011).  
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willingness to take part in a democratic process indicates the non-revolutionary nature 
of the movement. As an alternative, HTI offers a third path that envisions entry into 
the political system to stimulate a struggle from within. HTI seeks to participate in 
order to find support to enable it to destroy democracy in this way.  There is evidence 
for the posibility that HTI will translate this strategy either by establishing a new party 
or by pushing Islamic parties and leaders to form a pro-shari‘ah coalition. This 
outcome is likely not only because of HTI‘s desire to do so but also because the 
political reality is unfavourable to the realization of its ideal path of revolution. 
Possible support for implementing the shari‘ah from within the existing democratic 
process is likely to force HTI into penetrating into this process and becoming a 
‗political party.‘ This model of political activism is similar to what by Garton Ash 
called ‗refolution:‘ a fundamental change is achieved by participation in the political 
process and without overthrowing the existing political regime. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: HTI in the spectrum of 
Muslim organizations in Indonesia 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
Democratic Opportunities and Challenges 
The Impacts of Democratization on the Trajectory of HTI 
 
A. Introduction 
An often overlooked consequence of the fall of Soeharto in 1998 was the end of 
Soeharto‘s so called ‗de-politization‘ strategy to counter the mobilization of political 
radicalism. Combined with his militaristic approach, the strategy was successful in 
keeping radical movements, left and right, on the fringe of the political arena.
108
 
Unlike many other political transitions from authoritarianism to democracy that were 
followed by the decline of social movements (Hipsher 1998: 152-154), post-Soeharto 
Indonesia seems to confirm the success of Soeharto‘s strategy in demobilizing, though 
                                               
108 The strategy streamlined channels of political activities by simplifying political parties and 
controlling social organizations. These limited channels allowed tolerable sectarian advocacies but 
justified repression against anti-establishment movements. The success of this strategy in demobilizing 
political Islamic movements took the form of the inclusion of Muslim leaders and activities in the 
political institutions provided by the regime. Muslim political struggles were accommodated in parties 
like the United Development Party (PPP) and Golkar and social activities were channeled into many 
government-associated organizations like Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association (ICMI), the 
Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), and the Mosque caretakers association (DMI). The placements of 
the regime‘s agents in the leadership of these parties and organizations ensured government control that 
prevented dissidents from using the channels for the advancement of Islamist political agendas beyond 
the tolerable limit. The regime for example allowed the ‗Islamization‘ of bureaucracies but portrayed 
the idea to implement shari‘ah as subversive or anti-Pancasila that was put in the same group of 
Communism. The marginalization of Islamic extremism was also shaped by the support of the regime 
to Islamization projects, for example, by increasing the number of Muslims in bureaucracies, 
government funding of mosques and government facilitation of Islamic charity. This incorporation 
policy created a sense of recognition among Muslim communities and therefore reduced the appeal of 
arguments for shari‘ah adoption or the creation of an Islamic state. For further readings about 
Soeharto‘s ―de-politization strategy,‖ see Porter (2002). I have also discussed this argument elsewhere, 
see Ahnaf (2011).    
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not eliminating, Islamist movements. The beginning of the Reform era in 1998 that 
ended the above mechanism against the extreme right was followed by the emergence 
and re-emergence of a large number of political parties and diverse social movements, 
including those advocating the adoption of the shari‘ah. Many Muslim activists who 
were jailed by Soeharto because of their alleged radicalism now entered the political 
arena and revitalized previously banned social movements. Others created new 
organizations whose objectives ranged from specific issues such as fighting against 
immorality, heretic groups and Christian proselytization to more fundamental 
demands like transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state. Instead of demobilizing 
Islamist movements, democratization seemed to encourage their proliferation. 
 In this environment, countering the mobilization of Islamist radicalism relies 
on the role of democracy in demobilizing or moderating political extremists. As 
discussed in the first chapter, the view that democracy is naturally counter-
revolutionary is based on the availability of different channels of social conflict other 
than revolution. This opposes the revolutionary argument of ‗no other way out‘ 
(Goodwin 1998) and therefore deters the ability of revolutionaries to mobilize a broad 
anti-regime coalition which is required as a necessary precondition for a revolution 
(Huntington 1968: 275; Dix 1984: 423-46; Wickham-Crowley 1987: 473-99l; Tilly 
1978; Brinton 1965; Skocpol 1979).  
If not demobilization the impact of democracy on revolutionary movements 
may also take the form of moderation. This is especially true when revolutionary 
movements turn to participation in the democratic process. The transformation toward 
a moderate direction is driven by different factors including the need to attract 
majority or plural electoral voters (Dawns 1957), the oligarchic nature of organization 
that requires addressing organizational management over an ideological battle 
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(Mitchels 1999) and the need to satisfy the constituents‘ demand for concrete 
outcomes over a long-term fundamental change (Macmillan 2006).  
The history of Indonesian politics indicates the merit of these confident views 
of democracy. The trend for moderation among Indonesia‘s political Islamic groups is 
shown primarily in the decreasing significance of shari‘ah-related issues. Parties with 
an Islamist background like the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the United 
Development Party (PPP) have dropped their original ideology of demanding a 
specific place for Islam in the constitution and instead turned to inclusive issues such 
as creating ―clean government‖ and ―national integration.‖ However, even by doing so 
these parties are still unable to break the dominance of the secular parties. A few 
parties like the Crescent Star Party (PBB) maintain ―shari‘ah‖ in their political 
platform but this did not prevent the drop in its electoral popularity below the 
parliamentary threshold of 2 percent in the 2009 election.
109
 Likewise, non-party 
Islamist groups, like the Islamic Defenders‘ Front (FPI) and the Islamic Ummah 
Forum (FUI), became increasingly policy-oriented by concentrating their attention on 
specific issues of Muslim political interest rather than challenging the established 
political system. Other groups that remain determined in demanding a system change 
such as the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) are losing strength and divided.
110
 
Non-party Islamists, like Salafis, are relatively more stable if not growing by staying 
away from the political arena.  
                                               
109
For discussions about the decline of Islamic parties, see Mujani & Liddle (2009), Effendy 
(2009) and Steele (2006).  
110Under the leadership of Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) 
gained popularity as the front runner of the Islamic state ideology. However, in 2009 the organization 
split over the authority of Ba‘asyir as a supreme leader (amir) Existing leadership of MMI, most 
prominently Irfan Awwas and Muhammad Thalib, denied Ba‘asyir‘s absolute authority. Ba‘asyir then 
left MMI and founded his own organization called Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), see International 
Crisis Group (6 July, 2010, pp. 1-2).  
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Compared to this de-radicalization trend, the ‗refolutionary‘ orientation of HTI 
is unique. This chapter confirms the merit of the argument in support of the counter-
revolutionary strength of democracy. However, as HTI was resilient to the trend of de-
radicalization by combining participatory politics and anti-system campaigns, the 
impact of democratization on it remains limited. In the case of HTI, this study argues 
that democratization ―de-revolutionizes,‖ but does not ―de-radicalize it.‖ Given the 
problem of political representation in the prominence of pragmatism in Indonesia‘s 
party system, HTI manipulates democratic means to mobilize ideological rebellion 
against the established political system. In this way, HTI is able to progress its 
mobilization and continue to politically challenge the consolidation of democracy in 
Indonesia.  
This transformation confirms the argument of scholars like Selbin (1998), 
Farhi (2003) and Jost (2006) that democracy does not necessarily demobilize 
revolutionary movements. Adjusting to democratic circumstances revolutionary 
movements may metamorphose into a new model of movement that adopts a less 
confrontational tactic, sometimes by playing democratic games, to challenge the 
established political system.  
To support this assessment, this analysis follows the two arguments for the 
confident theory about democratic counter-revolutionary capacity. First, it looks at the 
responses of HTI toward political opportunity structures, which defines the 
democratic institutionalization of social conflicts. The availability of democratic 
channels other than non-democratic revolution is essential to counter the revolutionary 
argument of ‗no other way out‘ (Lipset 1960; Goodwin 2001). The model of HTI‘s 
behaviour in regard to democratic opportunities, either formal or informal political 
institutions is therefore crucial for defining the impact of democratization on HTI. 
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Second, following the argument of coalition building as a unique challenge of a 
revolution in a democratic context, this analysis looks at HTI‘s behaviour when 
attempting to address diverse groups. The conclusion on the impact of 
democratization is derived from HTI‘s behaviour, in terms of the abandonment or 
persistence in revolutionary campaigns, when political opportunities appear and 
coalition building endeavors are in progress.  
 
B. Political Opportunity Structure   
Kitschelt (1968: 58) defines political opportunity structure as ―specific configurations 
of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social 
mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some 
instances and constrain them in others.‖ More specifically, Tarrow (1983: 26-34) 
identifies three components of the political opportunity structure:  the openness of 
access to political institutions, the availability of allies and support groups, and the 
stability of political alignments. It is believed that in addition to the internal factor of 
organizational doctrine, the political opportunity structure plays a significant role in 
shaping the behaviour of social movements. It is a response to a perceived or actual 
opportunity structure that shapes the path of social movements. 
 Because HTI is currently not a political party this exploration of the political 
opportunity structure for the mobilization of HTI focuses on the first two components 
identified above by Tarrow. The first is the openness of access to political institutions, 
which refers to the formal mechanisms of the democratic process such as elections 
and the legislative processes. The second is the availability of allies or support groups 
that refer to the historical precedents for social mobilization. For this purpose, this 
study selects a number of cases within these two categories. These cases refer to 
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political opportunities for reform in favour of Islamist mobilization rather than 
opportunities for a fundamental change because, as suggested by Kitschelt (1968: 58), 
the political opportunity structure facilitates the mobilization of social movements in 
some ways, but constrains them in others. In the context of HTI, political freedom and 
opportunities provide opportunities for reforms but their adoption may constrain the 
mobilization for a fundamental change. Therefore the presence of potential allies or 
support groups that characterize an opportunity structure at the social level includes 
groups or leaders who favour reform rather than fundamental change. This choice of 
historical precedent for opportunities in favour of the partial adoption of the shari‘ah 
allows assessment on the extent of the democratic role on the political behaviour of 
HTI. Following the ―confident theory of democracy,‖ which values the availability of 
political channels as a key for the democratic counter-revolutionary strength (see 
pages 16-19), this discussion is aimed at characterizing the nature of HTI behaviour 
when interacting with the political opportunity structure. These opportunities occur at 
the level of the formal political institution and the occurrence of potential allies for 
social mobilization. 
 
B.1. Openings of Political Institution  
B.1.i. Constitutional Reform, 1999-2002 
As soon as HTI shifted to a public campaign two years after the departure of Soeharto 
in May 1998, it saw the political opportunities that came out of a series of annual 
sessions of the People‘s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 2000, 2001 and 2000 which 
discussed a rare agenda of constitutional reform. For advocates of the shari‘ah, the 
sessions were seen as a momentum to reopen the debate about the Jakarta Charter that 
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gives Muslims the right to observe the shari‘ah in all aspects of life.111 From the 
Islamist perspective, the key focus of the debate concerned Article 29 of the 
constitution, which declares that ‗The State shall be based upon the belief in the One 
and Only God.‘ Supporters of shari‘ah implementation demanded the addition of the 
seven words suggested in the Jakarta Charter into this Article to become ―The State 
shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God and the obligation of Muslims 
to observe shari‘ah.‖ Even though the translation of this statute into law would 
potentially spark debate over diverse understandings of the shari‘ah, pro-shari‘ah 
activists saw this as a stepping stone toward extensive shari‘ah rule.   
 As the debate over this provision was forbidden during the rule of Soeharto, 
many Muslim groups see this new period as a golden opportunity to generate political 
support for the constitutional adoption of the shari‘ah. Past fear of military 
intervention or presidential decree was no longer an issue. Movements to support the 
cause were mobilized. Outside parliament, various Muslim groups advocated the 
reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter into the Article 29.  For example, the Islamic 
Defender‘s Front (FPI) mobilized thousands of people in a rally in front of the 
parliament building. For the same cause, in 2000 the Indonesian Mujahidin Council 
(MMI) gathered hundreds of Muslim leaders from different organizations in a 
congress that issued a declaration demanding the implementation of the shari‘ah by 
the State. Inside parliament, few Islamic parties including the United Development 
Party (PPP), the Crescent Star Party (PBB) and an amalgamation of small Islamic 
parties that joined a coalition called the Union of the Ummah Sovereignty (F-PDU), 
lodged the proposal to amend Article 29 and to reinsert the Jakarta Charter (Hosen 
2005: 425). However, towards the end of the process most of the parties, including the 
                                               
111
 For information about the Jakarta Charter, see page 116.  
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Crescent Star Party (PBB) and the Justice Party (PK), removed the word ―shari‘ah‖ 
from the demand.
112
 PPP was later left the only party that kept the proposal for Jakarta 
Charter in the 2000 session, but it eventually declined the demand following a session 
in 2001 after its chairman, Hamzah Haz, was picked as the Vice of President 
Megawati from the nationalist party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 
(PDIP) (Salim 2008: 89). With a lack of support from parliament members, the 
Jakarta Charter was ruled out again.  
HTI‘s attitude toward this political process is unique. Despite the fact that the 
Jakarta Charter does not imply a comprehensive application of the shari‘ah in all 
aspects of life, it did not challenge or criticize this democratic struggle. From 2000 to 
2002, several editions of HTI‘s Al-Islam leaflet were devoted to responding to the 
process, and it was supportive of the Jakarta Charter. This was for example reflected 
in its regret regarding the decision of Islamic parties other than the PPP including the 
PK (the previous name of the PKS), the PBB and the F-PDU (Al-Islam 19) during the 
MPR session in 2000 not to pursue the matter. While admitting that the Jakarta 
Charter does not represent the khilafah model of Islamic government, HTI stated that 
the Jakarta Charter should be respected because it is part of the struggle for the 
adoption of the shari‘ah by Muslim leaders during the founding of the nation. Any 
effort to reintroduce the Jakarta Charter was therefore seen as a ―noble endeavour‖ 
that must be supported (Al-Islam 73). By this position, HTI did not see any 
contradiction between the reformist nature of the Jakarta Charter advocacy and its 
demand for a total replacement of the constitution with an Islamic one. This attitude is 
reflected in this paragraph of Al-Islam in response to the PPP‘s proposal to reinsert the 
Jakarta Charter:  
                                               
112 Nadirsyah Hosen interviewed leaders of PBB and PK about this decision. They said that the 
time is not right to demand the adoption shari‘ah. They were skeptical that the shari‘ah campaign would 
gain enough support at that time (Hosen 2005: 427).   
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Jelas bahwa upaya mengembalikan aqidah dan hukum syari'at 
Islam sebagai konstitusi dan undang-undang dalam kehidupan 
masyarakat di dunia Islam adalah merupakan usaha mulia 
yang harus diperjuangkan dengan sungguh-sungguh. Kaum 
muslimin harus mendukungnya, sekalipun usaha itu mesti 
dengan mengamandemen seluruh UUD 1945, dari pembukaan 
sampai penutup, dari dasar sampai atap! (Al-Islam 73).  
 
It is clear that the effort to reinsert Islamic faith and the 
shari‘ah laws to become the constitution and laws of social 
life in the Muslim world is a noble endeavor that has to be 
seriously fought for. Muslims have to support it even though 
thay have to struggle for an amendment of the whole 1945 
constitution, from the beginning to the end, and from the 
foundation to the roof. 
 
This statement demonstrates HTI‘s attempt to sustain its aspiration for a 
comprehensive amendment of the constitution. However, it was clear that in spite of 
this desire, HTI supports the Jakarta Charter that deals only with the introduction 
section of the constitution. This is reflected in the fact that on the ground HTI joined 
other Muslim groups to lobby parliament members from Islamic parties to support the 
Jakarta Charter. Together with prominent Islamist groups such as the MMI and the 
FPI, HTI lobbied the Islamic coalition in parliament, the Union of the Ummah 
Sovereignty (F-PDU), to support the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter. In August 
2002, it also signed a petition prepared by those organizations to support the 
charter.
113
 
However, unlike other Islamic groups and parties like the FPI, the KISDI 
(Indonesian Committee for World Muslim Solidarity), the PPP and the PBB that 
specified their demand for the reinsertion of the ―seven words‖ of the Jakarta Charter 
into the Article 29, HTI stressed the importance of a more comprehensive change. But 
HTI saw the Jakarta Charter as a minor issue compared to the more urgent demand of 
                                               
113 The participation of HTI in the groups that met with F-PDU was based on the interview of 
Arskal Salim with Asnawi Lathif, member of the F-PDU from PKNU. However, Salim does not 
mention the date of the meeting (Salim 2008: 98) 
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constitutional replacement. As a part of its effort to define its unique opposition to the 
system, HTI proposed an alternative draft of the constitution based on its 
understanding of the government system of the khilafah. HTI sought to deliver this 
draft to the chairman of the People‘s Consultative Assembly (MPR), Amien Rais, and 
the Islamic parties (Tempointeraktif. 4, November, 2001). Although HTI joined other 
groups in pressuring parliament members to support the inclusion of the Jakarta 
Charter it used the momentum to raise public skepticism for the political system, 
including the process of constitutional amendment. For this purpose, HTI did not join 
another rally by a coalition of more than a dozen Muslim groups that demanded the 
reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter into the constitution (Basalim 2002: 140-154, in 
Rahmat 2008: 51). Instead, HTI organized separate rallies on November 4, 2001 and 
August 3, 2002 under the campaign title of ‗Save Indonesia with Shari‘ah‘ 
(Tempointeraktif. 4, November, 2001). Unlike other Islamic groups that did not 
question the legitimacy of the Constitution (UUD ‘45), during the rallies the chairman 
of HTI, Ismail Yusanto, stated that the demands of HTI were not only for the adoption 
of the Jakarta Charter but also for the replacement of the constitution with an Islamic 
one (Tempointeraktif, November 4 2001). Yusanto‘s use of the words ‗not only‘ is 
significant. It reflects HTI‘s strategy of supporting reformist change while at the same 
time campaigning for the necessity of systemic change. In this case, however, the anti-
system campaign is more prominent than the support for changes within the 
framework of the existing system. This was most probably caused by the reality that 
the chance for the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter was slim.  
Therefore, even though HTI did not reject partial advocacy it put more 
emphasis on its anti-system opposition. This is reflected in the efforts by HTI to raise 
public skepticism for the process of constitutional reform. Several issues of Al-Wa‟ie 
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stressed the unreliability of shari‘ah application under an un-Islamic system (Al-Wa‟ie 
11: 14). In spite of its participation in other group efforts to pressure parliament 
members to support the inclusion of the seven words of the Jakarta charter into 
Chapter 29 of the constitution, at times, HTI also considered the current process of 
constitutional amendment illegitimate. It believed that it needed to open up the 
possibility for the total replacement of the Constitution by inviting wider public 
participation to propose an alternative draft of constitution. HTI suggested that any 
constitutional amendment should question the fundamental aspects of the political 
system such as Pancasila, the republic form of the state and democracy (Al-Wa‟ie 24: 
7-8). HTI was skeptical that the current process in the parliament could deliver this 
desired outcome. Speaking to the media during a rally in response to the 
parliamentary session in 2001, Ismail Yusanto said that HTI‘s rally was not aimed at 
achieving a specific political goal. He argued that the strong presence of nationalist 
parties in parliament made the goal of the parliamentary adoption of the Jakarta 
Charter unfeasible. HTI was therefore concerned more about the political opposition 
to the shari‘ah rather than the prospect for a constitutional amendment. The focus of 
HTI‘s discourse in this period was in challenging arguments against the shari‘ah. 
Because it does not see the amendment as a way toward a total change, he emphasized 
the interconnected nature of shari‘ah laws that necessitates their comprehensive 
application (Al-Islam 102). 
This fact reveals two tendencies of HTI. On one hand, it shows that  in 
response to political opportunities HTI was willing to abandon totality in its non-
particicipation policy that requires it to challenge gradualist campaigns when 
responding to political opportunity. Such a stance was taken even though the chance 
of success was slim. On the other hand, it demonstrates that what was most important 
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for HTI is not achieving policy changes; in this case it was the constitutional adoption 
of the Jakarta Charter. The primary goal was using the case to raise public awareness 
about shari‘ah. This goal is reflected in Yusanto‘s assertion that instead of aiming to 
achieve a specific political goal, the target of the rallies was ―to bring forward and 
uphold the discourse on shari‘ah application in a clear and strong manner‖ 
(Tempointeraktif, November 4 2001). 
 
 
B.1.ii. Elections: The Rise and Decline of Islamic Parties  
HTI has witnessed two national elections in the post-Soeharto era that took place in 
2004 and 2009. After the marginalization of Islamist politics by Soeharto through the 
fusion of Islamic parties into a single and controlled party, the United Development 
Party (PPP), post-Soeharto elections became a central arena of Muslim politics. 
Islamic parties, those that originated from Muslim communities and those that 
officially use Islam as a political platform, proliferated. After gaining only a minority 
of votes in the 1999 election, optimism among political Islamic activists rose as the 
Prosperous Justice party (PKS) surged into one of the top parties with 6.3 percent of 
votes in the 2004 election. Even though PKS‘ change towards a more inclusive 
platform was crucial for the surge, there was a belief that the rise of PKS represented 
the growing support for political Islam or at least the moderate right (see figure 6.1 
and 6.2). 
 In the 2004 election, ―secular parties‖ like Golkar and the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) were still dominant. However, the combined 
vote of Islamic parties was not insignificant. Moderate and far right parties or those 
that adopt Islam as political ideology like PKS, PPP, and PBB gained 20.7 percent of 
votes that granted them 114 seats out of 550 seats in the house. If this figure is 
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combined with central right parties or parties that originate from Muslim 
organizations but adopt Pancasila as a political ideology instead of Islam, the strength 
of Islam would almost double. The combined vote of two parties in this category, the 
National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB), is 18.8 
percent or 104 seats. With 39.5 percent of votes or 218 out of 550 seats in the house 
the gap between Islamic parties and secular parties is reduced to about 13 percent 
(about 76 seats). The combined votes of secular parties within the parliamentary 
threshold, including Golkar, the PDIP and the PD (Democrat Party), were 53.37 
percent (294 seats) (Indonesian Election Committee 2009).  This gap is still higher 
than the most successful achievement of Islamic parties in the 1955 election when the 
combined votes of Islamic parties, the Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the 
Indonesian Islamic Association Party (PSII) and the Union of Tarbiyah Islamiyah 
(Perti) was approximately 43.5 percent.
114
 The strength of the combined votes of 
Islamic parties in 2004, however, could be more significant when the votes of secular 
parties are divided. With a total vote of 37 percent, Islamic parties could outpower 
Golkar (23.27%) and the PDIP (19.8%) (see figures 6.1 and 6.2).  
 
   1999 2004 2009 
    Seats % Seats % Seats % 
Secular 
parties 
Golkar 120 24 128 23.27 108 19.2 
PDIP 153 30.6 109 19.8 93 16.61 
Demokrat     57 10.3 148 26.43 
Islamic 
parties 
PKB 51 10.2 52 9.45 26 4.64 
PAN 34 16.8 52 9.45 42 7.5 
PPP 58 11.6 58 10.54 39 6.96 
PK/PKS 7 1.4 45 8.18 59 10.54 
PBB 13 2.6 11 2 26 4.64 
 
Figure 6.1: Major Islamic parties compared to major secular parties in 1999-2009 
elections (compiled from different sources) 
 
                                               
114
 For discussion about the result of the 1955 election, see Suryadinata (2002: 19-42).  
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Figure 6.2: The declining votes of Islamic parties 
Theoretically, an effort to strengthen the Muslim force in parliament can be 
carried out by breaking the potential opposing coalition between secular parties. 
However, an Islamic confederation could also include Golkar, which is often 
considered an Islamic friendly party (Baswedan 2004). The inclusion of Golkar in this 
possible scenario is not without a reason. There is a record of support for Islamic 
legislation and policies from many Golkar politicians.  
The trace of political Islam in Golkar emerged during the Soeharto era. When 
Soeharto launched a policy of accommodating Islamic interests, he opened the door of 
Golkar for many Muslim activists of the Islamic Student Association (Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Indonesia/HMI).
115
 Some of HMI‘s elements in Golkar aspired for the 
mobilization of Islamic interests. It is therefore not a surprise that many Golkar 
politicians at the local level have shown openness toward accommodating the Islamic 
aspiration of attracting Muslim political support. This for example took place in South 
Sulawesi‘s district of Bulukumba where the bupati (the head of the district 
government) from Golkar, Patabai Pabokori (no longer serving as the bupati) 
implemented several forms of shari‘ah-based Perdas (regional regulations).116 
                                               
115 For discussion about Golkar accommodation of Islam, see Makrun (2009: 205-323). 
116 For reading about his role in the implementation of shari‘ah-based regulation in 
Bulukumba, see Buehler (2008). 
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Adding the potential of the inclusion of Golkar to Islamic advocacy and other 
secular but inclusive parties competing in the 2009 election such as Hanura and 
Demokrat, a powerful central right coalition could be built with approximately 78 
percent of the seats in parliament (see figure 6.3).  
 
Figure 6.3: Continuum of parties‘ ideologies competing in the 2009 election 
(Adapted from Baswedan [2004: 681])
117
 
 
Even if a formal coalition with Golkar does not happen, an Islamic block that 
combines right and central right parties can attract desertions from religiously 
committed individuals within Golkar and can potentially receive the remaining votes 
of Islamic parties that fail to meet the parliamentary threshold.   
HTI‘s attitude toward elections is not unchanging. After the legislative election 
in 1999 that resulted in the defeat of the Islamic parties,
118
 HTI reasserted its skeptical 
view of elections by suggesting that elections in democracy were not designed to 
prepare for a fundamental change. HTI‘s discourse on the election and on Islamic 
parties in 2004 was extremely critical. HTI highlighted the contradictions between 
                                               
117 New parties in 2009, Demokrat, Gerindra, and Hanura, are added as they are not included 
in Baswedan‘s use of this continuum for the results of elections in 1955 and 1999.  The inclusion of 
these parties in the ‗secular-inclusive‘ category is tentative due to their recent formation.  
118 Two nationalist parties, PDIP and Golkar were largely dominant with 33.74 and 22.44 
percents of votes respectively. The combined votes of Isalmic parties, including those inclusive 
ideologies (PKB and PAN) are under 30 percent. This shortage of votes discouraged Islamic parties to 
uphold sectarianism in politics.  
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elections in democracy and the khilafah (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 19-22), emphasized the failures 
of Islamic parties (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 3-4), drove people‘s attention to the prominence of 
political pragmatism (Al-Wa‟ie 47: 7-12) and reasserted its non-parliamentary 
approach for change (Al-Islam 196). However, it appeared that although its discourse 
on elections was highly skeptical, HTI had not totally lost hope. In January 2004 (a 
few months before elections), HTI published a circular (nasyroh) on the matter of 
participation in elections that distinguishes between participation in legislative and 
executive (presidential) elections. It allowed participation in legislative elections on 
the condition that candidates advocating the shari‘ah were available (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 27-
28). Even though it admitted elections as a method for political succession during the 
khilafah period it strictly discouraged participation in executive elections because 
executive elections in Indonesia are based on the democratic system. It argued: 
Proses pemilihan kepala negara dalam format sistem demokrasi 
sekuler, sama artinya dengan mengokohkan sebuah sistem yang 
bertentangan dengan sistem Islam secara diametral) (Al-Wa‟ie 41: 28-
29).  
 
The process of election for a head of state within the framework of 
secular democracy means strengthening a system that is diamentrically 
contradictory to the Islamic system.  
 
In May 2004, HTI also issued a circular (nasyroh) on the subject of ―electing a 
head of state‖ (kepala negara), in which, although it did not encourage boycotting the 
presidential election, it emphasized the difference between the head of state in 
democracy and in Islam (HTI, 31 May 2004). In this period, HTI made it clear that 
―[running for a parliament] if it is aimed at using parliament as an arena for da‘wah 
(preaching)... is permissible‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 45: 29). 
However, this distinction became blurred when HTI faced political reality. In 
response to the tendency of Islamic parties to build coalitions with nationalist 
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parties,
119
 HTI raised the idea of creating a ‗shari‘ah coalition‘  that combines Islamic 
parties (Al-Wa‟ie 47: 19-21; Al-Islam 200). HTI was unhappy with the tendency of 
Islamic parties to build coalitions with secular parties. It reminded them that: 
Jika kondisi ini [koalisi partia Islam dengan partai sekuler] terjadi 
maka perjuangan untuk menegakkan syari‘at Islam, walau hanya 
dalam tartan nilai-nilai substansi—apalagi formalisasi syari‘at 
Islam—akan semakin kabur dan tidak jelas arahnya (Al-Islam 200: 1). 
 
If this condition [coalitions between Islamic parties and secular 
parties] happens, the struggle for the shari‘ah, even though only at a 
substantial level-- not with the formalization of shari‘ah-- will have 
unclear direction. 
 
Even though HTI seemed to be more encouraged by the coalition between 
Islamic parties, it was also aware that many of the leaders of the secular parties are 
also Muslim. Therefore, it suggested that a coalition (wala‟) between Muslims 
(regardless of its parties) is permissible as long as it is aimed at creating an Islamic 
government (khilafah) (Al-Wa‟ie 47: 18-21). Due to the fact that these publications 
were made after the legislative elections and prior to the presidential elections, this 
implies that, although the ultimate goal of khilafah was upheld, HTI was interested in 
the creation of a shari‘ah-oriented coalition in either presidential or legislative 
elections. 
 In practice, this aspiration was carried out by visiting a number of political 
parties and presidential candidates including the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 
Amien Rais who was nominated by the National Mandate Party (PAN) and Wiranto 
from Hanura (Al-Wa‟ie 47: 30-31). HTI was also unable to distance itself from the 
political move of Muslim candidates like Amien Rais by taking part in a coalition 
forum of diverse Muslim groups and leaders from Islamic parties. They organized a 
                                               
119 In 2004, nationalist parties that dominated the top three in the result of legislative election 
competed to build coalitions with smaller parties, including Islamic parties. PDIP for example, initiated 
a coalition called the ‗nationalist coalition‘ that included Islamic parties such as PPP and PKB (Detik, 8 
September 2009).  
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gathering in the Al-Azhar mosque in Jakarta that was supportive, though not 
explicitly, to the candidacy of Amien (Tempointerktif, 4 July 2004). The choice of 
Amien Rais was not without reason. Building an Islamic coalition had been the tactic 
of Amien. In the early 2000s, Amien led a coalition called ‗central axis‘ (poros 
tengah) in parliament that combined Islamic parties to support the the rise of Gusdur 
to the presidency (Barton 2002: 275). He was portrayed as Muslim figure competing 
against Megawati who came from an ―ultra-nationalist‖ background. While other 
Islamic leaders such as Hamzah Haz and Hasyim Muzadi embraced coalitions with 
secular parties, Amien, who himself was nominated by a Muslim party, the National 
Mandate Party (PAN), assembled support from a number of Islamic parties including 
the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the Star Crescent Party (PBB), the Star 
Reform Party (PBR) and was endorsed by high profile leaders such as Din 
Syamsuddin of Muhammadiyah, Zainuddin MZ, and Aa Gym. This support was 
shown in the Al-Azhar gathering one day before the presidential election which HTI 
attended. The reality that Amien was competing against Megawati gave significance 
to HTI‘s publicised opposition to the candidacy of women (Al-Islam 200). Likewise, 
HTI‘s campaign against the idea of Islamic-nationalist coalitions (Al-Wa‟ie 47: 5) and 
the campaigns against secular leaders (Al-Wa‟ie 47: 31) implied an opposition to 
Amien‘s competitors, specifically President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) who 
has been portrayed by HTI as a liberal in economic policies.
120
 
Prior to the 2009 election HTI‘s tolerance of presidential elections was more 
explicit. On 2 July 2009, it issued another circular (nasyroh) entitled ―Pernyataan 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Tentang Pemilihan Presiden 2009‖ (The statement of Hizbut 
                                               
120 This portrayal is clear in an edition of Al-Wa‟ie (October 2009) with a cover title ―New 
Government: More Liberal.‖ The cover shows the pictures of President SBY and Vice President 
Budiyono (Al-Wa‟ie 110) suggesting that they continue and strengthen Soeharto‘s policy favouring 
economic liberalism. 
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Tahrir Indonesia on the 2009 presidential election). Unlike the earlier circular in 2004 
that used the term ―head of state,‖ in this later release HTI compared the law of 
presidential elections to the process of selecting a head of state (nashb al-ra‟is) in 
Islam. This was meant to signify the difference between a ―head of state‖ in the 
Islamic political system and a ―president‖ in a democracy. In contrast to the doctrine 
that prohibits participation in executive elections, this statement did not discourage 
people from casting ballots in the election. Instead, like the earlier circular, the 
statement urged people to only elect a presidential candidate who has a commitment 
to replace the existing secular system with a comprehensive application of the shari‘ah 
(HTI, 2 July 2009). Of course there was no candidate with such a character. However, 
the fact that HTI did not campaign for abstention from voting, in spite of the absence 
of an ideal candidate, implies that it was not challenging elections per se. Such a 
stance is important for HTI if it intends to participate in future elections.  
It is hardly a surprise, therefore, that in 2009 HTI was more pro-active in 
seeking indirect roles in the election process. As discussed earlier, after the failure to 
establish its own party in 2007, prior to the 2009 election HTI encouraged the 
formation of a coalition of Islamic parties. It did so not only with word, but also in 
action through an initiative to establish an Islamic block or ―poros Islam‖ (Antara, 21 
July, 2008). For this purpose, HTI organized a series of visits to Islamic parties 
including the PPP, the PAN, and the PKS. Sometimes HTI could not be restrained 
from explicitly calling for voting for Islamic parties. For example, after meeting the 
leaders of the PPP, the spokesperson of HTI, Ismail Yusanto, spoke to the press: "HTI 
mengeluarkan bayan atau penjelasan kepada khalayak, kader, dan simpatisan untuk 
menggunakan haknya dengan sebaik-baiknya dengan memilih partai berasaskan 
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Islam," (HTI issued a clarification to its members and sympathizers to use its right for 
voting by voting for Islamic-based parties) (Antara, 1 August, 2008).  
The results of the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections were disheartening for 
candidates of Islamic parties. Seven, out of ten Islamic Islamic parties in 2009, 
according to Fealy, can be considered Islamist in the sense of supporting the 
application of the shair‘ah. But these parties only managed to gain 19 percent of the 
total votes. This indicates very limited support for the shari‘ah (Fealy 2009). The idea 
of an Islamic based coalition proved ineffective. Indonesian politics, according to 
Platzdasch, shows ―the triumph of political logic‖ over ideological ideals. This was 
apparent in the fact that after losing in legislative elections, they gave support to 
presidential candidates from various ideological backgrounds (Platzdasch 2009: 264). 
In 2004, the PKS supported Amien Rais who was paired with a nationalist leader, 
Siswono Yudohusodo, the PBB supported a nationalist combination of President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of the Democratic Party (PD) and Jusuf Kalla of Golkar, 
and the PPP nominated its own leader Hamzah Haz who ran with Agum Gumelar who 
did not have Islamist background (Carter Centre 2005). In 2009, almost all Islamic 
parties including the PKS, the PPP and the PKB and the PAN supported President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his running mate Vice President Budiyono 
(Indonesian Election Committee 2009b).  
 However, the outcome of a coalition is not the only objective of this move. 
More significantly, the discourse and initiative for a shari‘ah coalition is also useful to 
push for political polarization along sectarian lines. In spite of the declining votes, the 
presence of Islamic parties in government coalition, according to Fealy, demonstrates 
that the role of Islam in Indonesian politics is not ―diminished‖ but is ―changed‖ in 
nature. The winning party cannot neglect the power of Islamic parties and this 
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maintains the influence of Islamist aspirations (Fealy 2009). Therefore, in response to 
this situation, HTI was quick to argue that the loss of Islamic parties and candidates 
was the result of a Muslim reluctance to uphold the shari‘ah as a political platform 
rather than an indication of the irrelevance of the shari‘ah in real politik (Al-Islam 
441). 
HTI‘s strategy in pushing sectarian politics was not limited to the effort to 
develop Islamic versus secular fragmentation in political arena. This distinction does 
not always represent the reality in Indonesian party systems because of dissmiliarities 
between Islamic and secular parties in terms of platform, personnel and action. Many 
secular parties are led by Muslim leaders who often mobilize support based on Islamic 
symbols. It is therefore understandable that even though HTI‘s idea of a shari‘ah 
coalition often means a coalition between Islamic parties, it could not isolate Muslim 
influencial figures from the secular parties. For this reason, HTI sought to persuade 
retired General Wiranto from the Hanura party to adopt the shari‘ah in his campaign 
for the presidency (Detik Bandung, 9 June 2009). Wiranto did not seem to respond to 
this call positively as his party strengthened its ―secular‖ stance.   
It is interesting to compare HTI‘s behaviour during the elections in 2004 and 
2009. From the Islamist perspective, the 2004 election gave more optimism than the 
2009 election because of the rise of Islamic parties in 2004 compared to their decline 
or stagnant performance in 2009. The 2004 election could appear as a brighter 
political opportunity than the 2009 election. Nonetheless, in spite of this difference, 
HTI‘s behaviour during these two periods was not dissimiliar. While criticizing 
elections and party politics, HTI does not explicitly discourage non-participation in 
elections; and instead it typically called for parties and candidates to adope shari‘ah as 
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a political platform.
121
 This indicates the objective of HTI to use elections as a chance 
to push for political fragmentation based along religious lines. HTI does not totally 
reject party politics. Instead it embraced party politics through the election process as 
a means of mobilizing political support for the shari‘ah. From the perspective of HTI, 
creating a political divergence based on religious lines is more important than 
securing a political position or the adoption of the shari‘ah through the parliamentary 
processes, as these are less feasible. The polarization is essential in HTI‘s struggle to 
develop relevance for its call for the shari‘ah and the khilafah and ultimately in 
deligitimizing the established political and legal system. From this point of view, the 
seemingly ambiguous behaviour of this engagement with party politics and of 
opposition to the democratic system is not the paradox it seems.  
 
B.1.iii. Institutional Opening in Local Politics 
One of the most profound aspects of democratic reform after the fall of Soeharto is 
decentralization. Introduced in 1999 through the passing of the local autonomy law 
(Law No. 22/1999), the decentralization process overhauls Soeharto‘s centralized 
polity in two ways: it introduced local elections and it expanded the authority of local 
governments (Bunte 2009: 117).
122
  
An undesired outcome of the decentralization is the rise of communalism. To 
target Muslim constituents especially in areas where Islam is a strong aspect of 
communal identity such as in West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, and West Java, many 
local political leaders use morality arguments and adopt symbolic politics by 
appearing to accommodate Muslim political interests. While the formalization of the 
                                               
121 See discussion on HTI‘s discourse on election (in pages 77-82), its engagements with 
political parties, political leaders and elections (in pages 133-142). 
122For examples of violence related to local elections, see International Crisis Group (8 
December, 2010). 
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shari‘ah at the national level has been rejected this pattern of local elections is seen as 
a political opportunity by Islamist activists. This has created a new enthusiasm among 
Islamist leaders who aim to shift the focus of the struggle for the shari‘ah from the 
national to the regional level. The goal is to surround central government with an 
increasing number of shari‘ah bylaws at the local level to give examples of the 
viability of the shari‘ah and thus to gather support and perpetuate the adoption of the 
shari‘ah at the national level.123 As a part of this orientation some Islamic groups 
formed operational units to pressure or lobby local authorities to adopt the shari‘ah.  
An example of this move was the formation of the Commitee for the Preparation for 
the Implementation of Shari‘ah (KPPSI) at the provincial and district levels by the 
network of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI).
124
  
This campaign has intensified local demands for the adoption of the shari‘ah, 
which played an important role in the rise of the number of shari‘ah friendly 
regulations in local areas. The modus was that local authorities collaborated with 
Islamist groups to introduce shari‘ah-friendly bylaws on the basis of the local 
autonomy law. Since 1999 there has been an increasing number of provincial and 
district regulations (also called Peraturan Daerah [Perda]) that adopt specific aspects 
of Islamic law. Compiling data from various sources until 2008, Bush records 78 
regulations in 52 districts and municipalities out of 470 districts and minicipalities in 
Indonesia (Bush 2008: 2). At least until 2008, these regulations have cast fear of a 
growing Islamization at the regional level (Marshall, 5 April, 2004). However, as 
concern rose over the negative impact of the laws on women and minorities, 
opposition to the regulations also raised questions about their compatibility to the 
national constitution. Additionally, due to the nature of the regulations that were 
                                               
123 For further information about this development, see Tempo (2006) 
124 For a reading about the Preparation Committee for the Implementation of Shariah (KPPSI), see 
Ramly (2006)  
 195 
 
 
produced by a marriage of convenience between the Islamists and opportunists, local 
authorities found most of the regulations unsustainable and ineffective. As a result, by 
2004 the number of these type of bylaws, according to Bush, began to drop (Bush 
2008: 174-191). 
In spite of this recent setback, decentralization has given a sense of political 
opportunity to Islamic groups. HTI‘s attitude toward this political change has also 
changed. In the early period of the introduction of the local autonomy law, HTI was 
extremely skeptical toward the law. In January 2002, Al-Wa‟ie took the issue as a 
focus with the cover title ‗Local autonomy law: solution or problem?‘(Al-Wa‟ie 17). 
HTI‘s answer to this question was negative. It described local autonomy laws as 
―poison‖ rather than a ―medicine‖ to the problems of local societies (Al-Wa‟ie 17: 11). 
It saw the extension of authority of local governments as triggering the misuse of local 
autonomy laws for the political interests of elites. HTI challenged this law by arguing 
that the competition between local governments to raise incomes has led to conflict 
over borders and resources. Instead of strengthening regional commitment to the 
national government, it argued that the local autonomy has bred separatism. National 
disintegration is also arguably threatened by conflict over resources between 
neighboring districts. The interest in short term economic incomes was seen as a 
factor of the openness of local government to foreign investments, something that 
undermined national sovereignty (Al-Wa‟ie 17: 7-11; Al-Islam 84). In this period, HTI 
described decentralization more as a threat rather than an opportunity. 
However, in 2005 when local elections (Pilkada) were first implemented, 
HTI‘s attitude toward decentralization became ambiguous. On the one hand, in line 
with its view of elections, HTI was skeptical of Pilkada. It described Pilkada as a 
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―dangerous event.‖ This is reflected in the following statement of Ismail Yusanto in 
an interview with Al-Wa‟ie:  
Ketentuan menganai otonomi daerah memang memberikan kekuasaan 
dan kewenangan lebih besar kepeda daerah. Dari sini Pilkada bisa 
membuka kemungkinan bahaya, yakni ketika konspirasi jahat yang 
bergelimang uang (penjudi, rezim korup, dan penguasa hitam) 
ditambah dengan dukungan pihak luar negeri mampu menempatkan 
yang didukungnya. …Bahaya yang paling penting adalah rakyat 
menjadi lupa bahwa perbaikan negeri ini semestinya, di samping 
dengan menghadirkan pemimpin yang baik adalah dengan 
menghadirkan system yang baik…itulah syariah Islam (Al-Wa‟ie 59: 
43).  
 
It is true that the local autonomy law gives larger authority to local 
government. Therefore Pilkada can be dangerous when the conspiracy 
of evil power (gamblers, corrupt regime and black rulers) combined 
with foreign support suceeded in elections. ...The most serious danger 
is that it makes people forget about the true change this nation need. 
[it is] that in addition to the producing a good leader, it also needs a 
good system, ... that is Islamic syari‘ah. 
 
On the other hand, in spite of this highly critical view of Pilkada, Yusanto also 
saw a prospect for change by admitting that Pilkada could be instrumental in the 
advocacy of the shari‘ah. He argued:  
Dalam era otonomi daerah, pemilihan kepala daerah bisa memberikan 
kesempatan untuk penerapan syari‘ah Islam di level daerah. Apabila 
didukung oleh DPRD niat itu akan lebih mudah diwujudkan seperti 
yang terjadi di semumlah daerah....perda itu tentu masih sangat jauh 
dari mencukupi untuk penerpaan shari‘ah islam secara kaffah. Tapi 
dengan pemimpin yang pro-shari‘ah (bupati Bulukumba meski dari 
Golkar, ia sangat bersemangat untuk menerapkan syari‘ah) dan 
dengan dukungan DPRD serta rakyat secara keseluruhan peluang 
penerapan shari‘ah Islam tentu lebih terbuka‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 59: 44). 
 
In the local autonomy era, election of a local government can create 
opportunities for shari‘ah implementation at the local level. This goal 
can be more easily realized when supported by DPRD [local House of 
Representative] as has happened in a number of districts....Those 
perdas [shari‘ah inspired bylaws] are still far from enough for the goal 
of comprehensive application of the shari‘ah. But with pro-shari‘ah 
leaders (like head of Bulukumba district who even though coming 
from Golkar but is very enthusiastic in implementing shari‘ah) and 
with support from DPRD as well as people in general, chances for 
shari‘ah implementation is surely larger. 
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HTI‘s instruction with regard to Pilkada was not totally negative to elections. 
Yusanto for example called for Muslims to play pro-active roles in local elections by 
encouraging the participation of candidates with a commitment to the shari‘ah. 
Yusanto stated: 
Umat Islam tidak boleh lagi sekedar menjadi pendukung calon kepala 
daerah tanpa jelas hendak kemana yang didukungknya itu akan 
membawa mereka. Tegasnya, umat Islam harus berani berkata bahwa 
mereka hanya akan mau mendukung calon kepala daerah yang amanah 
dan yang mau menerapkan syariah (Al-Wa‟ie 59: 44). 
 
Muslims can longer support candidates for regional government 
without clarification of their orientation. Unequivocally, Muslims 
should dare to say that they will only support candidates who are 
trustworthy and committed to implement the shari‘ah. 
 
This implied HTI‘s desire to capitalize on the opportunity of decentralization 
to push for the creation of local governments that are supportive of the Islamist cause.  
This orientation was in practice demonstrated in some instances by HTI‘s engagement 
with local government. As discussed in the previous chapter, HTI has been successful 
in building a relationship with the South Sumatra governor, Mahyuddin. This progress 
is a good example of the way HTI seized political opportunities that come out of 
decentralization. The primary purpose of this move, however, is different to other 
Islamist groups that focus on the government‘s adoption of specific aspects of shari‘ah 
as for example carried out by Islamist pressure groups such as the Preparation 
Committee for the Application of Shari‘ah (KPPSI) and the Islamic Ummah Forum 
(FUI).  
The primary agenda of HTI is to tap into local governments to use their power 
to expand its presence. This is reflected in the choice of activities taken up by HTI in 
seizing the opportunity provided by the South Sumatra governor‘s attempt to use 
Islamic sentiments to gain support from Islamic groups. These activities include a 
seminar on shari‘ah-based resource management (Al-Wa‟ie 86: 37), a seminar on the 
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political roles of women (Al-Wa‟ie 82: 37), and a Muslim leadership gathering in the 
governor‘s office (Al-Wa‟ie 82: 39). However none of these activities was practical in 
pressuring the government to adopt shari‘ah-friendly regulations as advocated by 
other Islamist groups. The topic of the seminar on shari‘ah-based resource 
management was too theoretical to be practical as an economic policy. Given HTI‘s 
typical assertion that economic policy requires an Islamic economic system in 
opposition to capitalism, HTI should have realized that expecting the governor‘s 
adoption of its alternative proposal for shari‘ah-based resource management was not 
feasible. Nevertheless, HTI accepted this topic as an opportunity to use the local 
government government‘s status for delivering its campaign (for an alternative 
system) and for attracting recruits from among government officials.  
Rather than focusing on tangible or short-term outcomes in the form of 
government regulations on Islamic morality (though this orientation is often 
unavoidable) HTI chose activities that could support its own interests of propaganda 
and mobilization. Like other Islamist groups, HTI saw decentralization as a political 
opportunity, but HTI‘s perspective of the opportunity is more of a long-term strategy 
of penetration rather than the short-term production of Islamic policies.  
  
B.2. Informal Politics: The Importance of Allies   
B.2.i. Mobilization Momentum: Uproars against Indecency and Blasphemy  
In the recent period no other issue has united more Muslims across the spectrum than 
the call for government action against pornography and allegedly anti-Islamic 
heresies. Some see this development as representing the rise of radicalism and the 
decline of moderate Islam (Khalik 2008) or as an indication of the increasing 
influence of Islam on Indonesian politics (Tanuwidjaya 2010).  
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Elsewhere, the argument against pornography may be a non-sectarian issue. In 
Indonesia however, the issue is a unique demand by conservative and hardline Muslim 
groups. The campaign has been portrayed as anti-pluralist that threatens civil rights, 
and expressions of art and culture. The demand is therefore strongly opposed by the 
non-Muslim majority in provinces like Bali and Papua (Tempointeraktif, 3 November 
2008; Kompas, 14 September 2008; Kompas, 3 November 2008).  
Likewise, opposition to Ahmadiya is an ideal issue for HTI‘s campaign. 
Ahmadiya is an offshoot of Islam whose members venerate the founder, Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad, and believe in his prophecy. Muslim groups accuse Ahmadiya of 
teaching beliefs and practices that deviate from the true teaching of Islam.
125
 The 
religious aspect of the issue makes it an ideal target for HTI to develop sectarian 
arguments. Additionally the opposition of mainstream Muslim groups to Ahmadiya 
helps HTI identifies itself with the mainstream.  
While support for the campaign against these two ‗enemies‘ has came from 
diverse Islamic segments, including members of the mainstream Muslim groups, 
Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiya, Islamist groups were mainly responsible for 
publicly raising and advocating the issues. The success of mobilizing public and 
government favour for the campaign has given political credit to the Islamist 
groups.
126
  
After months of campaigns that combined the strategies of political lobbying, 
rallies, petitions and repeated violence against Ahmadiya and alleged pornographic 
                                               
125 For a historical record of Indonesian Muslim opposition to Ahmadiya, see Triyana (2011). 
126
 In the analysis of International Crisis Group (ICG), the essential role of Islamists groups in 
pressuring the government is indicated by the list of organizations referred to support a 
recommendation draft of a team appointed by the govermment in 2005 to evaluate the legitmacy of 
persecuting Ahmadiya. These organizations include Forun Ukhuwah Islamiyah Indonesia; Dewan 
Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII), Syarikat Islam, Ittihadul Muballighin, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan 
Umat Islam, Al Irsyad, Institute Tarbiyah al Qur‘an Jakarta, Persatuan Islam (Persis), Persatuan 
Tarbiyah Islamiyah and LPPI. Of these organizations only Muhammadiya represents the mainstream 
Islam (International Crisis Group 2008: 2-3).  
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media by various Islamic groups, the Government took accommodative action. On 9 
June 2008, the government issued a joint-ministerial decree that considered Ahmadiya 
a heretic group and ordered its followers to stop disseminating its theological 
teachings (Kompas, 9 June, 2008). A few months after this, the Government showed 
another friendly gesture toward Islamists. Faithful to his course of non-confrontation 
with the religious majority, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed in 
December 2008 the anti-pornography bill, ratifying a law that criminalizes any ―sex-
related material‖ deemed as violating public morality (Republika 10 December, 
2008).  
 The outcome of the government ruling however did not fully satisfy the 
Islamists. The decree on Ahmadiya fell short of banning Ahmadiya as demanded by 
the Islamist groups and the provisions in the pornopgraphic bill were vague in order to 
protect cultural expression. Nonetheless, this accommodation energized Islamist 
groups and raised their optimism for potential support. From their perspective, the 
most welcomed aspect of the process was the participation of the members of 
mainstream Islamic groups, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and the Indonesian 
Ulama Council (MUI). This raised the possibility among observers that the influence 
of radical groups was on rise (International Crisis Group, 7 July 2008). Muslims were 
becoming more accepting of structural Islamization. A favorable or tolerant attitude 
toward Islamist aspirations did not only come from mainstream Muslim community. 
In some cases, the ability of minority Islamist groups to mobilize polarizing discourse 
with regard to Government rulings on Islamic morality attracted support from the so 
called ―secular parties.‖ On issues like Ahmadiyah and pornography, the fear of being 
seen as anti-Islamic prevented the parties from totally opposing Islamist aspiration 
(Tanudjaya 2010: 42).  
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The regulations on pornography and Ahmadiya were not the only reason for 
Islamist optimism. Various other developments are also seen as indications of the 
increasing support for the introduction of the shari‘ah in public affairs. These include 
the occurrence of shari‘ah-friendly regional regulations, various surveys indicating 
high support for shari‘ah implementation and alleged government tolerance for 
Islamist prosecution against minorities and liberal Muslim activists.  
 HTI‘s role in these campaigns is apparently intense. With regard to the 
government ruling against Ahmadiya, the International Crisis Group (ICG) gives a 
special attention to the role of HTI in addition to other organizations like the 
Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), the Islamic Ummah Forum (FUI) and the 
Islamic Defenders‘ Front (FPI). While MUI, a semi-govermental body that represents 
diverse Muslim groups provided the institutional role in pressuring the government, 
HTI in conjunction with the FUI connected MUI to street protests (International Crisis 
Group 2008: 8-15). This mass support was essential for MUI‘s advocacy because 
mainstream organizations, like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, usually choose 
a less confrontational approach on the issue.
127
 Muhammad Al-Khattah who, at that 
time, represented HTI and FUI, was a key figure in the mobilization of the masses 
through rallies and ulama gatherings to demand the banning of Ahmadiya. But Al-
Khattah was not the only one from HTI to play a role in providing MUI with large-
scale support. The spokesperson of HTI, Ismail Yusanto, was frequently involved in 
various anti-Ahmadiya ralllies and ulama gatherings. It is clear that HTI was heavily 
involved in the anti-Ahmadiya advocacy. This stance has unavoidably made HTI 
more supportive to a gradualist approach to change. In spite of the Government 
response that was not fully satisfying for the Islamist demand of banning Ahmadiyah, 
                                               
127 For example Hasyim Muzadi, head of NU in this period, while endorsed the government 
decree on Ahmadiya, condemned FPI‘s illegal persecution of Ahmadiya and suggested dialogue to 
persuade members of Ahmadiya to return to the true teachings of Islam (NU Online, 3 June 2008. 
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HTI responded positively. In a dialogue on national television, TV One, in response to 
the decree on Ahmadiya, Yusanto stated: ―As a process, the interministerial decree 
(SKB) on Ahmadiya should be appreciated. However, this SKB does not address the 
substance of the problem that requires the banning of blasphemy against Islam‖ 
(Sebagai sebuah proses, SKB penting diapresiasi. Namun, SKB tidak menyentuh 
masalah subtansial, yakni pelarangan atas penistaan dan penodaan Islam) (Al-Islam 
409).  
Nonetheles, it is clear that what is most important for HTI in its opposition to 
Ahmadiya was not Government action against Ahmadiya, but its ability to exert 
influence and gain sympathy from Muslim communities. This is reflected in a note by 
Yusanto published in Al-Wa‟ie in response to the unsatisfying decision of the 
Government on the matter:   
Turunnya SKB, walau belum memuaskan, merupakan kemenangan 
politik yang besar. Suatu hari sebelum turunnya SKB, seorang 
pengamat politik berbicara di depan seorang pejabat tinggi negara dan 
para tokoh, ―Wah, kalau SKB turun ini bahaya, bargaining politik 
Hizbut Tahrir akan naik. Karena otak di belakang gerakan tersebut 
adalah Hizbut Tahrir‖  
 
Although unsatisfiying, the issuance of the interministerial decree 
(Surat Keputusan Bersama/SKB) is a major political victory. One day 
before the SKB was issued a political observer talked to a high level 
officer and leader: ―if this SKB is issued it can be dangerous 
[because] it can raise the political bargaining of Hizbut Tahrir‖ (Al-
Wa‟ie 97: 7-9) 
 
Events such as public opposition to Ahmadiya also became valuable momentum for 
HTI to create sectarian polarization and it identifies itself in the same pole as 
mainstream Muslim communities.   
 A similiar attitude was undertaken in the anti-pronography campaign. In 
response to the debate in the House about the proposed bill on pornography, HTI 
organized rallies across the nation that called for ―clean Indonesia from pornography 
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and ‗pornoaksi‘ [porn expression] with the shari‘ah and the khilafah‖ (HTI, 27 
October, 2008). In some of the rallies, HTI criticized the democratic process in the 
house that used voting on the matter. This view is explicitly forbidden in Islam (HTI, 
22 October, 2008). It futher sought to explain that its position was neither to support 
nor to challenge the anti-pornographic law but to call for the elimination of 
pornogaphy and porn-related activities with the shari‘ah and the khilafah (HTI 29 
October, 2008,). However, it appeared that HTI could not restrain itself from taking 
part in pressuring the House to pass the law on pornography. In a rally in front of the 
House in Jakarta, this demand was delivered explicitly (HTI, 28 October, 2008). 
Furthermore, HTI went to meet members of the House of Representatives‘ Special 
Committee (Pansus) on the law to push for its revision on pornography in accordance 
with the shari‘ah (HTI, 30 October, 2008). It argued that the issue of pornography is 
evidence of the relevance of its campiagn for the shari‘ah, as stated by Yusanto in a 
media interview: 
Di sinilah pentingnya penerapan syariah di tengah masyarakat. Karena 
syariah akan memberikan pengaturan tentang berbagai hal, termasuk 
menyangkut masalah pornografi dan pornoaksi, dengan jelas dan 
konsisten untuk seluruh masyarakat...Semuanya tentu bisa 
diwujudkan, jika syariah diterapkan secara kaffah di bawah naungan 
Khilafah. Dengan cara itu, kerahmatan yang dijanjikan dari penerapan 
syariah itu bisa diwujudkan (HTI, 31 October, 2008).  
 
Here lies the importance of the application of the shari‘ah in societies. 
The shari‘ah will provide clear and consistent rules for all issues 
including pornography and porn actions that apply for all people. This 
can be realized if shari‘ah is implemented comprehensively within the 
institution of khilafah. In this way the good aspects of shari‘ah can be 
realized. 
 
Following the pattern of using popular issues to create sectarian divide, HTI 
also identified the saga on the anti-pornographic law as part of a continuing battle 
between Islam and secularism. In this regard, an issue of Al-Wa‟ie headlined on the 
subject with the cover titled ―RUU Pornografi: Pertarungan Islam versus 
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Sekularisme‖ (Draft of Pornographic Law: A Battle between Islam and Secularism) 
(Al-Wa‟ie 99).  
 Sometimes the effort to gain sympathy and expand mobilization forces HTI to 
abandon its opposition to the political system. This is, for example, obvious in an 
official statement released by HTI in response to the issue of pornography and 
Ahmadiya. The content of its press release only presented reasons to support the 
passing of the laws on pornography without suggesting the necessity of a 
comprehensive application of the shari‘ah and the khilafah as it typically demands 
(HTI, 19 May, 2006).  
Likewise, the statement on Ahmadiyah was a full of endorsement of MUI‘s 
argument for the banning of Ahmadiya without implying that the total application of 
shari‘ah is the only solution to eliminate heretic groups (HTI, 24 December, 2007). In 
this context, the interest in identifying itself with the Muslim political struggle has 
made HTI tolerant of minimal outcomes. After the passing of the law that was not 
satisfying to the Islamist demand, HTI was critical but responded rather positively by 
arguing ―it is better to have a rule rather than to be without any rule‖ (lebih baik tetap 
ada aturan daripada tidak ada sama sekali).
128
  
Nonetheless, this more moderate gesture is only part of HTI‘s policy. In general HTI‘s 
strategy in this period remained overtly radical because of the combination of political 
engagement or participation and campaigning for comprehensive change. Overall, the 
discourse and action of HTI in 2008 was radical or closer toward the extreme pole. 
From 2005-2007 HTI‘s discourse tended to be less radical with an average score of 
1.6 to 1.7. In 2008, the discourse became more radical with an average score of 2.5. 
                                               
128 This quoted reaction was cited in the official publication of PKS‘s South Jakarta branch, 
PKS South Jakarta (PKS Jakarta Selatan, 24 October 2008). Even though this statement could not be 
verified, the fact that HTI ceased the advocacy for pornogaphy after the passing of the law is parallel 
with this statement.  
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Similarly, the average score of HTI‘s discourse from 2005-2007 was between 2 and 
2.4 and then turned toward a slightly more extreme direction with the score of 2.5. 
This means that in the interests of seizing political opportunities that placed it in a 
favorable position to expand its influence, HTI was willing to momentarily leave its 
revolutionary objective to one side. This tactic was tolerated because HTI believes in 
other occasions it has made its anti-systemic argument clear in the eyes of the public.   
 
B.2.ii. MUI‘s Accommodation of Islamism 
Another post-Soeharto social change in favor of Islamization is the changing character 
of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI). The Council was founded in the early period 
of the Soeharto administration in 1975 as a consultation body of diverse Muslim 
organizations. Muslim organizations are therefore represented in the organizational 
structure of the Council in which representatives from the two largest organizations, 
Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, traditionally occupy leadership positions. The 
establishment of the council, however, cannot be separated from Soeharto‘s effort to 
exert control on Muslim communities. During the period of Soeharto administration, 
the Council was state-oriented. Even though it is formally a non-governmental 
organization, it received funding from the government and played a role in issuing 
fatwas to support Government development programmes. According to Nur Ichwan 
(Ichwan 2005), after the fall of Soeharto, the Council appeared to shift from state-
oriented to ummah-oriented. Even though it is still enjoying funding from the 
government, but has been given authority to manage Islamic charities and halal 
certification which increases its financial capability, it became increasingly more 
independent from state influence. MUI still assumes a bridging role between the 
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government and the Muslim community, but is moving closer to the societies rather 
than merely serving the interests of the Government (Ichwan 2005). 
 As a part of the effort to approach the ummah, the Council is becoming more 
involved in Muslim politics. In the 1999 election for example, the MUI released an 
advice (tausiyah) favoring Islamic leaders who were opposed to non-Muslim 
candidates (Ichwan 2005: 56-58). The MUI also became more intense in its advocacy 
of state-aided Islamization. This transformation is often seen as a part of the process 
of a move to the right by the Council. The most notable indication of this is the 
widening of MUI‘s membership to include activists from new groups including those 
with radical orientations including HTI (Ichwan 2005: 49). With representatives from 
Islamist groups in MUI‘s internal structure, MUI facilitated the formation of Muslim 
inter-group alliances, such as Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (the Islamic Brotherhood 
Forum) and Forum Umat Islam (the Islamic Ummah Forum), which play instrumental 
roles in fostering the state-aided Islamization of public affairs including the campaign 
for shari‘a-friendly regulation in localities.  
 The extent of MUI‘s accommodation of Islamist politics is however limited. 
MUI‘s commitment to the state ideology or Pancasila, democracy, and the interest of 
preserving national inter-religious harmony and national integration remain the 
differentiating line between the MUI and the Islamist groups. Nevertheless, this shift 
has created a sense of optimism among Islamists. The connection between MUI and 
Islamist groups is, stronger than before, which is demonstrated by the increasing 
appearance of MUI leaders in Islamist activities. 
  As a part of this development, HTI has been actively approaching the MUI to 
deliver its campaign to Muslim communities. As elaborated in the previous chapter, 
MUI is the most frequent ally sought by HTI in its activities (see figure 3.8 in page 
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107). An example of HTI‘s engagement with MUI is its participation in the Congress 
of the Indonesian Muslim Ummah (KUII) organized by the MUI, especially the fifth 
congress in May 2010. This congress aimed at facilitating the creation of a common 
strategy in the Muslim struggle in various sectors of life within the context of the State 
of Indonesia. The first and second congresses were held in 1947 and 1952. Under the 
Soeharto administration the congress was stopped. It resumed again in 1998, when the 
MUI was given responsibility for the organization. With the purpose of co-
coordinating a common agenda for Muslims, the congress accommodates all strands 
of Muslims by inviting representatives of diverse Muslim organizations. The MUI and 
mainstream Muslim organizations however play the central roles. Because of its 
consensus-seeking orientation, the Congress for the Indonesian Muslim Ummah 
(KUII) has never produced concrete outcomes except in 1947 when the congress 
initiated the founding of Masyumi, an Islam Islamist organization, which later became 
the only Islamic party competing in elections until 1955 (Jaringan Islam Liberal 
2005).  
 With the resurgence of the demand for the implementation of the shari‘ah after 
the fall of Soeharto, it increasingly became a central subject in the Congress arena. 
According to Bahtiar Effendy, who served as a member of the Congress steering 
committee in 2005, the surge of the call for shari‘ah implementation in the congress 
was due to the diverse nature of its participants, which include those with radical and 
conservative views. The vocal presence of these segments echoed the aspiration for a 
strategic formulation of shari‘ah implementation (Jaringan Islam Liberal 2005). Given 
the openness and extensive nature of participant recruitment, Islamist groups saw the 
Congress as a place for campaigning for the Muslim alliance to foster the 
implementation of the shari‘ah. This is reflected in a note from the secretary general 
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of the Muslim Ummah Forum (FUI), Muhammad Al-Khattath, who expected that the 
congress would pave a breakthrough for the development of a shared concept of 
shari‘ah in various aspects of life and commitment to campaigns for its adoption by 
the State (Suara Islam, 8 May, 2010) 
 It is no surprise therefore that HTI saw the Congress as a ―strategic forum‖ 
(HTI, 8 August 2010). For this reason, it proactively sought participation in the 
Congress. HTI expressed its disappointment to a statement of a plan from the 
organizer to exclude so called controversial organizations that included HTI, the 
Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and the Islamic Defenders‘ Front (FPI) in the 
last congress in 2010 (Suara Islam, 9 April 2010). This sparked anger from the MMI 
and the FPI who demanded an apology from the organizer.
129
 But in an effort to 
maintain the opportunity for participation, HTI chose to take a less confrontational 
reaction by lobbying the committee to accept its presence. Despite the involvement of 
the Government in the congress represented by scheduled speeches for the President 
and the Vice President, HTI expressed its interest to participate in the Congress. The 
organizer finally revoked the plan to exclude the three organizations. While this 
change did not persuade the FPI to accept the delayed invitation, HTI in contrast 
welcomed the invitation and expressed its commitment to participate and support for 
the Congress (HTI, 22 April, 2010).  
 In the fifth KUII in 2009, HTI was successful in getting five of their members 
into the Congress arena. Two of them, M.R. Kurnia and Harist Abu Ulya came as 
representatives of HTI, while the other three were HTI members who represented 
MUI‗s branches in the provinces of Riau, Bangka Belitung and Banten (HTI, 8 June 
2010). HTI prepared a concept draft on the relevant aspects of the shari‘ah to be 
                                               
129 MMI sent a protest statement to MUI called ―Tazkiroh Majelis Mujahidin to MUI‘ that 
demands MUI‘s apology for the ‗controversial‘ charge (Era Muslim, 25 April 2010) 
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proposed as a discussion topic at Congress sessions. Such a proposal however, was 
not always upheld. For example during the session on Muslim leadership, a delegate 
of HTI, M.R. Kurnia, proposed four criteria for a political leader. None of them 
explicitly required a commitment to adopt the khilafah. Instead, Kurnia promoted 
characters that resonated with the common aspiration of the audience such as 
possessing an Islamic personality, defending Islamic teaching from heresies and 
liberal ideas, a commitment to advocate the shari‘ah and an ability to unite the ummah 
(HTI, 9 May, 2010). The demands for the Islamic state or opposition to democracy is 
absent in this proposal. HTI accepted the neutral or less specified terms of the 
resolution and left aside its doctrine that requires calling for the ummah to challenge 
and disengage from the government and the existing political system.  
 On another occasion, a local leader of HTI from Riau, Muhammadun, 
mentioned the khilafah during the session. He suggested that ―a leader should be 
integrated into government leadership to be able to enforce shari‘ah.‖ Because a 
leader has to play a role at the national and international level, he said ―that type of 
leadership is called khalifah (caliph)‖ (HTI, 9 May, 2010). HTI‘s leader at the central 
board, however, chose a different tone. In a note in the aftermath of the congress, 
Ismail Yusanto admitted that propagating the khilafah was challenging because of 
resistance from the audience. HTI claimed that its proposal in other aspects, especially 
in economic issues that demanded the government disengage from its capitalistic 
system and the adoption of shari‘ah as an economic system was welcomed (HTI, 8 
August 2010). 
 The outcomes of the Congress were minimal compared to HTI‘s goal of 
steering public opposition to the established political system and the campaign for the 
khilafah. The Congress produced a document called the Jakarta Declaration 2010 that 
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consists of six recommendations that are in nature ―integrationist‖ with regard to the 
relationship with the government and political system. They include: 
1. A commitment to unite the thought and strategic action in facing the challenge 
of the ummah and the state as an integral part of the development and 
supremacy of the Muslims and the state of Indonesia. 
2. A commitment and responsibility to contribute in the progress of the state and 
nation of Indonesia. 
3. A commitment to strengthen leadership that follows the sunnah (model) of the 
prophet and the empowerment of shari‘ah economy for the prosperity of the 
ummah, state and nation. 
4. An endorsement of the view of the importance of ummah leadership to 
implement the doctrine of amr ma‟ruf nahy munkar (enjoining good and 
forbidding evil) as a part of the effort to implement shari‘ah in all aspects of 
life. 
5. Support for the formation of an implementing body for the above 
recommendation 
6. MUI is responsible to organize and elect a committee for the implementing 
body (Indonesian Ulama Council, 11 May 2010) 
 
Only resolution number four that upholds the importance of ―the shari‘ah law 
in all aspects of life‖ is close to HTI‘s proposal even though there remains a lack of 
practicality. The resolutions also include a call for the strengthening of ―shari‘ah 
economy,‖ but this does not include criticism of the current economic system and 
economic policies of the President who is considered liberal-minded by HTI. 
Opposition to capitalism - one of HTI‘s most frequent targets of attack - was not 
included in this point. Similarly, even though the recommendation on shari‘ah is 
paired with the phrase ‗in all aspects of life,‘ it does not indicate which concept of 
shari‘ah should be adopted and how it should be implemented. A central question on 
whether the existing political system should be replaced by a shari‘ah based political 
system, is not addressed in the resolutions.  
These unspecified and ―integrationist‖ recommendations were uncritically 
accepted by HTI. In Al-Islam published in the aftermath of the Congress, HTI praised 
the outcome:  
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Dalam KUII V itu para ulama dan tokoh ormas Islam menunjukkan 
tanggungjawabnya. Mereka merespon fakta politik kekinian tersebut 
sekaligus memberikan arah yang benar bagaimana umat Islam harus 
menentukan pilihan-pilihanya (Al-Islam 506). 
 
In the KUII V, ulama and Muslim leaders have demonstrated their 
responsibility. They responded to current political realities and 
provided directions for the ummah. 
   
HTI however manipulated the results by describing them as an evidence of the 
response of the ulama to the failure of the existing political process. It also added an 
explanation to resolution number four suggesting that this means a call for the ummah 
to select candidates as leaders who possess an Islamic personality (Al-Islam 506). This 
delegitimizing view of elections is not the official stance of the congress, which did 
not oppose democracy or elections. This point is not mentioned in the declaration 
published in the website of the MUI (Deklarasi Jakarta 2010). 
Several points can however be considered as achievements for HTI. First, it 
gained a place to address a wide audience to campaign for the khilafah and to expand 
its membership. The most apparent aspect of HTI‘s manipulation through its 
involvement in the congress was its use of a corner of the venue to display banners 
and circulate publications (HTI, 8 May, 2010).  Second, it allowed HTI to identify 
with mainstream Muslim groups and to exert influence. This in itself helps defend 
HTI from the negative labeling of ―radicalism.‖ Third, it allowed HTI to push for 
discussion on the application of the shari‘ah as an alternative to national problems. 
The point ‗shari‘ah implementation in all aspects of life‘ in the recommendation can 
be considered progress for HTI. Such a recommendation can be used to argue that its 
syari‘ah and khilafah campaign is in line or endorsed by major ulama represented at 
the Congress for Indonesian Muslim Ummah (KUII).  
This effort to gain recognition was however taken without an impasse. In order 
to gain acceptance and to appeal to a diverse audience HTI had to adopt a less 
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confrontational rhetoric and attitude toward the Government and the established 
political system. For this purpose HTI emphasized the call for the shari‘ah and 
occasionally for the khilafah but left aside its opposition to democracy and other key 
aspects of the political system including Pancasila and the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). In contrast to the doctrine of dharb al-alaqoh 
(attacking relationship) that requires a constant struggle to separate Muslim people 
from the Government, HTI made no effort to challenge the Government involvement 
in the congress that took the form of speeches from the President, Vice President and 
the presence of Government officials; although it was critical of the contents of the 
speeches (HTI, 7 May, 2010). Finally, HTI was uncritical of the resolutions of the 
Congress that were integrationist in nature as reflected in resolutions encouraging 
Muslim contribution and participation in Government programmes. 
  
C. The Democratic Impact: De-revolutionized, Not De-radicalized  
HT‘s theory of revolution is dissimilar to the conventional Western model of 
revolution that necessitates violence as a strategy to boycott or undermine the stability 
of a political regime. As an alternative to violent strategies, HT‘s theory of revolution 
emphasizes non-cooperation and non-participation as a strategy to undermine the 
legitimacy of the democratic political system and government. It seeks to mobilize a 
wide social opposition and disengagement from the established political system to 
persuade elites to support a revolutionary transition from democracy to khilafah. As 
part of non-participatory and non-cooperative strategies, HTI emphasizes the extra-
parliamentary struggle but does not reject the parliamentary process as a means to 
foster the delegitimation of the political system.  
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 In reality however HTI has been largely inconsistent in following its non-
participation and non-cooperation strategies.  
Operating in the democratic structure of Indonesia‘s Muslim majority 
environment has led HTI to tolerate participatory and co-operative politics. This 
suggests that HTI has been de-revolutionized by the democratic context of Indonesia. 
Two aspects of the ―political opportunity structure‖ provided by democracy are 
essential in HTI‘s deviation from its non-participation and non-cooperative doctrines. 
These include institutional openings favoring limited Islamization and the presence of 
allies within the system. HTI‘s opposition to democracy is clear but when political 
opportunities occur it is willing to take a part, direct or indirectly, in the democratic 
process in favor of the partial accommodation of Muslim interests. The above cases of 
political opportunities illustrate this transformation, which include the following 
points: 
1. HTI supported and was involved in advocating the adoption of the Jakarta 
Charter in constitutional reforms. 
2. HTI‘s shift from total opposition to executive elections prior to the election 
period to openness for supporting a pro-shari‘ah candidate in the 
presidential election. This changing attitude cannot be separated from the 
changing political situation as this connects with the idea to create an 
Islamic coalition for the presidential election of 2004. The precedence for 
this political opportunity was the candidacy of Amien Rais to whom HTI 
gave implicit endorsement.  
3. HTI was originally opposed to the local autonomy laws. But its view and 
attitude toward this particular instance of political change became more 
positive after it discovered that local autonomy offered an opportunity for 
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the introduction of shari‘ah-friendly regional bylaws and the changing 
attitude of some local governments toward a more friendly relationship 
with Muslim societies. HTI was co-operative with local government when 
it saw this as an opportunity for increasing its political influence.  
4. HTI‘s reaction to the Ahmadiyah case demonstrates its support of a 
gradualist approach to change. This is driven by its desire to use opposition 
to gain sympathy for its ideas and expand its membership. But by doing 
this HTI tended to abandon the revolutionary mandate of constantly 
challenging the central elements of the political system such as the 
existence of the Government and the House of Representative.  
5. The case of HTI‘s participation in the KUII V is evidence that it wishes to 
restrain from revolutionary rhetoric when addressing a diverse audience. In 
this case, HTI restrained from its usual attack on the political system and 
government. Instead it accepted the integrationist recommendations of the 
Congress with regard to the relationship between the ummah and the state.  
This cumulative evidence confirms the argument of the counter-revolutionary 
nature of democracy. The availability of democratic mechanism for change counters 
the aspiration for revolution that requires an extra-parliamentary process to overthrow 
the existing political system. The incorporation of a significant portion of Muslim 
political actors into the existing political system is the key to this. The fact that many 
Muslim leaders who could be HTI‘s most potential allies embrace the democratic 
struggle as illustrated in the above six points and has made HTI tolerant or less 
confrontational toward participatory and co-operative politics. The presence of allies 
within the system has become a unique democratic challenge for HTI because it is 
sometimes difficult to draw a clearly defined line between the forces of change and its 
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enemies. It is the interest in gaining support from potential allies within the system 
that encouraged HTI to take a less challenging role toward the established political 
system. As shown by Ryan, in his analysis of the impact of democracy on 
revolutionary movements, it is the challange of mobilizing a broad anti-regime 
coalition that leads to the surrender of revolutionary movements to the democratic 
system (Ryan 1994: 34). HTI‘s lack of confidence in mobilizing an anti-system or 
anti-regime coalition motivated it to choose an alternative path to the revolutionary 
struggle.  
 This does not mean that HTI is becoming moderate. The core of HTI‘s 
strategy remains radical because of its use of political engagement as a means to 
expand anti-system mobilization. Evidence shows that HTI‘s involvement in 
participatory and co-operative politics is driven by its goal of gaining political roles in 
the Muslim community. Unlike reformist Islamists, HTI did not seize democratic 
opportunities merely for short-term and concrete gain. Its change to a more 
participatory attitude is a part of strategic ambivalence especially constructed for the 
following purposes: 
1. To gain roles and recognition in the Muslim political struggle and to 
enhance social networks. As a new group with a radical agenda, HTI is 
doing this as an attempt to move itself from the periphery to the epicenter. 
2.  HTI‘s support of the partial advocacy of the shari‘ah is driven by an 
interest to create sectarian fragmentation and encourage sectarian division. 
The rising support for the shari‘ah would serve HTI‘s ―bandwagon‖ 
politics for it to create a perception that the shari‘ah has become a public 
demand. With the claim of strong support for shari‘ah, HTI aims to push 
Islamic parties toward an extreme right direction by upholding the shari‘ah 
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on political platforms. This situation supports HTI‘s goal of embarking on 
parliamentary politics to undermine the system from within.  
3. By supporting the partial adoption of the shari‘ah, HTI aims to present 
examples of the viability of the shari‘ah, though this should not be seen as 
its primary objective. When the partial adoption of shari‘ah failed to create 
a positive impact, HTI manipulates the situation to challenge the system. It 
is this strategy that leads HTI to tolerate minimal outcomes as illustrated 
by its positive reaction to the Government ruling on the Ahmadiya issue.  
In short, the democratic environment of Indonesia has become both a 
challenge and an opportunity for HTI.  
The constant occurrence of political opportunities for democratic struggle to 
foster Islamization and the inclusion of Muslim leaders within the system are the 
antithesis of HTI‘s aim to undermine the established political system.  However, 
HTI‘s willingness to depart from a stubborn revolutionary struggle has rewarded it 
with opportunities for political freedom that allows it to maneuver in order to mobilize 
support bases inside and outside the system. Given this political freedom, HTI 
exercises a strategy of ambivalence in which it is continuously propagating the 
khilafah in an effort to undermine public support for democracy; while at the same 
time it manipulates democratic struggles to gain sympathy, expand membership, and 
ultimately create an environment that empowers sectarian politics. Its reluctance to 
move further toward moderation is driven by what Tezcur, in his study on the 
radicalization of Workers' Party of Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey, calls ―dynamic of 
competition.‘  
Political competition under democracy that challenges the political hegemony 
of radical movements motivates them to radicalize in order to survive (Tezcur 2009: 
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2). Competing with the trend of moderation among the majority of Muslim social and 
political actors, HTI may see political radicalism as an identity for mobilization. As 
suggested by Tezcur, political opportunity marginalizes the revolutionaries‘s potential 
for support: ―the survival of the organization [PKK] necessitates radicalization rather 
than moderation‖ (Tezcur 2009: 2). The ‗dynamic of competition‘ in Indonesian 
politics that makes parties play down the shari‘ah has motivated HTI to uphold the 
shari‘ah as a political identity. To challenge this moderating tendency, it therefore 
promotes the argument that the electoral decline of Islamic parties is the result of their 
departure from the shari‘ah campaign rather than the reverse (Al-Islam 441).  
The success of this strategy however, depends on the performance of 
democratization and the changing attitude of Muslims toward the shari‘ah. The failure 
of party politics and the inability of the Government to deliver prosperity could create 
a political and social crisis that will give relevance to HTI‘s campaign. If an actual 
revolution is obsolete, the failure of democracy to deliver will give HTI an 
opportunity to foster political fragmentation based on sectarian lines thus dividing 
Islamic and nationalist factions, and planting seeds for the development of extreme 
right politics in Indonesia. The aspiration to become an anti-system party could be 
HTI‘s materialization in this situation. This goal could also be energized by the view 
that the Prosperous Justice party (PKS), as a prominent Islamist party has lost many of 
its core constituents since its move toward the centre. HTI may see this as a 
momentum to gain support from Islamist voters who are increasingly disillusioned by 
the moderate tendencies of the PKS. To sustain this orientation, HTI however relies 
on favorable situations at the social level which includes the rise of support for 
Islamization by the State and the relative acceptance of mainstream Muslims by HTI.  
Opposition to HTI‘s arguments about the obligation of the khilafah that necessitates 
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challenging the established political system has led HTI to retreat from its 
revolutionary direction. The opposition of mainstream Muslims to HTI‘s khilafah 
ideology could therefore be crucial in pushing HTI from radical to more moderate 
politics.  
 
D. Conclusion  
This case of HTI provides a nuanced understanding of the debate about the impact of 
democracy on revolutionary movements. This chapter confirms the thesis that 
democracy, regardless of its performance, is counter-revolutionary (see pages 17-19). 
However, this does not suggest that the counter-revolutionary impact of democracy 
means the destruction or demobilization of revolutionary movements. The growth of 
HTI in its operation under the different democratic circumstances of Indonesia 
illustrates this tendency. 
 This study also reveals a different finding to the theory suggesting that weak or 
minimal democracy encourages movement radicalization in term of the intensification 
of totalitarian rhetoric or anti-systemic opposition (Berman 2003; see pages 22-23 of 
this thesis). The contextualization of HTI in the democratic environment of Indonesia 
is closer to the argument proposed by Farhi (2003; see pages 20-21 of this thesis) who 
argued that democracy encourages the transformation of a revolutionary movement 
into a new model that adopts gradualist and non-confrontational tactics to advocate 
anti-systemic opposition. The persistence of HTI for political radicalism suggests that 
this is especially the case in a situation where democracy is weak.  
The impact could be more severe to HTI if democratization in Indonesia is 
more deliberate-  this is the key to its legitimacy. The strong support for democracy 
means that the majority of Muslims are supportive of the existing political system. 
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This situation will make HTI‘s anti-systemic campaign irrelevant and will therefore 
potentially foster its future toward either demobilization or moderation. Stubbornness 
toward anti-system politics in a situation of high support for the political system could 
result in either demobilization or destruction of HTI. Alternatively, HTI could 
transform into a more moderate stance by abandoning its aspiration to overthrow 
democracy and fully participate in democratic politics in order to at least survive in a 
situation of flourishing democracy. This could take the form of establishing a new 
party or joining an existing party that is fully committed to democracy or deepen its 
integration with other social movements that work as a pressure group for reforms in 
favor of Islamization.   
 
 
 
 220 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the end of each chapter I have added a section entitled conclusion. I will not repeat 
these conclusions but draw from the thesis as a whole a number of findings. I will then 
discuss the implications of these finding and bring the thesis to end.  
 
A. Summary of Findings 
In this thesis I have argued that HTI is seeking an alternative path to revolution and 
reform. HTI advocates a strategy of „political radicalism‟ that combines opposition to 
the democratic system with selective involvement in the democratic process.  
This orientation presents a different view to existing studies of HT that focus 
on its extreme directions, including its role in providing an ideological foundation for 
violent extremism and the suggestion that its revolutionary ideology will necessarily 
promote a revolutionary path. 
This strategy departs from the revolutionary doctrine of al-Nabhani that 
requires the movement to consistently undermine the legitimacy of any un-Islamic 
system by advocating political detachment or non-participation (dharb al-„alaqoh). 
Al-Nabhani‘s theory for change focuses on inciting public anger toward the 
(democratic) existing system (kasyf al-khuttath) and mobilizing support (nusroh) from 
powerful elites (ahl al-quwwah) to initiate a political change toward the establishment 
of the khilafah through an extraordinary political process (pages 55-60).  In contrast to 
this, HTI seeks entry into the democratic system by engaging with democratic 
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institutions (such as the Government, the House of Representatives, and political 
parties) (pages 121-137).  
Instead of fostering scepticism about democracy, HTI often lends legitimacy to 
these institutions by seeking their support for shari‘ah-based policies. Rather than 
advocating political detachment from the democratic system, HTI tolerates 
‗democratic concessions‘ by taking part in Muslim programs in support of the shari‘ah 
within the democratic framework (pages 137-145).  
However, this does not mean that HTI is becoming moderate. It rejects full 
support of reformist politics that focuses solely on pressuring the existing political 
establishment to gradually adopt the shari‘ah without addressing the inherent failure 
of the present political system.  
HTI supports democratic struggles for the institution of the shari‘ah as an 
intermediate goal or as an instrument to stir rebellion against the established political 
system both in the nation and within elements of the bureucracy. This is reflected in 
HTI‘s continued calls for the khilafah to be instituted, its continued opposition to 
democracy, and its criticism of gradualism (pages 100-103).  
HTI‘s non-confrontational approach to democratic institutions has awarded it 
with political freedom without which it cannot expand its mobilization. Its 
involvement in Muslim policies in favor of the shari‘ah helps it in gaining influence in 
society and thereby establishes a variety of support bases for future political 
mobilization.   
This pathway resembles the model of political change called by Timothy 
Garton Ash, „refolution‟ (Ash 1990). Learning from the political transitions from 
communism to democracy in Poland and Hungary, the refolutionary model of change 
takes place through a process of incremental change that leads to a fundamental 
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change of the political and the economic systems. Unlike revolution, this model of 
change takes place without overthrowing the old regime. Instead, the opposition 
persuade the ruling regime to share power in a new Government to bring about the 
fundamental changes that are required. The focus of the struggle is to challenge the 
legitimacy of the political system more than attacking the political structures.  
HTI envisions two routes to change.  
The first and more desired path is the extra-parliamentary change by which 
HTI will offer its political resources to elites in the military or to powerful and 
influential leaders to initiate a coup or other forms of political change that pave the 
way toward transition from democracy to an Islamic government (pages 64-66). 
However, as HTI‘s effort to find a powerful patron (nusroh), especially the military, 
has not been successful, the second path of democratic struggle is more feasible.  
Evidence indicates that HTI envisions the creation of a genuine Islamic party, 
which is similar to Europan anti-system or extreme right parties, to use parliament as 
a vocal point to promote shari‟ah and Islamic legal and political system as an 
alternative. This path is not explicitey declared by HTI; but it is indicated by several 
characteristics of HTI, including: (a) a combination of an anti-systemic campaign that 
tolerates participatory politics, (b) the justification of participation in legislative 
elections over participation in executive elections, (c) the call for political leaders or 
candidates of Islamic parties to uphold  the shari‟ah in political campaigns, (d) the 
demand for the removal of a clause in election regulations that prohibits opposition to 
the state ideology in political campaigns, and (e) the support of  a „winner takes all‟ 
system in elections to allow the winning party to introduce a new constitution (see 
pages 78-81).  
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Establishing a new party is however not an easy task, although this may be the 
ideal. The key to the transformation into a participating party is largely an issue of 
gaining sufficient structure at the local level rather than maintaining an ideological 
and public debate about the legitimacy of participating in the democratic process. The 
current discussion in parliament to raise the parliamentary threshold from two to five 
percent if realized could make this task harder for HTI.  
While working on mobilization to increase the chance of gaining sufficient 
support to start a new party, the alternative option for HTI is to push  Islamic parties 
to build an “extreme right” coalition in parliament.  
This strategy has been demonstrated by HTI in its call for Islamic parties to 
unite and become what it calls an ‗ideological party‘ by strengthening Islamic identity, 
upholding the shari‘ah in campaigns and prioritizing the education of Muslim 
constituents in favour of the establishment of the shari‘ah over electoral pragmatism 
(see page 80). For this purpose HTI encourages Islamic parties to create an Islamic 
bloc or ‗poros Islam‘ in parliament and presidential elections (pages 140-141). We 
may therefore anticipate that HTI will lend its political resources to a party or a 
coalition of parties that are willing to shift toward right-leaning politics.  
So far however, HTI has not been able to offer significant resources to 
persuade existing parties to do so. So we can expect HTI‘s efforts in the interim  to 
increase the chance of bringing about the birth of an anti-system party by continously 
creating an ‗educated market‘, in which Muslims are distrustful of the democratic 
system and receptive to the installation of a shari‘ah-based Government as an 
alternative. Parallel to this we may see HTI continously tapping into sensitive issues 
regarding Muslim political interests to create a polarization that unites Islamic forces 
to oppose so called secular or liberal forces. In the short term, the success of HTI can 
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be measured by its ability to mobilize new anti-democratic enclaves in Muslim 
communities and in the state apparatuses that strengthens ideologisized Islamic bonds 
over the traditional bonds of mainstream organizations.  
This evolution of HTI cannot be separated from the democratic environment of 
Indonesia. The aspects of Indonesia‟s democracy that effect HTI most are political 
freedom and opportunity (chapter 6).  
Political freedom allows HTI to expand its influence without the threat of state 
repression. Meanwhile the fact that the majority of Indonesia‘s population is Muslim 
provides HTI with opportunities for political accommodation through the democratic 
process. The presence of a political opportunity for pro-shari‘ah mobilization has 
reduced the interest to maintain the idealist path of revolution. The revolutionary 
doctrine of ‗no other way out‘ other than the immediate establishment of the khilafah 
challenges the political channels used by other Muslim political activists. The fact that 
many Muslim leaders who could be HTI‘s most potential allies also embrace the 
democratic struggle has made HTI tolerant or less confrontational to their involvement 
in the democratic process. The presence of allies within the system has become a 
unique democratic challenge for HTI to draw a clearly defined line between the force 
of change and its enemies. It is in HT‘s  interest to interact  with and infiltrate into the 
parties of its potential allies within the system that will cost HTI‘s consistency in 
challenging the elements of the established political system.  
This study shows that democratization has de-revolutionized HTI as an 
organisation, but it is yet to de-radicalize HTI as a movement.  
The defects of democracy in Indonesia, as reflected in the increasing public 
disillusionment with democratic institutions such as the House of Representatives and 
the modus operandi of the political parties, encourages HTI to continue to  campaign 
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for a systemic change. Further change of HTI toward a moderate or deeper 
integration into the democratic system therefore depends on the process of 
democratization.  
If people‘s confidence in the democratic process is strengthened as the result 
of the Government‘s democratic ability to deliver prosperity and political 
representation, HTI‘s opposition to democracy will become irrelevant. In the situation 
of high support for democracy, HTI‘s chance of survival depends on its willingness to 
integrate itself into the democratic system by eschewing its anti-democratic rhetoric. 
Otherwise, if HTI responds to the increased legitimacy of democracy with persistent 
radicalism in the form of continuing its opposition to democracy, HTI faces 
destruction as an organization. The survival of HTI is unimaginable without adapting 
to the new situation. 
 
B. Implications of Findings  
Post-Soeharto Indonesia is what some scholars call the era of ‗post-Islamism‘ (Roy 
2004, Bayat 2007). In spite of the rise of religious piety among Muslims, political 
Islam is unable to raise great interest in shari‘ah-based politics. Islamist parties have 
become increasingly integrated into the democratic system that they set out to destroy. 
In Indonesia, even though many Islamic parties avoid the sectarian rhetoric of the 
shari‘ah in order to appeal to a wider audience, they cannot break through the 
dominant influence of ‗secular‘ parties.  
HTI attempts to change this situation. Despite the fact that Islamist parties that 
continue upholding the shari‟ah in their platform are at the bottom among Islamic 
parties in terms of influence, HTI sees their decline as connected with their 
renunciation of the shari‟ah as a political ideology. HTI aims to bring the ideology 
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back into the political arena. It uses the democratic context to mobilize social support 
for the shari‟ah and thereby to persuade political leaders to return to the shari‟ah as 
a political platform. HTI encourages Islamic parties to focus on educating the people 
about the supremacy of the shari‟ah and to set up a continuing shari‟ah faction in 
parliament.  
It is unimaginable that HTI will be successful in achieving its goal of 
overthrowing democracy and of establishing the Islamic state of the khilafah. This is 
because such a process will require a wide-cross section of coalition support against 
democracy.   
Post-Soeharto Indonesia is not like ‗authoritarian democracies‘ such as Egypt 
and Tunisia that motivated the uprisings leading to ‗revolutions‘ in 2011. A president 
in Indonesia can only be re-elected for two terms. As an open democratic country, 
Indonesia provides institutions that may accommodate the Muslim demand for the 
shari‘ah within its democratic framework. HTI‟s objective of undermining the 
legitimacy of democracy is not only tamed by the presence of Muslim actors within the 
democratic system, but also by its own tendency to enter and to participate  in the 
system.  
However, HTI‘s political radicalism that advocates the creation of the basis for 
the sectarian ideology of the shari‘ah in the political process is a critical challenge to 
the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia and its mobilization could bring about 
changes on a number of levels. 
First, HTI could create pro-shari‟ah cleavages in society. In spite of its radical 
ideology, HTI has been successful in portraying itself as part of mainstream Islam. Its 
focus in targeting Muslim leaders rather than the people has attracted young or non-
established clerics (see pages 106-112). Many of them are part of mainstream Muslim 
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organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. This mobilization is made 
possible by the minimal opposition of the mainstream leaders to HTI. This helps HTI 
in building associations of Muslim leaders united by the shared-goal of establishing a 
political structure based on the shari‘ah.  
The latest gathering of HTI in Jakarta in 2009 that brought thousands of 
Muslim leaders from across the nations demonstrates its mobilization and financial 
capability. If this progress continues unimpeded, we may see the strengthening of a 
pro-shari‘ah identity that unites politically the mainstream Muslim organizations. 
HTI‘s success on recruiting young clerics may create a gap of ideology between the 
central and local leadership of the mainstream Muslim organizations. The leadership 
of these organisations may continue their commitment to the state ideology of 
Pancasila and democracy, while the leadership at the lower level is increasingly 
supportive of shari‘ah ideology. HTI‘s clear presentation of its ideology (as shown in 
its conceptualization of the shari‘ah into detailed policy briefs) can attract members 
from the mainstreams who are disillusioned by the decreasing roles of Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhamamdiyah at the social and political levels of Indonesian society.  
 Second, at the government level, HTI has achieved some successes in 
penetrating the bureaucracy. This is apparent in HTI‘s ability to organize programmes 
in partnership with government officers or agencies. The success of HTI in gaining 
authorization from offices of education Ministries to organize training for school 
teachers of Islamic history in Bogor, West Java, and running religious session for 
students in various public schools in Pasuruan, East Java, demonstrates the grounds 
gained by HTI in the bureaucracy. Often, there is support from local political leaders 
to enables HTI to expand the audience for its propagation of the shari‘ah as a political 
ideology (pages 127-129).  
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 Third, the advances that HTI gained at the social and bureaucracy level are 
essential for its aim to change the political landscape. If it is to be successful in 
mobilizing support for the shari‘ah, HTI has to convince political leaders to support 
shari‘ah-based policies. In this way, it can play its role in advocating political 
polarization based on the sectarian debate of pro and anti-shari‘ah. The rise of Adolf 
Hitler and Chavez that marked the fall of democracies in Germany and Venezuela 
showed that polarized politics, especially when it is based on pro and anti-system 
division, was crucial to the changing of the political landscape that led to abolition of 
the democratic system in these countries. HTI is still far from achieving this kind of 
outcome. One may find HTI‟s dream of bringing about a khilafah based Government 
unlikely, but its effort to create political division based on sectarian issues is not.  
 Political and religious pluralism is essential to the stability of the democratic 
system in Indonesia. History shows that political sectarianism bred by the demand for 
an Islamic State has created conflict and disintegration. HTI‘s campaign for the 
shari‘ah as a political ideology is therefore antithetical to the consolidation of 
democracy in Indonesia 
 HTI‘s participation in the democratic process has not yet led the movement 
toward a genuine integration into this process. A key to what will happen here is the 
continued low confidence of the Indonesian people in the performance of democratic 
institutions. In other word, the failure of democracy to deliver will give a chance for 
pro-shari‟ah and anti-democratic forces to gain political power.  
In an open democracy like Indonesia such an opportunity is especially 
significant because the repressive measures used by Soeharto to marginalize Islamist 
movements are now absent. The development of democracy that increases its 
legitimacy is therefore essential in deterring the sectarian mobilization of HTI. This 
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study shows that the inclusion of Muslim actors in the democratic process forced HTI 
to engage with the democratic system.  
There is evidence that tolerance of mainstream Muslims toward HTI has 
helped the organization continue on its path of political radicalism. The opposition of 
the mainstream to HTI‘s khilafah campaign is likely to inhibit HTI‘s political 
development. Political representation that empowers the moderate Islamic 
mainstream is therefore essential in deterring the impact of HTI‟s political radicalism.   
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―Melawan Propaganda Anti Syariah‖ (Al Wa‟ie 71: 4-5) 
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―Deklarasi Umat Islam‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 72: 7-8). 
―Menjadi pemimpin Ideologis‖ (Al-Wa‘ie 73: 19-23).  
―Menuju Indonesia Bersyariah‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 73: 7-8).   
 ―Membumikan Al-Qur‘an Perlu Political Will Penguasa‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 74: 7-8) 
―Lenyapnya Penghalang Nushroh‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 75: 19-23). 
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”Silaturahmi HTI Kota Yogya dengan TNI Kodim 0734/Yogyakarta: bangun Sinergi 
untuk Memperbaiki Negeri‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 77: 37) 
―Sosialisasi FUI di Sulteng‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 77: 37) 
―Meretas Jalan Menuju Perubahan Hakiki [Telaah atas Buku Manhaj Hizb at-Tahrir fi 
at-Taghyir] (Al-Wa‟ie 78: 63-66) 
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―Silaturahmi HTI dengan DPW PKS Jateng‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 79: 38) 
―HTI Jateng Kunjungi PDIP Jateng‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 80: 40) 
“Kediri Bermartabat dengan Syariah” (Al-Wa‟ie 80: 39) 
―Wagub Sumsel: Khilafah Menjadikan Hidup Sejahtera‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 81: 38) 
―Amien rais dan HTI‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 81: 42) 
―Workshop KKR DPD II HTI-Ngawi‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 81: 38) 
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“ HTI Jateng Prakarsai Forum Peduli Syariah” (Al-Wa‟ie 87: 37-38) 
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―Dari Massa Mengambang ke Massa Ideologis‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 97: 7-9) 
―Fenomena Golput‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 97: 9-13) 
―RUU Pornografi: Pertarungan Islam dan Sekulerisme‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 99: cover title) 
―Demokrasi Sesuai dengan Islam?‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 104: 31-33) 
―Workshop Ulama dan Asatiz HTI‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 104: 73) 
―Demokrasi Sistem Kufur‖ (Al-Wa‟ie 104: cover page) 
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HTI 
(All sources listed below were retrieved in the period of October 2010-April 2011). 
 
―Memilih Kepala Negara‖ (HTI, 31 May 2004). This source is no longer accessible on 
HTI‘s official website, but is available in this following that republishes HTI‘s 
propagandas: http://www.hayatulislam.net/2007/memilih-kepala-negara.html 
―Pernyataan Hizbut tahrir Indonesia tentang Penolakan Terhadap RUU PM‖ (HTI, 28 
March, 2007). This source was no longer accessible on HTI‘s official website, but is a 
available on this website that contains HTI‘s propagandas: 
http://www.khilafah1924.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=363&It
emid=2  
―Konspirasi Kolonialis Eropa Menghancurkan Khilafah‖ (HTI, 13 July 2007), 
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2007/07/13/konspirasi-kolonialis-eropa-menghancurkan-
khilafah/  
―HTI Jawa Timur Klarifikasi Berita AULA‖ (HTI, 11 November, 2007), http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2007/11/11/hti-jawa-timur-klarifikasi-berita-aula/  
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―Pernyataan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Tentang Kasus Ahmadiyah‖ (24 December, 
2007), http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2007/12/26/pernyataan-hizbut-tahrir-indonesia-
tentang-kasus-ahmadiyah/ 
 “Deklarasi Darunnajah” (HTI, 2 August 2008) http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2008/08/02/deklarasi-darunnajah/  
―‘Demokrasi Rancu, Voting untuk Sebuah Definisi Pornografi‖ (HTI, 22 October, 
2008), http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2008/10/22/komentar-politik-demokrasi-rancu-voting-
untuk-sebuah-definisi-pornografi/ 
 ―Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia di Berbagai Kota Serentak Menggelar Aksi Bersihkan 
Indonesia dari Pornografi-Pornoaksi dengan Syariah‖ (HTI, 27 October 2008), 
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2008/10/27/hizbut-tahrir-indonesia-di-berbagai-kota-serentak-
menggelar-aksi-bersihkan-indonesia-dari-ponografi-pornoaksi-dengan-syariah/). 
―Liputan Media HTI di Daerah Demo Terkait RUU Pornografi‖ (HTI, 28 October, 
2008), http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2008/10/28/liputan-media-hti-di-daerah-demo-terkait-
ruu-pornografi/  
―HTI Tegaskan Berantas Pornografi‖ (HTI 29 October, 2008), http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2008/10/29/hti-tegaskan-berantas-pornografi/ 
―RUU Pornografi Disahkan Menjadi RUU‖ (HTI, 31 October, 2008), http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2008/10/31/ruu-pornogarafi-disahkan-menjadi-uu/ 
―Kunjungan Silaturrahmi HTI Pasuruan ke Diknas Kabupaten dan Kota Pasuruan HTI‖ (HTI, 
11 March 2009), http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2009/03/11/kunjungan-silaturrahmi-hti-
pasrusun-ke-diknas-kabupaten-dan-kota-pasuruan/     
 ―Demokrasi, Alat Perjuangan Syariah?‖ (HTI, 26 March 2009),  http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2009/03/26/demokrasi-alat-perjuangan-syariah/  
 ―Nasyroh: Hukum Pemilu Legislatif dan Presiden,‖ (HTI, 26 March 2009), 
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2009/03/19/nasyroh-hukum-pemilu-legislatif-dan-presiden/  
 ―Maqalah Ulama-Ulama Sunni Tentang Wajibnya Nashbul Khalifah‖ (HTI, 20 June 
2009), http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2009/06/20/maqalah-ulama-ulama-sunni-tentang-
wajibnya-nashbul-khalifah/  
―Tyasno Sudarto: Manifesto HTI Layak untuk Indonesia‖ (HTI, 3 June, 2009), 
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2009/06/03/tyasno-sudarto-manifesto-hti-layak-untuk-
indonesia/  
 ―Siapakah Amil Zakat?‖ (HTI, 24 September, 2009),  http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2009/09/24/siapakah-amil-zakat/  
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―Bolehkah Menjadi Pengacara‖ (HTI, 1 January 2010), http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2010/01/01/bolehkah-menjadi-pengacara/  
 ―Bantahan HTI Terhadap Permohonan Pengujian Materiil UU Tentang 
Penyalahgunaan Dan/Atau Penodaan Agama‖ (02 February 2010), http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2010/02/02/bantahan-hti-terhadap-permohonan-pengujian-materiil-uu-
tentang-penyalahgunaan-danatau-penodaan-agama/  
 ―Jubir HTI : Wacana Penting Untuk Perubahan dan Tegaknya Khilafah !‖ (HTI, 4 
April, 2010), http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2009/04/04/wacana-penting-untuk-perubahan-
dan-tegaknya-khilafah/     
 ―Hizbut Tahrir Diundang dan Siap Sukseskan Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia ke V‖ 
(HTI, 22 April 2010), http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2010/04/22/hizbut-tahrir-diundang-dan-
siap-sukseskan-kongres-umat-islam-ke-v/ 
―HTI Kritik Pidato SBY dalam Sambutan KUII V‖ (HTI, 7 May, 2010), http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2010/05/07/hti-kritik-pidato-sby-dalam-sambutan-kuii-v/ 
―Foto Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia V‖ (HTI, 8 May, 2010), http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2010/05/09/foto-kongres-umat-islam-indonesia-v/   
 ―MUI Riau: Semestinya Kepemimpinan Umat Menyatu dengan Kepemimpinan 
Negara untuk Terapkan Syariah‖ (HTI, 9 May, 2010), http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2010/05/09/mui-riau-semestinya-kepemimpinan-umat-menyatu-dengan-
kepemimpinan-negara-untuk-terapkan-syariah/  
―Tolak Pemimpin Amoral!‖ (HTI, 9 may 2010) http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2010/05/09/hti-tolak-pemimpin-amoral/  
―Catatan Jubir: Impuls Kecil Respon Besar‖ (HTI, 8 August 2010), http://hizbut-
tahrir.or.id/2010/06/08/catatan-jubir-impuls-kecil-respon-besar/  
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